DoS lead makes DoD more effective, and is key to allied consensus on hybrid war and ilaw, agreement and enforcement of cyber norms, and tech leadership
Goldman 20 Dr. Emily O. Goldman, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, former cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Law Review, 3(4), Fall 2020, p.84-101, https://tnsr.org/2020/09/from-reaction-to-action-adopting-a-competitive-posture-in-cyber-diplomacy/ /GoGreen!
Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative
Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense.
Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.
Communicate and Build Consensus
The State Department’s foreign service officers forward-deployed as “cyber diplomats” can strengthen consensus among allies and partners on the nature of the cyber security problem and on the need for action to address it. To do so, they should be conversant with the U.S. government’s efforts to address cyber competition and armed with information to speak authoritatively about them. The State Department has long promoted a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The key elements of that framework include: (1) affirmation that established principles of international law apply to state behavior in cyberspace;62 (2) adherence to certain non-binding norms of state behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and (3) consideration, development, and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace. Since not all states share American views on responsible behavior in cyberspace, the United States is working with partners and allies on collective attribution and imposition of consequences.
These initiatives are now being complemented by the Department of Defense’s strategy of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s operational approach of persistent engagement. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officers in missions around the world need to be well-versed in these other efforts and prepared to explain them to foreign partners on a routine basis. America’s partners want to understand U.S. government strategy and policies.63 It is U.S. policy that cross-domain responses to cyber aggression should be complemented with steady and sustained activities to make networks more resilient, to defend them as far forward as practicable, and to contest the most dangerous adversaries.64 Every diplomatic engagement that includes cyber issues would be an opportunity to build support for these mutually reinforcing approaches.
Bolster Cyber Cadre
The greatest talent, most consequential research and development, and most innovative applications of cyber and other emerging technologies are globally distributed across individuals, commercial entities, governments, and academia. Competing successfully requires recognizing, understanding, and leveraging insights and advances wherever they reside in real time. The nation that best understands and can most rapidly harvest the benefits of changing knowledge (e.g., quantum encryption, artificial intelligence, machine learning, high performance computing, big data, 5G) will be best positioned to secure its future. Conversely, states that lag behind competitors will find closing gaps a daunting and risky challenge. 5G represents the proverbial canary in the coal mine because the United States lags behind China in deployment. Unless the United States ensures the talent is in place to monitor and lead on future technologies, it may again be caught unprepared.
The State Department does designate foreign service officers with a cyber portfolio, but they are usually assigned as an additional duty, often to economic officers at embassies and consulates. One option would be a dedicated cadre of “cyber diplomacy-coned” officers,65 or even a regional dedicated officer cadre located at a large or strategic embassy in each region to augment the part-time officers at post. These cyber diplomacy-coned foreign service officers would report on priorities and trends in research and investments across governments, industries, academia, and research institutes worldwide, and identify where adversary regimes are vulnerable to diplomatic, information, military, and economic threats.66 They would “identify and catalyze opportunities,” in the words of the U.S. National Security Strategy,67helping to set the conditions for competition by building mechanisms for information sharing and agile collaboration.
Enable Defend Forward
The U.S. National Cyber Strategy’s guidance to promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, one that ensures there are consequences for irresponsible behavior, is a key objective for the United States. To succeed, this framework should be pursued in tandem with an active approach to stem ongoing adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict. The Department of Defense is now defending forward, outside its existing networks, to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. It is time for the State Department to join in these efforts.
An informal division of labor currently exists between the departments of State and Defense, whereby the former promotes norms in traditional diplomatic channels while the latter pursues defend forward through military channels. Yet this leaves several problems unresolved. Parallel communication increases the risk of messaging fratricide across military and diplomatic channels in partner nations. Military cyber operations may engage foreign policy sensitivities that the State Department is better equipped to address. On the other hand, State Department desk officers may throw a wrench into planning because they do not understand Defense Department strategy.
The United States needs to operate continuously alongside allies and partners. Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations by working through diplomatic channels to set the conditions for the United States to operate by, with, and through foreign partners and their networks in order to expose, contest, and defend against adversary cyber aggression. Sustained diplomacy can help institutionalize these operational partnerships and make defend forward more anticipatory and effective. Institutionalized cooperation, including the conduct of joint and coalition operations and the development of agreed-upon legal and policy frameworks, is essential to prevail in long-term strategic competition.
The State Department can set the conditions for consensual foreign partner-enabled discovery operations (i.e., “hunt forward” operations) through bilateral engagements.68 These operations enable the United States and its partners to understand an adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will in turn enable network defense of U.S. partners, improve anticipatory resilience of U.S. and partner networks, and thwart cyberspace aggression. The State Department can scale the process of explaining the Defense Department’s defend forward strategy, enabling the United States to proactively set the conditions for “hunt forward” operations. The State Department can also actively ensure Defense Department cyber teams receive support from U.S. embassy country teams and benefit from insights about foreign partner networks gained through State and USAID-led cyber security capacity-building programs.
Mobilize Coalitions
The National Security Strategy calls on U.S. diplomats to “build and lead coalitions that advance shared interests” in the ongoing contests for power.69 The State Department has a history of coalition building, most recently with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS formed in 2014. The State Department is thus uniquely positioned to mobilize partners to sustain pressure on adversary cyberspace behavior and cyber-enabled campaigns. A three-tiered coalition could increase information sharing, agile collaboration, and operational agility.
At the core of this coalition would be states that possess the capability and capacity to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations and work with diplomatic, law enforcement, and industry partners. A second tier would comprise less-capable or less-committed states that core states operate with (and through) to counter and contest aggression below the level of armed conflict. The United States has extensive experience negotiating basing and transit rights in sovereign territory along the Soviet perimeter during the Cold War. It should negotiate the cyber analogue of basing and transit rights to set the conditions for swift and persistent action. The transit issue is likely to be less controversial for allies and partners than remote cyber operations on infrastructure within another state’s territory (addressed below).
A third tier would comprise public and private actors across the broadest practicable set of countries in a resilience consortium to leverage collective market power, secure the internet, and counterbalance the illiberal vision of information control promoted by Russia and China.70 This is especially urgent as countries shift from 3G and 4G (third and fourth generation) to 5G communications networks. By offering attractive financial terms, authoritarian governments can dominate the telecommunications industry in developing countries and control digital tools that increase censorship, repression, and surveillance. It is imperative that public and private actors assist the broader coalition in combating such trends.
Several pillars for a resilience consortium already exist. Cyber security capacity-building received a boost when the State Department and USAID launched the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership in July 2018, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.71 In July 2019, USAID launched a development framework called Countering Malign Kremlin Influence. The framework was designed to build the economic and democratic resilience of countries targeted by Russia. Cyber security is considered high priority.72 The launch of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation in October 2019 can attract private capital flows into contested markets to stem the spread of surveillance networks.73 In November 2019, the United States, Australia, and Japan announced the Blue Dot Network to promote high-quality and trusted standards for global infrastructure development as an alternative to the predatory lending and debt-trap diplomacy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.74 By re-prioritizing emerging market economies for affordable and reliable internet access and infrastructure, the United States can shore up internet freedom, ensure economic prosperity for the United States and its partners, and secure the outer ring of telecommunications networks as America’s first line of cyber defense.
Another important initiative is the Clean Network program. Building upon the 5G Clean Path initiative, the Clean Network is a comprehensive effort by a coalition of like-minded countries and companies to secure their critical telecommunications, cloud, data analytics, mobile apps, Internet of Things, and 5G technologies from malign actors. The coalition relies on trusted vendors that are not subject to unjust or extra-judicial control by authoritarian governments.75 Five new lines of effort were recently announced to ensure telecommunication carriers, mobile app stores, apps, cloud-based systems, and undersea cables are all rooted in digital trust standards.76 More than 30 countries and territories are now Clean Countries, and many of the world’s biggest telecommunications companies are Clean Telcos.77 These efforts have laid the foundation for a broader coalition the State Department could mobilize to implement competitive cyber strategies.
Accelerate Interagency Consensus on Conventions Below the Use of Force
What constitutes acceptable behavior in competition below the level of armed conflict? While there is a normative prohibition against crossing the threshold of armed conflict and while states appear to tacitly agree on many types of behavior that cross that threshold, the unilateral ingenuity states display in developing novel approaches to achieving strategic gains invites the potential for miscalculations on and around this threshold. Moreover, the strategic competitive space outside of armed conflict is still maturing. It is a space where the rules are malleable and where mutual understandings of acceptable and unacceptable behavior are few.78
The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.
However, the United States should first decide what it believes are the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, which requires it to detail how national interests manifest in cyberspace and the security postures needed to defend those interests.79 Other nations will need to do the same. The issue is where there is convergence, not just with like-minded states, but with adversaries. Examples that come to mind are the integrity of the global financial infrastructure; nuclear command, control, and communications; and disinformation that disrupts public health efforts — an issue which is of special relevance in light of the current global health crisis.80
Shape International Discourse on Cyber Operations and Sovereignty
One of the greatest concerns for allies and partners are operations that generate cyber effects outside U.S. military networks. These operations are designed to disrupt the ability of an adversary to conduct cyber operations against the United States and its allies — what the 2018 U.S. Cyber Command vision refers to as “contest.”81 There is no U.S. declaratory policy on the sovereignty implications of cyber operations. Specifically, the United States has not declared its position on whether remote cyber operations that generate effects on infrastructure within another state’s territory require that state’s consent. There is a divide among states on this issue, and on whether such acts require international legal justification. There is also divergence in state views on how international law applies to states’ conduct of cyber operations below the threshold of a use of force and outside the context of armed conflict.82 On one end of the spectrum is the United Kingdom, which has publicly declared that remote cyber operations below the non-intervention threshold are not prohibited by international law and do not require consent.83 On the other end of the spectrum, the Netherlands agrees with the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations that such operations violate state sovereignty and require consent.84
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have officially declared their respective positions and they have polar opposite views on this core question. Moreover, Estonia, Australia, and the United States have officially articulated their positions on the applicability of international law to cyber operations yet have not weighed in on this particular issue. Gary Corn considers this range of positions “prima facie evidence of the unsettled nature of the question.”85 The United States needs to seize the diplomatic initiative and publicly articulate its stance on this issue to help influence the court of world opinion. The most explicit official U.S. statement comes from the Department of Defense general counsel:
For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory. This proposition is recognized in the Department’s adoption of the “defend forward” strategy: “We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.” The Department’s commitment to defend forward including to counter foreign cyber activity targeting the United States — comports with our obligations under international law and our commitment to the rules-based international order.86
This is an area where the State Department should be leading internationally if the United States hopes to persuade others to adopt its preferred norms, particularly as allies wrestle with legal ambiguities surrounding cyber operations.87
Adopt a Competitive Mindset
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy challenged the Defense Department to adopt a “competitive mindset” in order to “out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate” threat actors.88 The department responded to this challenge. It reorganized, fielded new technologies and capabilities, created cross-functional teams that effectively work across traditional bureaucratic lines to prepare for long-term strategic challenges from China and Russia, and pivoted to the proactive cyber strategy of defend forward.
There is progress at the State Department in adapting to great-power competition. Secretary Mike Pompeo has given a series of speeches on the challenges posed by China, most forcefully on July 23, 2020, at the Nixon Presidential Library.89 In 2019, all policy bureaus were directed to build strategic plans that prioritize competing with China.90China’s challenge to the Western-led, liberal world order has impacted decisions on foreign assistance. USAID’s “Clear Choice” framework provides alternatives in the energy, digital, and infrastructure sectors to China’s development model.91 The State Department-led campaign to convince countries to ban Huawei equipment from their 5G networks is bearing fruit as a growing number of states, including all members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, exclude Huawei from their 5G networks. China’s crackdown in Hong Kong and its lack of transparency about the origins of the novel coronavirus no doubt added to concerns regarding the use of Chinese technology.92
Thus, the State Department has begun to adopt a competitive mindset. Yet much remains to be done. Framing the Huawei issue as a strategic competition over the future of digital governance and control of the global digital backbone, in addition to the security risks of embedding a Chinese provider into critical communications infrastructure, reflects a competitive mindset. So does the proactive approach of the Global Engagement Center, which leads interagency efforts to address foreign adversary disinformation and propaganda that undermines U.S. interests. Cyber diplomacy by the State Department needs to embrace this competitive mindset, and this will require reprioritizing resources and revisiting current lines of effort.
Conclusion: A State Department Cyber Strategy
A new bureau for cyberspace within the U.S. State Department can help to consolidate cyber issues. However, it will remain an incomplete effort, as cyber issues touch nearly every bureau and require a broad-based approach. This reflects the pervasiveness of digital technologies across all facets of human endeavor — economic, social, political, and security. It also reflects adversaries’ integrated strategies that use cyberspace to gain strategic advantage and redefine the policies, principles, and standards of the global order. Consequently, no single bureau can manage the full panoply of cyber issues.
More importantly, making bureaucratic changes divorced of strategy is just rearranging deck chairs. The State Department should understand its role and then strategically reorient its bureaucracy to meet that strategy’s objectives. A cyber strategy is not a panacea. However, properly applied across the whole department, an effective strategy would unify efforts and ensure the State Department’s cyber priorities are aligned with the National Security Strategy’s focus on great-power competition, and improve coordination and integration — particularly between the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, which focuses on technical cyber incidents, and the Global Engagement Center, which focuses on information and influence operations. Like the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, USAID, and the Department of Justice have all produced department-wide cyber strategies or frameworks that are internally focused and externally nested.93 An effective cyber strategy could build upon the progress the United States has already made and posture the nation to regain the initiative in cyberspace competition with authoritarian rivals. It should include the creation of a cyber diplomacy-coned career track for its foreign service officers. It should articulate how the State Department will lead, partner, and act in order to set the conditions for the United States to compete and sustain strategic advantage in cyberspace. And it should support U.S. government efforts to persistently counter and contest malicious foreign cyberspace campaigns and influence operations.
Adversaries of the United States and its allies and partners employ highly variable approaches, aligned to their national interests and competitive advantages against U.S. vulnerabilities across all elements of national power. Although competition in physical space is episodic, it is continuous in the cyber and information spaces where persistent campaigns gradually accrete meaningful advantage short of war. Without adopting and employing a proactive strategy against these threats across the whole of government, the United States may eventually find itself in a position of parity or even disadvantage with adversaries. In such a situation, emboldened adversaries will have shaped the competitive space to the point where they will have won without fighting.