BUT, shields NATO cohesion by avoiding the need for consensus upfront
Shapiro 9 Jeremy Shapiro, non-resident Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; and Nick Witney, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; “Conflicted Europe,” Chapter 2, Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009, ISBN 978-1-906538-18-7, https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR19_TOWARDS_A_POST_AMERICAN_EUROPE_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-US_RELATIONS.pdf /GoGreen!
In an effort to get beyond “mutual trust” and “consultations”, we asked our experts in each EU member state to tell us what they saw as the three most important issues in that state’s relationship with the US. The responses are tabulated at Annex 1. The lack of a common set of European priorities for the transatlantic relationship is well illustrated; the issues cited range across most regions of the world and also include global issues as diverse as climate change, democratisation, and nuclear non-proliferation. There is also a high incidence of “parochial” issues, especially for the smaller states (for example, Malta’s problem with illegal immigration), suggesting a tendency to look across the Atlantic for help on issues on which the EU seems to be of no help because it lacks either a remit or a consensus or both. Even when respondents cited the importance of “investment and trade”, they were actually referring to individual national interest; the collective EU interests that the Commission defends are seemingly so effectively delegated to the EU level that they slip out of national consciousness.
The big exception to this confusion of views and priorities is security and defence – listed among the top three issues by three-quarters of our respondents, and by many as the most important aspect of the transatlantic relationship. This preoccupation is by no means confined to those recently escaped from the Soviet empire; most western Europeans feel the same. Nearly all of our respondents judged bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation with the US to be close, productive, and largely immune to turbulence elsewhere.16 All regarded the continued engagement of the US in Europe’s defence as vital – with NATO, “the bedrock of our security” (see national defence white papers passim), as the key institution.
In general, therefore, European attitudes have evolved remarkably little over the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our audit suggests that, despite the expansion and evolution of the EU and, in particular, the development of its external identity – despite, indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global diffusion of power – member states continue to think of the transatlantic relationship in terms of NATO and of bilateral relations. The Cold War dispensation, whereby the US offered Europeans security and the role of junior associates in running the world in exchange for European solidarity, remains deeply ingrained. Europeans seem essentially to want more of the same – especially now that there is a US president who Europeans can believe shares their own instincts.
How do they aim to get it?
This picture of a Europe preoccupied with the defence and security dimension of transatlantic relations, reluctant in consequence to do anything that might rock the boat, and determined to pursue its interests bilaterally rather than collectively is reinforced by our enquiries into the various assets and levers that different European states felt they were able to use in attempting to get what they wanted from Washington. The results are set out at Annex 2.
Once again, it is striking that the vast majority of assets or levers identified by our respondents relate to their role in diplomatic and especially defence and security co-operation with the US. Many member states believe that they have particular regional expertise or connections that Washington values; others list their readiness to promote democracy, especially in the eastern neighbourhood and the Caucasus. A majority point to their support for US military operations or the hosting of US military bases (10 member states support a continuing US military presence in Europe of some 70,000). One-third of EU member states even regard their geographical location as a key asset vis-à-vis the US. Beyond that, the other widely perceived asset is what we have termed “cultural links” – affinities of history or ethnicity which Europeans believe to have enduring political value. In short, Europeans aim to present themselves to the US as useful and attractive – and more so than their peers.
So one answer to the question of how Europeans seek to advance their transatlantic interests is: for defence, through NATO; for trade and competition issues, through the EU; and for almost everything else, bilaterally.
This preference for the bilateral track is more easily understood when it becomes clear how many of the European member states believe themselves to have some particular comparative advantage in dealing with Washington (see table below). The UK is not alone, or even in a minority, in cherishing the idea that its “special relationship’” is more advantageous than any collective European approach.17