3. Euro-Pacific Alignment Not Key To Counter China — Asian partners are sufficient, Europe’s military won’t help, and Europe is bogged down with Russia.
Bekkevold 22 — Jo Inge Bekkevold, Senior China Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, former Political Officer and Minister Counsellor at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022 (“NATO’s New Division of Labor on Russia and China Won’t Be Easy,” Foreign Policy, July 11th, Available Online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/nato-strategy-china-russia-threat-europe-asia-geopolitics/, Accessed 07-15-2022)
Nonetheless, even though the new Strategic Concept sends a strong signal of trans-Atlantic unity, it is too early to conclude that it enables a joint and well-coordinated U.S.-European approach on China. The reason for caution is geography. The U.S.-China rivalry presents NATO with a different challenge than the U.S.-Soviet one. During the Cold War, from its pivotal position in the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet Union constituted a threat to the entire Eurasian rim, from Europe all the way to the Far East, and it was a two-flank challenge to the United States. Europe was the core area of the Cold War strategic theater, and this consolidated not only a united threat perception among the United States and its European allies but also a common military strategy. China’s geographic position, on the other hand, does not preordain trans-Atlantic unity in a similar way.
Moving from strategy to policy implementing the Strategic Concept, the United States and European NATO members will find that the geopolitical logic of U.S.-China rivalry will shape a new, and not always easy, trans-Atlantic division of labor in three major ways.
First, from its geographic position on the Asian rim facing the Pacific Ocean, China represents a one-flank challenge to the United States. U.S. balancing of China will thus be largely regional, focusing on the Indo-Pacific with a lower priority for the trans-Atlantic flank. In fact, the new U.S. National Defense Strategy presented in March—after the Russian invasion of Ukraine had already started—clearly states that priority will be given to deter the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. One important outcome of the war in Ukraine—and the consolidation of the European side of NATO with Finland and Sweden as new members—is a more balanced burden-sharing within NATO, which allows the United States to channel more resources to Asia over the long term. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the debate had increasingly shifted toward putting Europe in a position to defend itself. With Germany and other European countries committing to greater defense expenditures in the wake of Russia’s war, European defenses will indeed be bolstered.
Secondly, balancing China in the Indo-Pacific theater will require the United States to lean more on Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members and other Asian partners than on NATO. In recent years, the larger European nations have eagerly deployed naval vessels to sail in Asian waters, though some of these deployments have been little more than symbolic. NATO is strengthening relations with its formal Asia-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand—with an agreement to step up cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, other new technologies, and countering disinformation. Nevertheless, it is still nebulous how exactly European militaries will add value to U.S. balancing efforts in Asia. European navies have been in constant decline since the end of the Cold War, whereas the Chinese navy has surpassed its U.S. counterpart in terms of number of vessels. China is now building the equivalent of the entire French Navy every four years. Elbridge Colby, co-founder of the Marathon Initiative, has suggested that it might serve the United States better to have Europe play to its strengths in the Euro-Atlantic area, an opinion echoed by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Commenting on the British deployment of its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, to the Indo-Pacific region in 2021, Austin indicated that Britain is more helpful closer to home than in Asia.
Finally, due to its limited geographic reach across Eurasia, China will remain a lesser threat to European security than Russia. With Russia an openly belligerent threat for the foreseeable future, European resources will be pinned down at home, impeding the implementation of a joint trans-Atlantic approach in the Far East. For instance, NATO plans to increase the strength of its rapid reaction force dedicated to the defense of its Eastern European members nearly eightfold to 300,000 troops. Even though U.S. armed forces will remain engaged in Europe, the bulk of NATO’s increased presence along its Eastern European frontier will have to be provided by European countries. And the security challenges in Europe’s own neighborhood are by no means limited to Russia. At a time when the United States is increasingly preoccupied in Asia, Europe faces crumbling stability in the Middle East, North Africa and other regions directly affecting Europe, not least through potential migration and refugee crises.