DoS crowds themselves out anyway
Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, https://afsa.org/creeping-foreign-policy-militarization-or-creeping-state-department-irrelevance /GoGreen!
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.
Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?
Has Foggy Bottom lost relevance in the foreign affairs arena by emphasizing soft-power social agendas (e.g., the creation of special envoys for various religions, LGBTQ, the Holocaust, global youth and global women’s affairs) that are distinctly American over hard-power national security interests (e.g., strong international security and healthy economic systems that protect allies and provide opportunities for American businesses)? Or is it, perhaps, simply that the Foreign Service is either late in arriving or missing from the field where the military is operating?
The answer, of course, is all of the above. But there are two broad aspects of the problem that I believe are fundamental: first, the proliferation of priorities at the State Department following the end of the Cold War; and second, the missed opportunities at State during the past 20 years of joint operations with the military to institutionalize the kind of professional and personal relationships that would enable the smaller Foreign Service to exert leadership in the foreign policy arena at home and abroad.
A Proliferation of Priorities
The end of the Cold War and the so-called “end of history” marked a shift for the State Department. We hired a more diverse Foreign Service that, in turn, took on a broader range of narrower activities that more resemble small-picture social engineering than traditional, big-picture diplomacy. At the same time, State reallocated existing resources to create an alphabet soup of new under secretaries, functional bureaus, offices and special envoys. At its peak during the Obama administration, there were more than 50 of the latter. As Ambassador Jim Jeffrey observes in a March 3 piece in Foreign Policy, neither the 2010 nor the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review focuses on “traditional” diplomacy. The department has diffused its energy too broadly to the neglect of fundamentals, and this, in turn, left a vacuum that the military has had to fill.
New State Department priorities include such things as this, for example. In Muslim-majority Indonesia in 2014 and 2015, not long before the deadly January 2016 extremist terrorist attack on Starbucks and other locations rocked the capital, Jakarta, our consulate in Surabaya produced impressive Hispanic heritage month YouTube videos of its celebrations, which included spending money to bring Los Angeles artists to paint murals on the walls of a local school and sponsor fun runs for local girls. Similarly, in March the U.S. embassy in Macedonia—a country with simmering interethnic tensions and endemic corruption that hasn’t had a government since elections in early December 2016—flew in a lawyer from the Office of the Special Counsel to lecture locals on the Hatch Act, even as refugees streamed north from Greece and European-born Islamic State group fighters returned from Syrian battlefields.
A solely military response is not sufficient. We want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S. government and the international community, recognizing that it is only through a combination of capabilities that we will achieve and sustain our strongest deterrence posture.
—General Joseph Votel,
Commander, U.S. Central Command,
March 9, 2017
In religiously conservative Uganda, a U.S. Army commander there to train units in combating the Lord’s Resistance Army and al-Shabaab in Somalia had to deal with backlash from an angry counterpart when the U.S. embassy flew the rainbow flag high over Kampala in a righteous response to that country’s persecution of the LGBTQ community. That subsequently set back efforts to combat other forms of violent abuses of human rights in eastern Africa.
One general commented, “If everything is a priority for the State Department, nothing is.”
On its own, each example represents admirable commitment by the Foreign Service to human rights, social progress and good governance policy efforts. But collectively, that commitment ignores the opportunity cost of not prioritizing activities more immediate to countering violent extremism, promoting economic prosperity and strengthening the security necessary to address higher-order human rights and civic goals.
The proliferation of activities that pander to U.S. domestic special interests and divert resources from other work, and whose effectiveness cannot easily be measured, is one aspect of the creeping irrelevance of American diplomacy. This problem has been compounded by the Foreign Service’s apparent unwillingness or inability to work with the U.S. military when they need us the most.