Perception of the possibility of cancelling the plan is key to leverage
Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/ /GoGreen!
When Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed experts to examine NATO’s future, they noted that a “drift toward NATO disunity … must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” To date, allies have lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. The European Union can theoretically address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism and conditionality on its funding. NATO, by contrast, has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally that violates the alliance’s founding principles and no financial carrots that might incentivize good behavior.
Good Intentions Won’t Be Enough
In his first months in office, President Biden has already demonstrated a desire to defend trans-Atlantic values. Recognizing the Armenian genocide and adopting sanctions against Russia and China in coordination with Europe are only the most recent examples. But how Biden plans to translate this democratic agenda into concrete action in NATO remains unclear. A mere declaration of good intentions won’t be enough. As NATO adapts for the next decade through the “NATO 2030” process, leaders should seize the opportunity to adopt concrete solutions to defend democratic values and ultimately uphold NATO’s political cohesion.
A first and most essential step would be the adoption by NATO leaders of a “political pledge” by which allies would recommit to abide by the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. These principles are often mentioned in NATO’s official communiques but in a cursory way, reflecting the limited attention given to them. The NATO 2030 reflection group promoted a similar idea with its proposed “code of good conduct.” Substance-wise, allies should pledge to uphold trans-Atlantic values — including democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law — but also to respect some principles of good behavior, such as consulting allies on national decisions impacting trans-Atlantic security, refraining from blocking matters external to NATO, and making good faith efforts to settle any dispute with another ally. This “pledge” could be part of the communique adopted by NATO leaders in Brussels or a stand-alone document. At a minimum, these principles should be imbedded in the new strategic concept that NATO is likely to launch at the June 14 summit.
Next, NATO should monitor individual allies’ compliance with these principles. Without any monitoring mechanism, a political declaration risks becoming little more than a declaration of good intentions. First, allies should be able to raise their concerns to the North Atlantic Council or even at the ministerial level when they believe that a serious violation of the “pledge” by a NATO member is occurring. Such discussion would force that member to justify its decisions and create political pressure in itself. Allies could also institute a regular review of each country’s compliance with NATO’s core values and link it to NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. This periodic report would be prepared by the International Secretariat under the authority of the assistant secretary general for political affairs or the deputy secretary general. NATO could build on existing metrics used by the European Union or by nongovernmental organizations such as Freedom House. Finally, joint NATO-European Union “resilience response teams” could provide advice or assistance to allies, such as those new NATO members in the Balkans, which might want help addressing their societal vulnerabilities. Their efforts could draw on existing resources such as NATO’s centers of excellence on cyber, strategic communications, and hybrid threats. Taken together, these procedures would provide the basis for a periodic discussion on the political health of the alliance.
A last but challenging step would be to raise the political cost for allies breaking the rules. This is admittedly the most difficult course of action given NATO’s consensus rule and the aforementioned lack of legal mechanisms to sanction or expel. Here, NATO will need to be creative and use a mixture of incentives and disincentives. In terms of incentives, allies should make clear that decisions on NATO leadership positions, facility placement, or ministerial locations will be evaluated in light of the respect for NATO’s values. If this fails to induce better behavior, allies should move to publicize violations or consider restrictive measures such as cancelling exercises or NATO events or limiting participation in military planning or intelligence sharing. For less sensitive measures such as cancelling visits of NATO officials or appointing assistant secretary generals, these measures could be implemented directly by the International Secretariat. For other, more sensitive measures, the alliance might be forced to consider a “consensus minus one” approach. Finally, additional pressure can be brought through bilateral or European Union channels, thereby harnessing other instruments of power such as financial incentives in support of NATO objectives.