Their ev’s acontextual – none of it says consensus-based decision-making is better – BUT increasing bilateralism now empirically proves it’s worse for cohesion
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf /GoGreen!
While NATO navigated the “new challenge – new format” issue, minilateral arrangements thrived in the Euro-Atlantic space, proliferating in the aftermath of defining security events, from the end of the Cold War to 9/11. They have gained new prominence throughout the last decade as NATO finds itself torn between competing priorities and struggles to balance territorial defense and external stabilization efforts. Differences in threat perceptions among members in Eastern and Southern Europe have added to this trend, as have internal political tensions and a growing desire for greater strategic autonomy among some European countries.
NATO’s eastern flank has been a particularly fertile landscape for minilateral formats. Events, from the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, created a new impetus to enhance deterrence, readiness, and exchange within and outside of NATO.
Newer regional initiatives built on longstanding cooperative efforts, such as the Nordic Baltic 8, a regional format for political consultations formally established in 2000 that engages Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden.
In 2009, the Nordic Defense Cooperation was launched as a collaborative and voluntary effort between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to strengthen these countries’ defense capabilities and strategic regional exchange. The Northern Group, which was established in 2010 by the United Kingdom as a forum to discuss common defense and security issues, has a wider geographical reach.8
The Bucharest 9, in contrast, is a minilateral format that includes all allies on NATO’s Eastern Flank— from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the South. Although it is independent of NATO, it is closely aligned with the alliance, with representatives meeting on the sidelines of NATO summits.9
Recent years have also seen a rise in broader ad hoc groupings among European nations that create capacity to respond to crises. In this regard, the French-driven European Intervention Initiative (EI2)10 received significant attention. It is a lean, relatively informal structure that aims to drive a common strategic culture among participating European nations. It is deliberately independent of NATO and the EU to create a high degree of flexibility. Besides France, EU member states Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Italy, are part of the initiative, as well as non-EU countries, Norway and the United Kingdom.
The EI2’s primary focus is exchange, collaboration, and planning to better position participating nations to act quickly in a crisis. Underscoring its agility, a joint statement by EI2 Defense Ministers published at their second ministerial meeting in 2019 describes the initiative as “a flexible, resource-neutral and non-binding forum, where all the Participants are equal.”11 And while members are not bound to participate in any operations, the format is designed to help prepare them to work together in potential future missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN, or other ad hoc groupings.
Part of the rationale for the EI2 initiative was the French Defense Ministry’s exasperation with time consuming and excessive consultations between NATO members in crisis situations—a conclusion colored by experiences including the 2013 intervention in Mali and the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.12 The EI2 is designed to speed up this process by establishing a shared strategic culture that will make it possible to respond to crises more quickly. It enables European nations to set up groupings that can act swiftly and step in to act independently of larger institutions or lay the groundwork for larger operation overseen by the UN, NATO or the EU.
The EI2 underscores frustration with NATO’s consensus structure and the multi-body governance process of the EU. Both institutions are not known for quick decision making. As such, the EI2 could be an enabling asset in a crisis, but it also calls into question some of the core tasks assigned to NATO. Specifically, there are certain redundancies with other efforts, including some endorsed by NATO like the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (see further below). Moreover, it remains to be seen if significant divergences between the EI2 members in terms of strategic cultures – including their willingness to engage in conflict13 – can really produce any successes absent the larger institutional momentum provided by an organization like NATO or the EU once they achieve consensus.
The EI2 was launched in the wake of French disappointments with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established in 2017 to jointly develop defense capabilities within the EU. Although PESCO is part of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, participation is voluntary and is open to those “capable and willing.”14 The degree of integration became a sticking point for this format. For instance, France envisioned a selective initiative with more capable EU member states, leading to a leaner structure and a greater level of ambition.15 Ultimately, Germany’s vision of a more inclusive model prevailed with all but two EU member states (Denmark and Malta) joining PESCO. In contrast, the EI2’s “small, but mighty” scope is more in line with President Emmanuel Macron’s vision of European leadership.