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No risk of their impacts – cohesion in an Article 5 scenario is inevitable – our links are key to all the other impacts to cohesion

Wallander 18 Celeste A. Wallander, President and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council, “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 97(4), July/August 2018, pp.70-81, JSTOR /GoGreen!

Beyond its stabilizing effect on the broader continent, there is another reason NATO's liberal democratic character came to matter: in the absence of a shared external threat, the binding force of liberal democratic values and institutions has become essential to the alliance's effectiveness. NATO's ability to conduct security operations depends on its political cohesion as much as its members' military capabilities. Few question NATO's cohesion when Article 5 of its founding treaty is invoked that is, when an ally is directly attacked. Common external threats generate unified responses. After 9/11, for example, NATO members quickly joined the U.S. campaign against Talibanruled Afghanistan.

However, when the alliance faces a security issue that does not invoke Article 5, alliance cohesion is less certain because members have different priorities that guide their cost-benefit calculations. In such cases, liberal commitment to the rule of law has played an important role. The alliance has proved cohesive when acting outside Europe and when the stakes are well grounded in international law, as was the case during its 2011 intervention in Libya, which was backed by a un Security Council resolution.

In other instances, when the alliance has faced more diffuse and contested security challenges, a common commitment to liberal democratic values has proved even more essential to maintaining cohesion. Consider the Balkans: in 1995, NATO conducted Operation Deliberate Force to protect unsafe areas in Bosnia that had come under attack from ethnic Serbian armed groups. And in 1999, it conducted another air operation against the armed forces of what remained of Yugoslavia to prevent military attacks on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In both campaigns, Article 5 did not apply because no NATO member had been directly attacked. Nor was the alliance acting under a UN Security Council resolution. These interventions tested the alliance's political capacity, but ultimately, members coalesced around their common commitment to human rights, a principle that would become enshrined in international law in 2005 as "the responsibility to protect" (or R2P). The alliance's ability to prevent mass atrocities in non-NATO states was thus as much a product of its members' values as it was a product of their military assets.

By contrast, when democratic values and institutions have cut in the opposite direction, the alliance has been divided. Compare NATO's interventions in the Balkan wars to its disunity over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although the Bush administration contended that Iraq threatened global security by pursuing weapons of mass destruction (an area of international law far better established than R2P), NATO was far from unified on the matter. In fact, France and Germany were among the most vocal critics of the invasion. Although NATO's interventions in the Balkans had been legally problematic, the allies were still united in pursuing them because of their shared commitment to human rights. But when it came to Iraq, without a justification rooted in liberalism, not all of them were willing to support an intervention beyond the purview of Article 5.

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