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The other planks solve EDT competition — focus on basic research is key to operationalizing future EDT benefits

“war for talent”

Avoids DoD O/S DA because the NSIC will provide a budget report to congress – that means its priced in all the time

NSIC solves businesses not wanting to invest in basic research – clarifies what the government wants to fund, giving stability to pursue it

Talent et al. 19 (Jim Talent, holds a BA in political science from Washington University, with the Arnold J. Lien Prize as the most outstanding undergraduate in political science, and a JD from the University of Chicago Law School, adjunct professor at the Washington University Law School, former US Senator for Missouri, Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Defense Policy Board, senior fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center; Robert O. Work, holds a BS in biology from the University of Illinois, MA in Systems of Management from the University of Southern California, MS in System Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a MA in International Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, member of the IISS, distinguished senior fellow and CEO of CNAS, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (32nd), former Undersecretary of the Navy and Deputy and Principal Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy acting with the Secretary’s authority in management of the Department of the Navy, Senior Fellow for Maritime Affairs and Vice President of Strategic Studies in the CSBA, focusing on Department of Defense transformation and defense strategy; Lisa Atherton, holds an MA in Business from the College of William and Mary and a BS in legal studies from the US Air Force Academy, CEO of Textron Systems; Stephanie Murphy, US representative for Florida’s 7th congressional district, holds an MS in foreign service from Georgetown University and a BA in economics from the College of William and Mary; Jim Banks, US representative for Indiana’s 3rd congressional district; Donald J. Rosenberg, executive vice president of Qualcomm, former senior vice president of Apple, member of the International Advisory Board, holds a JD from St. John’s University School of Law; Christian Brose, CSO of Anduril Industries, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, managed the production and final passage of 4 NDAA’s; Nadia Schadlow, former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Advisor for Strategy, holds an MA and PhD both in government from the SAIS at Johns Hopkins; Eric S. Edelman, former US Ambassador to Turkey, former Under Secretary of Defense, former Vice President for National Security Affairs, holds a PhD, M Phil, and an MA all in US diplomatic history from Yale; Raj Shah, former Deputy Assistant to the President, holds a BA in government from Cornell University; Mike Gallagher, holds a BA from Princeton, holds an MSSI at National Intelligence University, and 2 MA’s in security studies and government from Georgetown University, and a PhD in Cold War history; Matthew Waxman, member and international affairs fellow of the council of foreign relations, studied political science and international studies at Yale University; Andy Kim, holds a BA in political science from the University of Chicago and an MPhil and PhD from Oxford University; "The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition", December 2019, Ronald Reagan Institute, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355498/the_contest_for_innovation_report.pdf, DOA: 7-13-2022)//ATJ *NSIB = National Security Innovation Base, defined as “the ecosystem of capital, research, knowledge, capabilities, policies, incentives, and people that turns ideas into innovations and transforms discoveries into useful technology and products to protect our national security.” (p. 10).

I. Directing, Coordinating, and Incentivizing the NSIB

The technologies central to the 21st-century national security landscape are changing the future of competition and conflict. These technologies include advanced computing, quantum technology, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous capabilities, cyber, advanced wireless communications (5G and beyond), hypersonic weapons, and microelectronics, among others. In this dynamic technological environment, to achieve competitive advantage, the United States must strive to be a “first mover” whenever possible and a “fast second mover” if surprised by an opportunistic competitor. The United States must also try to protect crucial technologies by fostering their development in the United States or allied nations and providing safeguards to ensure they are secure and reliable. Given the nature of this open competition, however, the United States must also hedge against those technologies that cannot be fully protected. We should, in essence, build higher fences around fewer things.

Findings:

1. The U.S. government lacks a formal structure that provides for more information sharing and collaboration among the disparate segments of the NSIB. This is the least developed and perhaps the most critical function the government can carry out.

2. The federal share of total R&D—at its lowest in over 60 years in 2018—has decreased, giving way to commercially driven R&D.12 This trend has created both positive and negative consequences for the NSIB. On one hand, this shift has increased the total level of R&D funding in the U.S. marketplace. On the other hand, motivated by short-term performance and commercial relevance, U.S. companies have moved away from the basic research often necessary to drive generational technological advances and instead focused on shorter-term strategies tied to quarterly earnings.

One manifestation of this trend is that today’s biggest American technology companies focus more on optimizing their current products and services rather than investing in follow-on basic research—the kind that earned American companies Nobel Prizes in the past.13

3. Universities are a critical node of the NSIB. Their research in sensitive areas, including government supported work on sensitive technologies, is vulnerable to foreign spying and IP theft. At the same time, the openness and attractiveness of American universities help promote scientific innovation and expand the American knowledge base.

USG outreach to academia should be coordinated across all agencies supporting the NSIB. It should include better communication of both the threats and the opportunities for those working within the NSIB. The partnership needs to be integrated between law enforcement, counterintelligence, government labs, and policy officials.

4. USG engagement with companies and universities has helped raise awareness of the challenge but faces limitations in information-sharing and messaging.

• Inconsistencies across USG agencies with regard to declassifying information about Chinese activity hamper the ability to bring charges against intellectual property thieves and decrease the effectiveness of warnings about the scale and effectiveness of China’s efforts.

• Even when information is declassified, the government lacks the tools and resources to disseminate the information effectively.

Recommendations:

1. Congress should authorize an interagency coordination body—the “National Security Innovation Committee”—that is responsible for enabling, developing, guiding, and safeguarding the NSIB. This entity would consolidate and elevate the existing agency lines of authority rather than create a new layer of bureaucracy. Its work should be strategic and not reactive.

• The committee’s goals would be to foster innovation in the United States or among our close allies, protect cutting-edge innovation from theft and exploitation by our strategic competitors, and establish safeguards to ensure national security applications are secure and reliable.

• The committee would aim to facilitate common purpose and coordinated effort among the federated NSIB ecosystem, from the traditional defense and national security community to private-sector innovation centers and academia. This effort should aim to focus the NSIB ecosystem on the innovations most important to the national competition, but not in a way that dampens its greatest strength—dynamism—or introduces bureaucratic obstacles, which are the enemy of innovation.

• The committee would clarify what the U.S. government expects of the NSIB, as the private sector elements of the ecosystem often struggle to identify sustainable technological investments in potentially vulnerable funding streams over time.

• The committee would formally designate the critical areas in national technological competition and maintain an understanding of the dual-use technologies being developed in the NSIB.

• Once identified, these technologies must be prioritized with long-term budgeting commitments. As such, the committee should be responsible for coordinating and submitting a unified budget analysis to Congress each year to evaluate all of the activities across the USG related to the NSIB. This analysis will bring clarity to the scope and breadth of investments in NSIB priorities and help policymakers rationalize and prioritize strategic investments.

• The committee would have the responsibility to manage information sharing across the government and the authority to task relevant government agencies with developing and executing policies relevant to the NSIB.

• The committee would provide a pathway for the private sector to provide input on its work.

• Congress would include an annual reporting requirement from the committee, assessing the state of the U.S. NSIB and the government’s efforts to protect it.

• The committee should be chaired by the DOD and include representatives from other government agencies with equities related to national security innovation. Members should include the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury along with White House stakeholders such as the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of American Innovation, as well as other agencies as Congress deems appropriate. Representatives from the various agencies should be designated by the secretaries or agency heads but not below the under-secretary level.

2. The USG should expand funding for R&D and proposals for non-DOD arms of the government—e.g., the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, and Commerce—to ensure a strong U.S.-owned and U.S.-based manufacturing center in key sectors, such as semiconductors.

Congress should authorize a new competitive grant program to fund basic research in areas important to 21st-century competition, such as AI, autonomy, quantum technology, or advanced computing. The grant program should be administered in coordination with the DOD to fill gaps in DOD funding.

3. While not sufficient to prevail in this competition, protecting American technology and intellectual property is a critical part of the U.S. approach. Efforts to secure the supply chain, such as the recent Executive Order securing the information and telecommunications supply chain, and rules establishing cyber protection standards will be an important part of arresting Chinese IP theft and countering one of their greatest strengths. Necessary, but not sufficient, steps include the following:

• The U.S. government should establish, maintain, and publicly release a list of academic institutions and other organizations that have a history of improper technology transfer, IP theft, or cyber espionage, or that operate under the direction of the PLA or Chinese intelligence services. The government should ban individuals who are either members of the PLA or affiliated with one or more of the organizations on this list from obtaining an F visa or J visa to the United States.

• The State Department should strengthen Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) for visas where there is potential for the illegal transfer of sensitive or dual-use technology. These SAOs, commonly known as Visas Mantis, should include a presumption of denial for visa applicants flagged by the State Department as potentially problematic. The State Department should inform companies in critical technology areas when they are recruiting or hiring individuals whose visa applications are flagged as such.

• The USG needs new tools to combat economic and industrial espionage. One such tool could be a new interagency committee and process to allow victims of IP theft to confidentially report and provide evidence to federal agencies to consider adverse action against foreign individuals and entities the government determines have unlawfully acquired IP from a U.S. person.

4. The USG and universities should work together to protect the integrity of sensitive research projects—especially those funded by the DOD, the intelligence agencies, and the Department of Energy—including sharing best practices, bolstering university security protocols, and improving compliance. Cooperation and communication between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and universities on these issues also needs to be improved. This should include nonclassified projects that have security implications.

• The DOD and the Intelligence Community fund unclassified but sensitive research projects at U.S. universities; however, they do not have good visibility on foreign participation in those projects. The USG should increase the required transparency of participants of this research, maintain a database of sensitive research projects, and develop a better understanding of foreign efforts to penetrate federally funded research projects.

• Universities should strongly consider policies that limit and ultimately reject funding from companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, that are closely linked to adversarial governments seeking to gain access to sensitive research.

• Technology produced by companies banned from the Federal Entities List should not generally be used in university research, especially research funded by the federal government.

5. The USG should pursue research partnerships with universities, similar to the existing programs with Purdue, MIT, and Georgia Tech, as a way to consolidate talent. By ensuring collaboration throughout the innovation process, sponsoring agencies can ensure efficient allocation of resources by preventing repetitive research while maximizing academic expertise. As part of these partnerships, the USG must clearly communicate the risk of espionage to universities.

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