Smart grids are particularly vulnerable to FDI attacks --- detection is key
Khazaei & Amini 21 --- Javad Khazaei, assistant professor in the electrical and computer engineering department at Lehigh University, and M. Hadi Amini, ssistant Professor at the Knight Foundation School of Computing and Information Sciences at Florida International University, “Protection of large-scale smart grids against false data injection cyberattacks leading to blackouts”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection Volume 35, December 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548221000482?casa_token=CJmndO91NGAAAAAA:hzNjEiWdnv10bAu7JnYgtcX86s_r21wmcKPMTE_mZNQK-8PEWxoJFMjNkexx3DXP-E5oTHW9
Power systems are the most important cyber–physical systems that guarantee reliability of other critical infrastructures including water networks, transportation, or health systems [1]. While the application of advanced monitoring system and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems enhanced the monitoring, protection, and security of smart grids, they have made the energy system vulnerable to cyber threats, which can jeopardize the security of power systems [2], [3].
A cyberattacker can therefore inject computer viruses or anomalies to endanger the security and resilience of the smart grid system [4], [5], [6]. Examples of such attacks include software bugs on Israel’s utility grid in 2016 [7], or Russian’s cyberattack on obtaining detailed data on nuclear power plants and water facilities in the U.S. in 2018 [8]. Another real-world example is the successful cyberattack by Russian hackers in December 2015 on the Ukraine power grid. In this cyberattack, 30 substations were switched off by hackers which resulted in a power outage of 1–6 h for almost 230,000 people [9].
Transmission lines are the most important assets in power delivery in smart grids, and if failed, can cause serious cascading problems leading to blackouts. One example of such cascading failure was a blackout in Italy that happened in 2004 [10]. Cyberattacks on transmission lines are normally designed to overflow a line or series of lines with the aim of cascading failures. Such transmission line congestion can be achieved if an attacker injects any false data on measurements without being detected by bad data detection algorithms during the state-estimation process. Recent studies show that these FDIs can be deliberately designed in order to bypass state-estimation methods without being detected [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. Therefore, targeted cyberattacks on multiple transmission lines can potentially cause cascading failures resulting in blackouts.