The 2017 NDAA only made things worse
Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
Recent efforts to reform the security assistance architecture tend to get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This has led to an inevitable focus on incremental tweaks that address tactical-level concerns. These weedy discussions, while useful, often take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given—and therefore, do not address the broader strategic and budgetary issues and imbalance between diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, policymakers and politicians often get lost in the technical nature of these discussions, lack broader historical context, and are easily persuaded by officials with a stake in largely preserving the status quo and in protecting their offices, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, they quickly lose interest in reform. A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.
Obama administration efforts attempted to improve interagency cooperation
During the first years of the Obama administration, White House officials led an interagency review of U.S. security assistance policy. The result, Presidential Policy Directive 23, established goals and policy guidelines for U.S. security assistance in 2013 and sought to increase interagency, meaning State Department-DOD, collaboration.51 But there were challenges in implementing these reforms. For example, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was created under the Obama administration as an experimental program designed as a joint effort, housed at the State Department with staff from both agencies and new funds to pool resources.52 But the GSCF turned out to be bureaucratically unwieldy and ultimately unsuccessful: Because it was housed at the State Department and the DOD, eight congressional committees exerted oversight, and projects were easily stymied by skeptical staffers.53 It also lacked institutional buy-in from the DOD, which was slow to provide staff and resources and focused on working around the State Department instead.
Congressional efforts have primarily focused on the DOD’s resources
Rather than concentrate on the overall security assistance landscape, congressional reform efforts focused entirely on consolidating DOD authorities and bridging silos within the existing system. For example, the fiscal year 2017 NDAA sought to institutionalize DOD assistance by merging many of the Pentagon’s authorities into a “new, broader global train and equip authority,” creating a new Section 333 under the DOD’s Title 10 authority.54 But Section 333 is essentially redundant to many of the State Department’s authorities, including FMF; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. And while the authorization calls for the “concurrence” of the secretary of state, in practice, it leaves the State Department with very little leverage and little ability to shape DOD programs. Some analysts found, “There are varying degrees of Section 333 implementation and buy-in from combatant command leadership,” with some viewing the State Department-DOD integration as a check-the-box exercise.55
While there have been some notable attempts, such as 2019’s Department of State Authorization Act in the House of Representatives,56 Congress has failed to enact any major legislation to modernize State Department authorities or resources. Moreover, these reforms to the DOD’s security assistance authorities did nothing to improve the State Department’s authorities; though Section 333 included reporting requirements that are considered a “gold standard” for assessing a partner’s capacity to absorb U.S. assistance, such assessments are not required for assistance from the State Department.57