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AND, independently collapses readiness

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf /GoGreen!

Various legislative and policy changes have attempted to modernize the SSA paradigm to keep pace with the threat environment. The most recent innovations, to include “1206” (now 2282) “train and equip,” Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), have received mixed reviews and assessments that generally fall along predictable parochial lines. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that the current framework has become a cumbersome “patchwork” of authorities atop an outdated foundation. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the second decade of the 21st century would bring relief from the post-9/11 fatigue of foreign crisis and engagements and that this lull would allow the national security apparatus to “reset” itself and prepare for a new model of conflict in the 21st century. However, the pace of escalating global conflict in recent years defied those expectations, leaving little bandwidth or space to do more than add to, or tinker with, the “patchwork” framework.

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The existing SSA infrastructure is not only outdated and dysfunctional, it is also seen as ineffective in tackling the growing mission of building partner capacity in fragile, high-threat environments. SSA is generally seen as effective when making gradual improvements to some existing capabilities in countries such as in Colombia and the Philippines and in countries where SSA is used to purchase access or influence (Pakistan, Israel, Oman, etc). In contrast, applying SSA in high-risk theaters with fragile political institutions (Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) to build new capability has shown little success. Despite much criticism of a system often deemed ineffective, many stakeholders resist change for parochial reasons. In fact, there are many actors who are better able to exercise perceived control of and oversight of policy by utilizing the patchwork. Bureaucratic elements often jealously guard the unique nature of these “stovepipe” authorities because it provides influence over policy decisions via the control or vote on the allocation of resources using such authorities. In addition, each authority reports to a congressional committee and provides an oversight mechanism that the congressional staffs will often strongly defend in the face of reform initiatives. As such, additional authorities are added that only marginally contribute to total effort but do not streamline or incorporate previous and existing authorities.

The growing reliance on “partnerships” and “building partner capacity” strains the Department of Defense’s ability to carry out its core requirement to be prepared to win our nation’s war in the more classic model of state-on-state conflict. In some cases, the partnership and BPC paradigm is being leveraged to return to the conventional security paradigm of preparing for state-on-state conflict, as in the case of the new South China Sea authority in the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). But elsewhere, and particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, the Defense Department will continue to struggle to resource and organize the military to support both pillars one (win our nation’s wars) and two (build partner capacity) of the QDR’s strategic framework. This tension could be reconciled through a “partnership” model of defense (The Center for Strategic and International Studies terms this “federated defense”) that applies to both paradigms of conflict and both pillars of the QDR. In many ways, the South China Sea authority represents this way of thinking. However, critics of this approach suggest that the U.S. has already ceded too much leadership and influence, and exercised too much restraint, as evidenced by the rise of Russian assertiveness relative to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Structurally, as DoD authorities increase and DoS legislation lags, the long-running tension between State and Defense grows. This is a complex problem with multiple root causes. Chief among them are the legacy stovepipes of authorities (Title 10 vs. Title 22) and oversight committees (Armed Services vs. Foreign Affairs), the lack of State expeditionary resources to civilian-based security sector assistance, and a perceived lack of State agility and interagency/White House coordination of efforts. In addition, in the absence of a common operating picture and tools to process the flood of critical data, there is no refinement of strategic goals into complementary concepts of operations applied against a common operational picture. Other actors such as State National Guard units, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence community are employing Titles 32, 21, and 50, respectively, in largely disconnected and often uncommunicated endeavors.

Figure 2. Imbalanced Security Sector Assistance (SSA) Approach

SSA initiatives are ideally a balance between Department of State and Department of Defense efforts, with security programs a part of broader programs that contribute to overall governance and stability. Current SSA is perceived to be playing a dominant role led by DoD.

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