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No leverage link – prefer studies

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060022.pdf /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

Does U.S. SA support host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA can help prevent democratic backsliding, but it does not actively support democratization in the way that it is typically designed and resourced. If the United States supported host nation democratization via its inspirational democratic example (e.g., protecting human rights and individual liberties), then U.S. SA was not the conduit for broadcasting the U.S. democratic example. The evidence showed that two spikes in U.S. SA (between 0.8% and 1.4% of host nation GDP) were quickly followed by increases in democratization, but the largest spike in U.S. SA (upwards of 1.52% of host nation GDP, and conditioned on democracy-related reforms) did not increase democratization. 590 If aid conditionality supports host nation democratization, then the case studies indicate that the threshold is between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP.591 The evidence in both cases supported the idea that U.S. SA reinforced host nation security, which helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding, though it did not increase democratization. If U.S. security sector assistance generally supports host nation security sector reform—which then improved its civil-military relations and democratic governance—then the case studies indicated the threshold is above 10.5% of annual U.S. SA to the host nation.592 Overall, the cases provided little evidence to support this argument and plenty of evidence to undermine it.

Does U.S. SA undermine host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA does not undermine democratization as it is currently designed and resourced, but it could have an anti-democratic influence under the same design with excessive funding. Does U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians’ security apparatuses undermine democratization? The case of Pakistan revealed two increases in democracy shortly after large spikes in U.S. SA given to military dictators, and both of those SA packages lacked democratic conditionality.593 If this mechanism is generalizable, then the activation threshold is above 0.85% of host nation GDP.594 Pakistan’s positive public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms in the 2000s undermined the argument that a bad U.S. democratic example deters host nation democratization.595 Both cases undermined the argument that Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Both gave ample evidence of domestic and regional factors that can explain different forms of host nation democracy. I found no evidence that either country feared a Western-sponsored democratic revolution.

The most compelling causal mechanism was that U.S. SA (especially when it lacks democratic conditionality) creates an aid dependency dynamic. If U.S. SA reinforces a rentier class in the host nation society, then it likely undermined democracy. Before 2008, U.S. SA to Pakistan was below 6.14% and was followed by democratization. 596 After the 2008 increase in democracy, Pakistan’s Freedom House rating stayed at 4.5 through 2017; and from 2010–2014, U.S. SA averaged 7.37% of Pakistan’s government revenue. 597 This causal mechanism may activate when U.S. SA is above 6.14% of host nation government revenue, but that assumes that Pakistan has a notable rentier dynamic. If Pakistan does have a rentier dynamic, then U.S. SA was a notable contributor to it. I found that Pakistan’s military economy predated U.S. SA, and so U.S. SA may have entrenched it slightly, but it did not alter the fundamental dynamic of state governance. In short, U.S. SA and other aid sources were insufficient to create a rentier dynamic that did not already exist.

I argue that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional actors. It is designed to accomplish U.S. security objectives. The programs capable of driving institutional reform are a meager share of overall U.S. SA. U.S. SA is rarely integrated with a whole-of-government effort for supporting host nation democratization, and when one could argue it is, the quantity and duration of funding is inadequate to supersede the influence of domestic and regional actors. When the host nation’s security interests diverge from those of the United States (e.g., post-9/11 Pakistan), the resulting agency loss increases the threshold of U.S. SA necessary to have a significant influence. Despite the stated theme of democracy promotion in U.S. policy documents, U.S. SA was primarily designed to accomplish security objectives. By design it was not able to compete with domestic and regional actors, and by quantity it is not enough to significantly influence host nation democratization.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The United States can pursue its security objectives and democratization agenda somewhat independently in accordance with its typical design and resourcing of U.S. SA. There is a continual debate in U.S. foreign policy circles regarding whether or not to use aid conditionality to incentivize democratization or to allow U.S. SA to focus solely on security objectives without constraints relating to host nation governance.598 I found no evidence that democracy-related aid conditionality on “traditional” forms of U.S. SA influenced host nation democratization, which means that such conditionality should be applied for other purposes (e.g., to satisfy U.S. legal requirement or political sensitivities).

If the United States wants to decisively support host nation democratization, then U.S. SA should go to recipients with good democratic prospects in sufficient quantity for adequate duration. U.S. SA would need to be designed as part of a whole-of-government support package and implemented for a generation or more. It would need to exceed 1.52% of host nation GDP and increasingly emphasize defense institution building programs and other programs that bolster host nation civil-military relations. 599 Anything less is unlikely to support host nation democratization decisively. How would a head of state decide where to commit its resources to promote democracy if it cannot afford to take this approach worldwide? I concur with Ottaway that there are two basic choices. The United States can lower its democracy promotion policy ambitions and settle for sub-standard democracies, or it can abandon some countries in which democratic prospects are particularly dim and focus its resources on countries that are more likely to democratize.600 U.S. SA would go to states that largely share U.S. security interests (which reduces agency loss); have a high GDP, a history of democracy, and some form of civil society (which supports democratic consolidation); have neighboring democratic examples; have host nation elites willing to democratize; and have the institutional capacity to absorb the assistance.

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