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Only the US can generate sufficient pressure through linkage with security assistance

Corke 19 Susan Corke, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund and Director of Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, “Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding our Shared Democratic Values,” Prepared Statement for the Record, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, U.S. House of Representatives, 11-13-2019, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110218/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-CorkeS-20191113.pdf /GoGreen!

Moving forward, democracy must be shown to work. Our Democracy Playbook14 (attached for reference) highlights strategies and tactics for pro-democracy actors to not only push back against illiberal and authoritarian-leaning actors, but also to renew the promise and resiliency of democratic institutions. While there will be no single, perfect strategy to best counter these illiberal challenges and rebuild trust in our alliance, we are dedicated to doing our part to equip democratic actors to defend and rebuild our democratic institutions, revitalize trust in democracy, and come together in common cause.

Before I conclude by sharing a few of our recommendations, I wanted to summarize five of the key points that should underpin a strategic approach to reinvigorating democracy as a security imperative for the alliance.

• Democracy is not a linear process, it can move forward and backward, and it requires active support at all levels.

• Democratic backsliding is a threat to shared security as it undermines alliance trust and interoperability

• Russia is an adversary to NATO, it seeks to bring chaos to the transatlantic system and destabilize democratic institutions.

• Corruption is weakening the alliance from within

• Technology has forever changed the operating environment for security and democracy

The far-reaching consequences of a decade-long run of authoritarian resurgence makes renewing and reenergizing liberal democracy in the trans-Atlantic space all the more necessary. To remain relevant, the transatlantic alliance and its leaders and institutions must be able to defend against and confront these current challenges.

1. US Must Lead NATO in Reinforcing its Democratic Principles. NATO as a military organization is not and should not be a leading actor in addressing democracy challenges, but member states have committed to “strengthening their free institutions”15 and should therefore stand by those principles whenever possible. Possible steps the U.S. could explore include:

a. Creating a commission or special ombudsman’s office within NATO that would be responsible for identifying violations of alliance principles.

b. At a minimum, NATO should continue to bolster its communiqué language regarding the importance of democracy to the strength of the alliance and should not hold summits or meetings in countries that have seen significant regression on rule of law.

2. US needs to lead by asserting a linkage between democracy and security, particularly by mobilizing the integrated capabilities of NATO in countering the aggression from Putin’s Russia.

a. Reaffirming economic sanctions on Russia will remain in place for as long as it occupies Ukrainian territory;

b. Sustaining NATO rotational troop deployments to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, while adding capacity

c. Reaffirming our commitment to democracy, as a system that has brought us peace. A go-it-alone world run by nationalist autocrats would be a scary place.

3. Make defending democracy and rule of law a first order priority.

a. The U.S. should support EU efforts to hold non-performing members accountable. The Eurobarometer showed that 89% of European support the need for the rule of law to be respected in all other EU Member States. 16

b. U.S. officials should issue systematic, coordinated, and high-level responses to any attempts to roll back rule of law while avoiding the perception that activities are solely externally driven. This engagement should prioritize messages that the U.S. does not support democratic rollbacks, infringements on human rights, censoring of independent media, universities and NGOs, and the hindering of judicial independence and efficacy.

c. In more supportive environments, donors and governments should vocally promote laws that safeguard NGOs and activists to help create a conducive environment.

4. Change a narrative that is no longer working– Democracy is not the end of history. Democracy must be nurtured and we must be alert to warnings when a fragile democracy starts to stray, as with Hungary and Poland. The U.S. must assert that is a legitimate and integrated part of our bilateral and multilateral relationships.

5. To support democracy, the U.S. needs an adapted funding model. The graduation model of democracy assistance is no longer sufficient to address the challenges of democracies in regression and in transition to authoritarianism. Russia is investing heavily in the information space – it is working. Priorities flow from money, thus we must invest adequately, particularly in media and civil society by,

a. Enhancing support for civil society, both regional and country specific. More funding should be allocated to countries where checks and balances are under attack, and particularly to organizations operating outside of national capitals.

b. Increased funding for independent media, including for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to establish or reestablish bureaus in countries where the media environment has become less free and where citizens can benefit from better access to uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.

c. Invest in people with exchange programs: good proposals for Congress to consider include a U.S.-Poland Parliamentary Exchange Program and one honoring the murder of former Gdansk mayor, Pawel Adamowicz.

d. Direct democracy support funding in countries at an earlier point – don’t wait for a fullblown democratic crisis to invest in capacity building, skills-training, monitoring, and network-building. Seek to always advance local ownership and involvement.

6. Go beyond capitals and understand local context: a starting point for external support must be understanding the local context and expressed needs of local activists. This knowledge transfer should occur through frequent interactions with a range of civil society and other local actors.

7. Advancing institutional channels. The US must continue to be a strong leader, working with allies. While support from these institutions can only go so far (given weak enforcement mechanisms based on member government compliance), rulings and reports create recommendations and pressure to reform.

8. Cyber-defense and technology preparedness:

a. Support independent media organizations and CSOs working to expose disinformation.

b. Governments and political parties should invest in the people and systems necessary for the technological security of election counting, voter registration machines, and political campaign networks.

9. Countering abuse and manipulation of social media platforms needs to be prioritized.

a. Dedicate funding for digital media literacy programs.

b. Hold social media companies accountable for removing material that violates the law.

c. Support narrowly tailored targeted government regulations that do not infringe on users’ right to free speech—focusing on mechanisms like political advertising and disinformation prevalence measures.

10. China knowledge and preparedness: The transatlantic alliance needs to better understand and prepare for what a rising China will mean for the transatlantic alliance.

11. Finally, we need allies. Non-engagement and going it alone does not work and will leave us weak and vulnerable. We have 70 years of peace with Europe to prove that this alliance is to the benefit of American security.

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