Multipolarity coming now despite Covid – intraregional trade, investments, and globalization prove.
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Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies," World Financial Review, https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA
IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [figure omitted] Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [figure omitted] The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [figure omitted] The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [Figure Omitted] As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. [figure Omitted] China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.