US biotech investment alone solves
Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1735810, Accessed Online on 6-21-22)
Leading in biotechnology is crucial for many U.S. economic and strategic goals; however, the U.S. must balance these with necessary regulation and oversight. Geopolitical events, such as global pandemics or great power competition, can also influence this balancing act. How can leaders strike the right balance to attain maximal benefit and prosperity for the United States? It was also clear that professionals in the biological sciences should play a role in determining this balance, potentially through organizations such as the National Academies that bridge the scientific and policy communities. 12 Responsible leadership is a central factor in establishing the necessary oversight starting at labs and extending to the intergovernmental sphere. Biotechnology and biosecurity regimes call for principled leadership that is responsive to scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders across institutions. Engaged leaders devise whole of enterprise solutions, an issue noticeably lacking with COVID-19 and a theme which will certainly appear in the future. Accordingly, oversight from knowledgeable leaders is a vital force in crafting policy that will spur innovation to build trust across sectors. Leaders and bureaucrats setting the regulatory tone should be mindful of striking the right balance: scientists who labor under burdensome regulatory regimes may be stymied in their pursuit of technological advancement. Leaders should avoid counterproductive measures such as layers of oversight, redundant paperwork, or a distrustful culture that hinder scientists’ spirit of risk taking or engagement beyond a stovepiped world. One troubling reality exists: much of global oversight falls between seams of multinational organizations, and cooperation from scientists and policymakers is essential to remedy a dilemma brought further into relief by COVID-19. There is no ambiguity on the necessary role of scientific expertise in biosecurity and biotechnology: to leverage cooperation to play an outsized role in working beyond the sphere of geopolitical competition. Panelists were unanimous in scientists’ power to work effectively across borders, to make friends via science. Forging relationships based on like-minded scientific expertise creates the possibility for the scientific community to harmonize interests that may sit uneasily between sparring nations’ heads of state. A basis for a Track 2 or 1.5 dialogue between different governments may run through the long-standing friendships that were cultivated by scientists before the return of great power competition. Scientist-to-scientist bonds offer policymakers with a foundation to utilize not only for diplomatic ends, but also in the possibility of a future global pandemic that necessitates collaboration. Scientific relationships will be the cornerstone for future cooperation, even when the fires of geopolitical competition flare up. Biotechnological competition with China represents a rupture from the past and threatens American primacy in this domain. Chinese policymakers identified biotechnology as a key space for China to dominate. China’s prioritization of biotechnology meets multiple ends for a state poised to shape geopolitics: Chinese biosecurity, the nation’s economy, and the health of the Chinese people. China’s strategic whole of nation investment in biotechnology aims to unseat the United States from its place of historic control over the material and intellectual production of biotechnology. In a break from historic competitors, a rival nation-state is pouring resources into technology development at levels that are comparable with the United States’ publicprivate funding streams. With the arrival of a near peer competitor in biotechnology, how should U.S. policymakers strike the right policy balance? On the one hand, stakeholders in government, philanthropy, and the private sector cannot underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. The implications for the United States extend beyond facing a competitor. China’s military-civil fusion, alongside torrents of state funding, aspires to fuse agents across China into the mission of overtaking America’s global position. The stakes are clear, and the consequences of losing preeminence for American biosecurity and economy should not be underestimated. 13 On the other hand, engagement with Chinese scientists and policymakers should not be dismissed out of hand. The experts agreed that China should be encouraged to take up a partnership role in the global biosecurity and biotechnology architecture. Evidence of Chinese willingness to participate exist at the institutional and personal level, and the voices on both sides of the Pacific urging cooperation should not be squelched. An American whole of enterprise solution to compete with China can exist in parallel with outreach efforts to prevent future pandemics. Striking the right balance between engaging and competing with China will not be easily executed, yet it is a policy solution that leaders in Beijing and Washington must embrace. A whole of sector push to facilitate developing nations’ biotechnology and biosecurity development can garner influence for the United States. Developed countries no longer hold a monopoly over biotechnologies. Developing countries are increasing investments in biotechnology, and this represents an opportunity for the United States to assert global leadership. Leveraging the United States’ scientific expertise to compete against China, shape norms, and usher in a global regulatory regime is not only a positive series of outcomes. It gestures to a policy agenda for the America’s role in the world’s biotechnology and biosecurity frontier. Nation-state competition is not the only challenge facing the United States. A pattern of panic and neglect historically led policymakers and the public to abandon investments in biosecurity of the order required to overcome COVID-19 and future pandemics. Institutions that preserve focus on biosecurity and biotechnology must be built that strike the right balance between encouraging oversight, elevating scientific expertise, competing with China, and cooperating internationally. The United States’ security, health, and economy are tethered to a biotechnological future that demands attention, not neglect.