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Status quo cooperation proves they’ll both “say yes,” but the counterplan is key to formalize the partnership and make it effective.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Inserting India Into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House Paper Number 30, March, Available Online at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefTech_Doc-04.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 9-13)

2. Imperative for a Trilateral Defence Technology Partnership

Despite its flourishing technological-industrial innovation base, the U.S. is now confronted with the reality that it no longer enjoys the absolute lead in many emerging technologies, especially in the defence sector such as drones, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing. Its principal adversaries, China and Russia, have pursued the same set of technologies to reduce their capability gap with the U.S. and attain competitive advantage. In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared that the country which takes the lead in AI will rule the world.3 China has identified these technologies as strategic technologies and anchored its flagship national policies such as “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy on them.4 In the Chinese Communist Party’s conception, these technologies are multi-use, which blurs the distinction between civil and military, thereby allowing the Party to utilise these technologies not just for national governance and industry, but for defence and security as well. Beijing has also joined hands with Moscow to collaborate and innovate on these technologies.5

China’s confrontationist attitude against its neighbors and adversaries— as seen in the ongoing border standoff with India in Ladakh—coupled with its determined efforts to take the lead in emerging technologies, make it imperative for India, the U.S. and other like-minded countries to bolster their existing research and development activities in such technologies. Though technological advancements are taking place at breakneck speed, it is clear that a solo national effort in developing and adopting critical technologies won’t go far. Therefore, India and the U. S. need to expand their effort and enlist another close partner, Israel, to advance their technological goals. The financial logic of such an effort becomes even more apparent in the face of the challenge of a once-in-a-century pandemic of COVID-19, which has strained economies and resource mobilisation, and distracted many countries from their strategic goals. If such cooperation is undertaken, it will enable cost-sharing for innovation, leading to optimal use of finite budgetary resources and achieving economies of scale.6 [end page 9]

For the United States:

• Israel is a principal military ally in West Asia. It is a technologically advanced partner for research and development in emerging technologies in defence and cybersecurity and also other domains such as renewable energy and food security.7 Israeli defence companies such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) have an extensive engagement with U.S. defence companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Silicon Valley majors such as IBM, Intel and Google have tapped into Tel Aviv’s start-up ecosystem for years.

• India has emerged as a principal U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific and offers a large market for its defence industry. The U.S. has developed a thriving defence and security partnership with India since signing the “Framework Agreement for Defence Cooperation” in 2005 (renewed in 2015).8 In 2020, the ties were elevated to a “comprehensive global strategic partnership.”9

For Israel:

• Substantial American foreign and military aid has enabled Jerusalem to achieve a qualitative military edge over its quantitively superior Arab neighbors.10 Israel has used American aid to innovate and develop military hardware such as the Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile and air defence systems, providing its territory and population much-needed protection from rockets and projectiles fired from neighboring territories. As a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the U.S., it gets specific military benefits like advanced defence technologies on a priority basis and intelligence-sharing.11 The high degree of mutual trust between the two countries is also evident with Israel being the only country to receive unfettered access to American military technology and equipment such as the F-35 fighter jet.12

• India is the largest purchaser of Israel’s weapons, which has provided the latter’s defence industry much-needed, stable access to a larger market and funding for its R&D.13 There is also extensive people-to-people contact between the two countries. Joining hands with India in expanding the scope of bilateral defence cooperation to include the U.S., will not only reinforce its access to the Indian market, but also offer opportunities for exports to emerging markets in Asia and Africa—India’s traditional defence export destinations. [end page 10]

For India:

A potential trilateral defence cooperation will build on the robust bilateral defence and security cooperation developed in the last decade with the U.S. and Israel. Both countries are major defence suppliers to India. They have also taken the initial steps in joint R&D with India’s state-owned defence R&D base.

• Israel: Driven by the shared threat perception of being surrounded by hostile neighbors, India-Israel relations have come a long way since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.14 Israel’s annual arms sales to India averages $1 billion and is the mainstay of the bilateral relationship. The purchase of various radar and missile defence systems along with drones and avionics (see Table 4 in appendix) from Israel have augmented the Indian military’s surveillance and operational capabilities.15 Israel has supplied India satellite imagery, hand-held thermal imagers and night vision devices which have proved particularly valuable in counterterrorism operations.16

Israel has aligned itself with the ‘Make in India’ initiative which has prioritised the development of a domestic defence industry.17 Both countries have co-developed and operationalised the Barak-8 air and missile defence system.18 They have expanded this cooperation by setting up a bilateral sub-working group on defence industrial cooperation, in September 2020, to focus on technology transfer, co-development and co-production, AI, innovation and joint export to friendly foreign countries.19

The three major Israeli defence companies—IAI, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems—have multiple, long-term joint ventures with Indian private sector companies including Bharat Forge, Tech Mahindra, Adani Group and Tata Advanced Systems to produce niche sub-systems and homeland security systems (see Table 5 in appendix). For instance, the joint venture between Elbit Systems and Adani Defence and Aerospace operates in Hyderabad, the only facility outside Israel which produces the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).20 In fact, Israeli companies have been quick to identify and use the unique technological solutions offered by Indian companies. A prominent example is Bengaluru-based Tonbo Imaging, whose specialised electro-optics technology has been part of Rafael and IAI’s precision-guided bombs for years. 21 [end page 11]

• United States: Since formalising defence cooperation, India has been inching up the ladder in the U.S. defence bureaucracy: In 2016, it acquired the unique status of ‘Major Defense Partner’ which opened access to advanced American defence technology. In 2017, the updated National Security Strategy described India as a “leading power and stronger strategic and defense partner”.22 This was followed by India receiving the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 status in 2018, enabling it to access dual-use high technology items—a major breakthrough as India had been denied these technologies for a long time.23

Defence trade and technology co-development and co-production are the two most important dimensions of this relationship. Between 2005 to 2020, the bilateral defence trade was $20 billion (see Table 4 in appendix). 24 American defence equipment has added considerable value to the Indian military’s power projection and surveillance capabilities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific domain.

Beyond defence trade, India’s persistent efforts to achieve self-reliance in defence have offered opportunities for bilateral engagement in technology co-development and co-production through the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) mechanism, created in 2012.25 While the initial focus of this cooperation was on basic technologies—identified as ‘pathfinder projects’,26 the approach has evolved into a focus on customised technologies, which are mutually beneficial. Current projects include co-development of air-launched drones and lightweight small arms technology (see Table 1).27 Also as part of the DTTI, the U.S. is working with India on aircraft carrier design. These technologies are still in the exploratory phase and therefore demonstrable progress is slow.

[Table Omitted — see URL][end page 12]

Through commercial joint ventures between American and Indian companies, India has built a substantial defence-industrial capability, enabling domestic players, like the Tata Group and Bharat Forge, to manufacture and export subsystems as an active participant of the global supply chain (see Table 5 in appendix).28

It is these existing bilateral partnerships that a trilateral cooperation will seek to synergise and expand. A focus on emerging technologies, taking advantage of the deep defence innovation in Israel and the U.S., will offer a clear pathway to initiate and develop this cooperation.

The idea of a trilateral cooperation is not unknown—but it is unfulfilled. In recent years, Indian American diaspora associations along with Jewish American associations in the U.S. have repeatedly raised the idea of a technology triangle between the three countries.29 Similarly, in September 2020, Bonnie Glick, then Deputy Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) revealed that the three countries had explored initial cooperation in 5G mobile communication technology.30

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