Only NATO solves – superior legitimacy, crisis management, resourcing, political will, integration and socialization
Nunes 20 Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Head of the Research Centre and former Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute, Portugal, PhD Political Science, University of Twente, postdoc International Relations, University of Groningen, “Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation,” National Defence Institute, June 2020, https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/idncadernos/Documents/Texto%20integral/idncadernos_37.pdf /GoGreen!
The development of this new European strategic approach reveals a constant tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis management can happen. That of Brussels, calling for further security and defence integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of capable and willing European member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of action, has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018. This system of security governance is a three-layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests.
Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of participants in a given security regime21 for instance that of the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development of formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organizations. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strategic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of selective engagement of strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats.
Being beyond the scope of this paper, these security configurations offers analytical space to empirical research allowing to test in which conditions, how this coexistence strengthens or conversely weakens cooperative security and how it impacts on EuroAtlantic security. The inclusion of a multilateralist focus in major political and strategic documents, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003), the EU Global Strategy (High Representative 2016) and NATO Strategic Concept (North Atlantic Council 2010) is accompanied by references to a normative and ruled based multilateral stand, on which both the EU and NATO are founded and from which they draw legitimacy for their external action in crisis management and conflict resolution.
This constitutive base for common security and collective action has also been shaping the base for cooperative output between the two organizations, having the EU’s interpretation of multilateralism, a normative and regulative emphasis that binds individual to common interests and obligations, while promoting “issue-based engagements” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 8 and 9) preferred by Member States and partners. Since 2016, an officially assumed interest-based approach to security and defence can be identified in several EU documents, such as the EU Global Strategy, the European Commission statements on the launch of the European Defence Fund or in the process leading to the institutionalisation of a Directorate General for Defence. Such initiatives may also translate what seems to be a more strategic European approach to new concepts, such as resilience or ownership22, while “principled pragmatism” appears as the new guiding principle for common foreign, security and defence policy, to use the expression adopted by the EU Global Strategy itself.
In the EU context, this emerging security governance discourse and practice based on effective multilateralism seeks to help confirming the Union as a security provider. First, it legitimises and reiterates the international stand of the European Union through international law, on the base of values, but also of interests that constitute a given multilateral structure. Second, it informs a normative and regulative basis for internal and external relations of Member States by reducing the space between these two levels of security. Third, it sets a comprehensive platform of cooperative engagement to harmonize implementation of guidelines, to improve coordination and to enhance cooperation at different levels: the international, the regional and the local. Fourth, in those non-juridically binding policy domains or on those areas which fall outside the aquis communautaire, it offers the opportunity for willing compliance among Member States (Nunes 2018). Due to the EU institutional design, with multi-level decision making levels, complex formal decision-making structure and wide-ranging external relations, multilateralism offers a broader multi-layered and trans-sectoral scope for policy action. It comprehends diverse policy domains with security implications from crisis management to humanitarian and development aid, adding to security new themes such as cyberspace or climate change and making available different policy instruments, whether one refers to those of trade, foreign policy, security and more recently defence. The EU forms a regional order, within which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP constitute a security regime shared by Member States, where the EU leads various multilateral processes (Ujvari 2016, p. 2) from trade to development. In a European context, multilateralism also means a system of governance within which traditional actors such as the UN, NATO and African Union coexist with emergent actors like China or India or with decision-making frameworks23 such as the North Atlantic Council.
Multilateralism has been a cross cutting theme in the EU and NATO policy documents.24 Being suggested by some as hindering national interest, it is acknowledged by others as a prevailing governance system. This despite a tendency for bilateralization of policies, manifestation of preference for intergovernmental decision-making methods or regionalization of security and defence through minilateralism of security and defence initiatives, as explained further ahead. Multilateral platforms, such as NATO and the EU, favour jointness of action and harmonization of understandings on security. Despite the presence of other cooperative configurations, it is still a lasting method of cooperation in the euro-atlantic context for several reasons. First, it is likely to gain support for legitimacy reasons adding normative guidance and representativeness to security practice, due to the number of participants involved, serving both common and particular interests. In June 2019, the European Council Conclusions describes it as “the best way to advance national, as well as collective interests” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 2). Second, for reasons of self-regulation of security and defence relations among participants, predisposing them to self-restrain, as opposed to “more common unilateral and less restrained methods” (Jervis 1985, p. 59). Third, for facilitating ad hoc access to resources and security and defence goods, such as common or collective knowledge, expertise and capabilities.
The minilateralist configuration of security and defence cooperation is characterised by cooperative arrangements among like-minded countries, for instance in the EU case under the form of “Pooling & Sharing” initiatives or “Smart Defence” in the case of NATO, gathering strategically able countries. It may occur within the EU and NATO or outside them. Minilateralism means a “diplomatic process of a small group of interested parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of international organizations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level” (Moret 2016, p. 2). This means that being a more flexible configuration, than formal multilateral agreements, located within security and defence organizations, it may generate better adherence and compliance from interested participants. In the security and defence domain, minilateralism gathers politically willing, self-interested and militarily able actors in order to advance what Member States perceive to be more difficult to achieve within the binding framework of security and defence organizations. In the European context, minilateralist alternatives are not a novelty being envisaged (Nunes 2018, pp. 53-55) in the Lisbon Treaty through: the mechanism of “Enhanced Cooperation” (TEU Article 327) in the domain of the Union’s non-exclusive competences; through the 2017 Council Decision (Council Decision (CFSP), 2017/ 2315),which set forward a Permanent Structured Cooperation among willing and able Member States and through the provision of a “Framework Nation” concept, TEU Article 43 (1), through which the Union will retain political control and strategic direction, while entrusting “specific responsibilities” or tasks to a Member State in the context of a EU-led missions and operations.25 In operational terms, minilateralism translates into a process of aggregated and shared capabilities, as referred earlier in the context of “Pooling & Sharing” or NATO’s “Smart Defence”.
In NATO’s case, due to its issue specific nature, minilateralism is invoked in a different manner. It describes a configuration meant to address transnational military and non-military challenges from stabilisation operations to counter cyber and hybrid threats, often positioned at the upper end of defence tasks due to its operational demands. It can also adopt the format of coalitions of the willing26 where some, but not all, of the Alliance members engage in the pursuit of security and defence goals.27 In this case, it serves the purpose of a more rapid response to threats, with less formal legal boundaries and complex decision-making procedures derived from international law, as those mandatory to the United Nations and EU led-operations or from the constitutive norms of the Washington Treaty, to which the Alliance abides by when acting collectively.
Changes in the nature of security, the transnational consequences of insecurity and the growing selective interdependence of interests among security actors led to a renewed interest in minilateralism. Due to the fact it gathers a smaller number of participants, it is better able to promote convergence of security interests and approaches, to accelerate responses to crises and to improve force generation, thus reducing the impact of security dilemmas, as perceived by states and security communities (Nunes 2017a, p. 18). This is even more relevant in complex security contexts, where different interests and preferences prevail in the face of multiple security challenges and in times of scarce resources.
The “strategic bilateralism”28 although it may occur within multilateral structures, such as international organizations, it also evolves outside the intergovernmental structures of the EU crisis management setting and that of the Alliance’s collective defence. In these cases, international and regional institutions may offer what Renard notes (2016, p. 31) as the role of “framing and institutionalizing cooperation (…) and occasionally in complementing member States, rather than substituting for them”. More often this cooperative configuration denotes a will, as in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and the United States to favour agreements at bilateral level that safeguard traditional foreign policy interests, outside and without the scrutiny of multilateral fora. Mattelaer (2019, p. 13) considers that the “prominence of bilateral diplomacy represents a symptom rather than a cause of change in the international system”. The revival of bilateral diplomacy can be observed in a wide variety of formats from the formality of the Lancaster House Treaty between Great Britain and France,29 following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty a year earlier30 to the launch in June 2018 of the French led European Intervention Initiative31 or the Franco-Danish Defence Cooperation, known as the European Initiative2 (EI2)32 that followed the Council Decision of 2017, establishing the first EU Council Decision initiative on Permanent Structured Cooperation. The EI2 enabled Denmark to contribute to European security and defence, outside the PESCO arrangement.33 Lastly, the Achen Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, signed on the 22 January 201934 through which the two countries agreed to “deepen their cooperation in matters of foreign policy, defence, external and internal security and development, while striving to strengthen Europe’s ability to act autonomously” (Aachen Treaty, 2019, Article 3). Although these initiatives have been agreed outside the European Union and NATO they aim at strengthening them, as referred in the preamble or provisions foresee in those declarations, while furthering the specific interests and preferences of contracting parts.
Being a common practice in international affairs, these three examples: the Lancaster House Treaty, the European Intervention Initiative35 and the Aachen Treaty36 occur in time, almost simultaneously to other initiatives agreed with the aim to deepen European security and defence cooperation, such as PESCO, CARD, the European Defence Fund and the setup of a DG Defence within the European Commission. This does not necessarily mean distrust by Member States on the political strength, binding nature or operational output of security and defence initiatives launched within the European Union. Strategic bilateralism supplement and is even “conducive to stronger multilateral cooperation” (Grevi 2012, p. 16). It may suggest that multilateral initiatives agreed in intergovernmental fora, only some of which legally binding like PESCO and with the regulative and financial weigh of the European Commission, such as the European Defence Fund, do not exclude the necessity of alternative cooperative configurations, capacities and operational output that multilateral institutions are unable, or unwilling, to deliver as a whole, for reasons of political interest, contextual opportunity and availability of military and non-military resources.
4. Contexts of Opportunity for EU-NATO Cooperation
The point of debate on capability gap still holds true, whether when comparing defence expenditures among the EU NATO member states in the Alliance context, Europe as a whole or between Europe and the United States.37
Twenty years later, the American political and very public discourse calling for greater strategic responsibility by European allies, coincided with the European Union’s claim for more strategic autonomy, following the presentation of the European Global Strategy, the launch of several European cooperative endeavours38 and the development of several bilateral security and defence initiatives, led by strategically strong EU member states.39
In 2016 the lack of formal endorsement of NATO’s collective defence by the President of the United States was aggravated by the doubts casted over the ability of European allies to allocate resources and commit to defence in the transatlantic context. This caused a perception of political, diplomatic and strategic “devaluation of the alliance”, in the sense attributed by Glen Snyder (1984, p. 467) and posed self-interested conditionalities to allies, beyond the 2% of defence spending target. Although, as Snyder (1984, p. 491) years earlier accurately assessed, the European allies should avoid the “risk of entrapment (consisting of) troop withdrawals, American downgrading of the priority of European defence in favour of other areas such as the Persian Gulf, or a further drift to unilateralism”40. These were exactly some of the decisions adopted and initiatives taken by President Trump, as from the earlier years of his presidency. In 2019, during the Munich Security Conference41 former Vice President Joseph Biden, and a potential running candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 Presidential election, did reiterate full support to NATO and to its allies conveying a firm belief in the principle of collective defence. This position was supported by the majority of the forty-five democratic senators in the United States Senate, by various senior military representatives at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon and senior diplomats and officials in Brussels, proving different perceptions within the American political establishment. Despite the rhetoric, the US has been increasing its commitment to Europe’s eastern flank, as the account by the Department of Defense Budget on the European Deterrence Initiative demonstrates.42
It was in a political environment of mutual political distrust, rhetorical and diplomatic controversy, of strained relations between Washington and most European capitals, of fears of rising nationalism in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Hungary and the announced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, that a second attempt43 to formally enhance EU-NATO cooperation took place.
Despite the instability felt in Europe’s neighbourhood and the destabilizing effects caused by the consecutive interventions in Middle East, by the regime change in Libya and by the course of American and Russian foreign policy, the European and euroatlantic institutions proved resilient44 to contingencies sourced in the personality of national decision-makers and on the hindrances of party politics.
A realization that the EU-NATO cooperation was an imperative followed two major challenges to transatlantic unity. On the one hand, the coalition force that intervene in Kosovo (North Atlantic Council 1999a and 1999b) with NATO, despite the absence of a United Nations mandate. On the other, the American intervention in Afghanistan, at a time when the United States declined to accept the possibility to invoke Article 5, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 200145.
The 2003 EU-NATO Declaration46 paved the way to the so-called development of a “strategic partnership” (Renard 2016b) between the EU and NATO. This led to the Berlin Plus agreement, opening the opportunity to the European Union to use NATO’s command and control collective structure and to institutionalise forms of cooperation and political consultation between the two organizations in the field of crisis management and capability development on fight against terrorism, organized crime and cybersecurity.
In 2016, the need to foster better EU and NATO cooperation was in part a reaction to two exogenous events. On the one hand, the potential wearing down of transatlantic relations in the face of growing defence spending, following the unilateral involvement of some allied countries in the Syrian conflict and in military operations in the context of fight against ISIS. On the other, due to a continuous ambivalence in relations between the United States, the EU and NATO sourced in the political and strategic narrative of American administrations against the development of European defence integration. The notion of European Security and Defence Identity or that of a NATO’s European pillar47 prevailed over a more autonomous European defence, while the very same administrations pressed for a more independent operational output of European allies, higher defence spending and stronger commitment of Europeans to NATO’s military operations.
Despite the potential for disagreement between the two organizations, contextual events did prove their adaptability to the changing strategic environment. NATO evolved from out-of-area to a new military stance with the return to European and transatlantic core defence functions, after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EU/CSDP, although without abandoning its security interests towards the near neighbourhood, turned its security focus to the protection of its citizens, to a more efficient response to external crises and called for better commitment towards regional security and capacity building of partners, leading to stronger resilience and committed ownership.48 These almost simultaneous processes of adaptation were accompanied by a closer relation among allies, centred on the principle of “effective multilateralism” and strategic complementarity, contradicting the idea of competition and duplication between the two organizations. This is a reserve frequently expressed among policy makers and analysts, although it has been formally addressed and solved within both organizations.
From an early stage, EU actors have denied the idea of competing or duplicating security and defence projects by stating that CSDP will act “where NATO as a whole is not or does not wish to get involved”, a concern repeatedly underlined since the 2001 Laeken EU Council and reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). More recently a statement adopted by the European Defence Agency assured that “no capacity duplication with other institutions such as NATO” would happen, stressing that PESCO would develop as a “coherent full spectrum force package” (EDA 2018, p. 4) in complementarity with NATO. This intention was also reiterated by the “Implementation Plan for Security and Defence”, by the “European Defence Action Plan” and by the “Notification letter on PESCO to the Council and High Representative”. This concern with avoiding the idea of duplication is also mirrored at the bilateral level among those which are strategically more capable. Recent agreements between actors such as France and Germany, as in the case of the Achen Treaty in its Article 4, emphasises that the bilateral commitment to reinforce cooperation between France and Germany, regarding European security and defence is taken “In light of their obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949 and of Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007 amending the Treaty on European Union” (Achen Treaty, 2019, Article 4 (1)) formally refuting any interpretations on duplication.
In July 2016, in Warsaw, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and NATO’s Secretary General signed an EU-NATO Joint Declaration on how to further cooperation between the two organizations. This initiative was followed in December, of the same year, by an agreement on a common set of proposals to implement “EU-NATO Joint Declaration” (2016) by endorsing 42 proposals in the 7 areas agreed: defence capabilities; capacity building; industry and research; cyber security; hybrid threats, operational cooperation and exercises. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called the 2016 agreement “a milestone in our relations,” recognising that “neither organisation has the full range of tools” to address new security and defence challenges unilaterally (NATO Meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2016).
In December 2017 the Council of the European Union49 would underline the necessity to implement the Joint Declaration reinforcing cooperation at the strategic and operational levels between the EU and NATO. A particular interest was placed on the collaboration between the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats¸ staff level cooperation on threat assessment regarding terrorism and on how to counter terrorist threats. The identification of gender indicators and assessments on how they could improve situational awareness, in support of the UNSCR 1325 agreed in 2000, were also addressed. It was agreed to promote EU and NATO staff presence in advisory and preparedness bodies for missions of the respective organizations and better coordination of EU-NATO exercises.
In 2018 a EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed reiterating the interest and noting the progress achieved on what regards military mobility, counter-terrorism, cyber security, hybrid threats, resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related risks and promoting the women, peace and security agenda. This was followed by the attendance of the new High Representative Josep Borrell to NATO Defence Ministerial meeting. At the operational level there is a continuous cooperative effort in the Aegean Sea, where NATO has six ships helping to implement the agreement between the EU and Turkey on the refugee crisis, as well as support to Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean.50 This measures and actions reflect the particular security and defence concerns of both organizations and how NATO and the EU may contribute to mitigate them. Coherence, complementarity and interoperability remain the three main drivers for EU-NATO cooperation and the only acceptable and feasible in times of limited budgets and increasing new challenges to security and defence.
However, the cumulative nature of the process of cooperation that result from the EU-NATO Joint Declarations cooperation, rather than phased and incremental, may be counterproductive for three reasons. First, for reasons of capacity availability and funding. Second due to the length of national legislative cycles, which may limit the political willingness of Member States to pursue, in a sustainable manner, new cooperative engagements once the political cycle has changed. Third, and as Verbeke notes (2017, p. 5), structural projects such as those related with states “Long term strategic interests or investments (such as energy infrastructure or major defence platforms) are neglected in favour of short-term tactical advantages or pet projects”. This trend may compromise the binding effect of more structural commitments, agreed within multilateral arrangements, such as NATO and the EU.
Each Member State encloses very specific political, strategic, diplomatic and security cultures, distinct historical legacies and operational output. This may be determinant on how security and defence cooperation moves forward and how Member States and participant states accommodate alternative frameworks in multilateral, minilateral and bilateral settings, adjusting to new processes of security governance. Connected societies are as prone to accountability as they are to the immediacy of results, a demand that fits poorly to the required long-term test to which regional and international cooperation is exposed to, in order to prove resilience to external challenges and efficient output in the face of change.
5. Advantages of EU-NATO Cooperation
Despite considerable improvements leading to better institutionalization of cooperation, between the EU and NATO, academic and policy debates are still focused on traditional divides, which can be systematized in two approaches: on how to address and manage security problems. Those that, in the words of Glenn Snyder (1984:489), postulate the effectiveness of “toughness and confrontation” and those who value a “strategy of conciliation”. This divide has been characterising the cooperative stance between the two organizations for decades and those of Member States foreign relations. To a certain extent, this dichotomy affects both the analytical and strategic approach, when addressing Euro-Atlantic security and defence relations. This varies from a persistent concern with the division of strategic work among European and non-European allies (Yost, 2000 and 2007); to the problem of strategic and financial burden sharing (Kivimäki 2019; Jakobsen 2018; National Defence Strategy 2018) and to the conditionality that results in the fact European defence will only be welcomed by the United States and by the more Atlanticist allies, if and when it strengthens NATO (Brattberg 2018; BillonGalland and Thomson 2018; Leonard and Shapiro 2019). The specific concern with division of strategic work in a NATO context and the reluctance of some Member States to embrace role specialisation of certain security and defence tasks at the European level, has evolved into a new perception on the disagreements registered among allies on the Alliance collective share of risks and defence expenses versus selective common investments in European security and defence, through Permanent Structured Cooperation. The two moments of strategic strain in 2003 and 2016, did not impair Euro-Atlantic cooperation and despite concerns with duplication and competition, developments have shown that complementarity between the two organizations is valued the most.51
Several circumstances have been enabling better opportunities for cooperation between the EU and NATO. First, contextual related reasons such as the emergence of hybrid threats in the Eastern Europe, the threat of potential and actual external interferences on allied countries internal affairs, the consequences of the refugee crisis over European unity and the uncertainties caused by the British referendum.52 To this already long list, one must add the internal and regional consequences of the conflict in Syria, the position of President Donald Trump regarding NATO and the EU creating a perception of existential threat the long and well succeed transatlantic alliance. On the one hand, it led to the claim that Europe should aim at a stronger role in the security and defence of Europe. On the other, that that strengthened position would only be supported if and when it reinforced NATO. In the face of current security challenges, unforeseeable outcomes of insecurity, limited resources and greater interdependency related with the consequences of uncertainty, the development of cooperation, rather than competition, is an expected outcome for relations among states and within international organizations. The deterioration of insecurity in North Africa, following the collapse of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, the downfall of the so called Islamic state in the Middle East, the consequences of revisionist foreign policies and the spread of terrorist acts in Europe point to the diversity of sources of insecurity and to the necessity for a more efficient and distinct form of security and defence cooperation53, of which military cooperation is just a part. Closer functional cooperation between the EU and NATO may help to better deal with the uncertainties of systemic insecurity in Eastern Europe and on the South and South-eastern rim of the Mediterranean, offering the opportunity to safeguard distinct national and international security interests. Decision makers and international bureaucracies should endorse what Member States do better, whether that is crisis response or conflict management, fight against terrorism, maritime security and mitigation of cyber and hybrid threats, according to different strategic cultures and interests, while fostering ownership and cooperation in response to security challenges.
Second, collaborative practice strives better in institutional environments where international socialization among security and defence actors is high. In strongly connected structures political, public scrutiny may turn collaborative practice into an instrument that adds legitimacy, better mobilizes public and political will and creates more favourable conditions to resource security and defence agencies, such as NATO and the EU-CSDP. NATO and the EU gather relevant strategic players, share a high degree of membership overlap and their international security mandates have a specific focus on European security and defence interests. This brings into Euro-Atlantic collaborative practice both an element of representativeness of interests and a dimension of legitimacy.
Third, power shifts in the international system may lead to changes in the nature of security, opening up a new range of tasks for international organizations beyond their original mandate, from military missions to operations-other-than-war, to humanitarian relief, organized crime eradication and disaster relief. This is reflected in new security tasks, but also in new mobilizing arguments in the way security roles are performed, such as preventive security, pre-emptive military action, mitigation of hybrid threats and crisis response, rather than classical military offensive, an option that governments and public opinions appear to be less inclined to support. New role prescriptions not only demand new military and non-military responses, but also a security discourse that appeals to cooperative action, combining international law, centred on value-based principles and arguments that serve national interests, while suggesting further functional integration on security and defence. Role specialisation may be an “asset” on demand given that not all armed and security forces can afford to have the full spectrum of capabilities required to mitigate current challenges and threats.
The institutionalisation of new forms of cooperative security, as established between the EU-NATO, by the corresponding declarations on cooperation of 2003, 2016 and 2018, underline the need to share risks and responsibilities in specific security levels, notably in the context of hybrid threats, maritime security to mitigate illegal trafficking of human beings and search and rescue of irregular migrants at sea. A good example of EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level was developed in the Horn of Africa to counter maritime piracy54, together with missions in land with the aim to develop capacity building on maritime security, in coastal areas in the region. Other cooperative efforts were developed in 2016, through Operation Sophia, with the aim to lessen the challenges posed by the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea, in combination with the support given to the Turkish and Greek authorities and the support made available by EU FRONTEX. In each of these missions and operations, both NATO and the EU moved from traditional security and defence in the far border, to counter-piracy and irregular migration in the near border.
The fourth advantage of enhancing security and defence cooperation between the EU and NATO results from the fact that, organizations and the states that incorporate them commit to cooperative frameworks for reasons of easier access to specialized knowledge, information and resources. Currently, the EU as already access to command and planning structures of NATO, under the Berlin Plus agreement and in the future it can be envisaged an eventual access of NATO to the EU-CSDP specific civilian proficiencies of the European crisis response toolkit. The development of both the EU CSDP Civilian Compact (Council of the European Union 2018) and the projects developed under Permanent Structured Cooperation (Council Decision 2017) may contribute to develop European actors roles, knowledge and experience on civilian crisis management, while supplementing the amount of resources needed among participant states in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and in post-conflict situations.
For cooperation to happen political will and trust must be present. These conditions are not mere technical arrangements, sometimes not even financial ones, they are a choice that shapes the opportunity to engage collective. The participation in new cooperative security frameworks in “conditions of confidence building, transparency, information availability and knowledge” (Nunes 2006, p. 89), enable institutional mimetism to strive among organizations, thus facilitating cooperation or conversely creating a situation of perceived competition for mandates and resources. In the case of NATO, there is a growing appeal among allies for it to perform civilian security tasks for which the Alliance was not originally created, as a political and military organization. In the case of EU-CSDP, one observes an increasing institutionalization of conditions aiming at a better operational deliver, following the approval of a Security and Defence Action Plan (European Council 2016) and the agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation.55
Lastly, the fact both NATO and the EU are politically integrated and highly socialised organizations, bound by similar norms and interests, makes political cooperation an opportunity and the prospect of more efficient operational collective engagement more likely. Cooperation is expected to work better in an interdependent security environment, where multiple memberships to organizations are present and where resources scarcity or uneven distribution of resources occurs turning cooperation into a more advantageous and less costly alternative.