US biodefense strategy solves
Berger et. al. 18 - Associate Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Ph.D. in in genetics and molecular biology at Emory University AND** Senior Research fellow at National Defense University, and PhD in biology from the University of Delaware AND** interdisciplinary biologist with a BA summa cum laude in chemistry from Harvard and a PhD in biochemistry from Stanford AND** former Program Director for Health Strategies at Parsons Federal Business Unit, and PhD in Biochemistry and two master’s degree, one in Pharmacology and the other in Toxicology (Kavita M. Berger, Diane DiEuliis, Corey Meyer, and Venkat Rao, “Roadmap for Biosecurity and Biodefense Policy in the United States,” Gryphon Scientific, 2018, Accessed Online at http://gryphonsci.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Full-Report_Roadmap-of-US-Biosecurity-and-Biodefense-Policy_2018.pdf, Accessed Online on 6-22-22)
The multi-use nature of emerging biotechnology presents several unique challenges to biosecurity policy and governance. Biosecurity and biodefense—broadly conceptualized—will be affected by emerging biotechnologies in a variety of ways which only now are beginning to be understood. In 2016, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the U.S. government to create a new “National Biodefense Strategy”, along with an implementation plan that encompasses the well over 100 existing biodefense and biosecurity policies and programs. The NDAA also requires an assessment of all existing governance to date, the analysis for which has not been made public. Although some have done work to evaluate the landscape of policies, no one yet has done a comprehensive relational analysis of their implementation. However, without a system-wide evaluation of all policy, the immediate and longer-term consequences to U.S. objectives for countering biological threats may never be understood. To better understand biosecurity and biodefense policy implementation and broader consequences, the authors have undertaken a comprehensive, relational analysis of all biodefense and biosecurity policies since 1913. The creation of such a relational “landscape” of policy enabled the authors to: 1) make fundamental observations about the biodefense policy landscape as it currently exists; 2) provide direction for the analysis of opportunity costs associated with the implementation of policies; 3) support the evaluation of policies; and 4) delineate clear needs for incorporation in the roadmap. Included in the analysis were U.S. Code, international agreements and partnerships, guidance, guidelines, and agency and executive-level strategies as primary components. U.S. Code, which encompasses enacted legislation and regulations, was used to prevent double-counting of policies. Once assembled, each policy was tagged by policy type, subject area, primary biodefense objective for which the policy was created, and the biodefense objectives that the policies indirectly affect after implementation. Figure 8 illustrates our approach used to analyze U.S. biodefense and biosecurity policies. Gephi was used to create the network maps and Tableau was used to create the dot graphs.(50, 51) All policies included in this analysis are publicly available through the U.S. Code, Code of Federal Regulations, Government Printing Office, White House archives, PHE.gov, and individual agency websites. To map policies to biodefense objectives, the authors evaluated the utility of using either the four pillars of biodefense in the 2004 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10/Biodefense for the 21st Century or the seven objectives in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. However, neither of these objectives included the full range of biodefense objectives. Therefore, the objectives used in this analysis are listed below and cover the full spectrum of biodefense activities: • Situational Awareness, which includes threat assessment, risk assessment, and intelligence • Prevention, which includes export control, physical security, personnel security, cyber security, nonproliferation, and threat reduction • Preparedness, which includes preparedness planning, community engagement, research and development of medical countermeasures, and detection and biosurveillance activities • Response • Recovery Science and technology capabilities supporting biodefense objectives are: • Natural, engineering, and social science research • Medical countermeasure research and development • Biosurveillance and detection • Forensics The science and technology capabilities often fall under more than one biodefense objective and therefore, are included as separate objectives in our policy analysis. In addition, biosafety is listed separately in the policy analysis primarily because both of its definitions – measures to prevent laboratory exposure or release of pathogens and to prevent environmental release of genetically modified organisms for the protection of biodiversity – may help to address biosecurity risks. Laboratory biosafety measures provide overlapping benefits for laboratory biosecurity. Furthermore, U.S. policies on safety of biotechnology products and recombinant and synthetic nucleic acids are part of the overall governance landscape of biology and biotechnology, including research about which security concerns are raised. For example, synthesis of the extinct horsepox virus using commercially-synthesized DNA has elicited significant concern among security experts about its dual use potential. This research would not be covered under any U.S. biosecurity policy if conducted in the U.S. because horsepox is an animal only pathogen that went extinct on its own. However, this research would be covered under U.S. biosafety and worker protection policies if conducted in the United States. Because of its complexity and the concern it has generated among some national security experts, the authors have developed a policy case study on this research.