Second --- Hostile actors will use ambiguity to undermine NATO cohesion --- attribution through intelligence sharing is essential to collective response and deterrence
Christian 20 --- Joshua D. Christian, M.A. in Strategic Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, “RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS TO DESTABILIZE NATO”, Thesis Paper, June 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1114628.pdf
Russia’s apparent interest in destabilizing NATO at the strategic level likely entails degrading relationships not only within the Alliance but also within individual states of the Alliance. Karlsen notes that promoting division within the Alliance is what Western security institutions believe to be a key goal of Russian cyber operations.323 Due to this, cyber attribution is a critical aspect of responding to a cyber operation and NATO needs to denounce and openly attribute blame to the provocateur of a cyber operation. Open attribution places the aggressor state in the international spotlight which works to deter that state from future operations. It is the recommendation of this author that NATO adjust its posture and demonstrate a willingness to denounce any cyber activity that experts believe is from Russia. The case studies demonstrate the significant challenge to investigate and accurately attribute responsibility for cyberattacks. It is the recommendation for policy makers to conduct ongoing research and analyze findings to guide countermeasures and training.
Currently, not all NATO states are as willing as the United States to attribute blame for a cyber operation. The French presidential election provided documented evidence that resulted in the U.S. government’s willingness to blame Russia; in contrast, the French government refrained from directly attributing the cyber operation to Russia.324 In order to strengthen the Alliance and its position as a leading institution, NATO leaders are encouraged to evaluate future events and require collective recognition and responses to Russian cyber operations. A collective response and agreement from all of the NATO states, in response to a cyber operation against one member, displays a unity within the Alliance that further strengthens NATO. A unified NATO response demonstrates a strong Alliance that will minimize Russia’s ability to create division within the states and an Alliance that is prepared to respond to any threat.
2. Determine NATO Threshold for Response and Retaliation
The NATO Alliance is centered around the Article 5 commitment to collective defense from a conventional attack. In 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that “a serious cyberattack could trigger Article 5.”325 This is an evolving stance on cyberattacks that the Alliance did not demonstrate during previous incidents of Russian cyber operations analyzed in this thesis. Russia was able to carry out those cyber operations with minimal repercussions due to the issue of attribution. Following a systematic intelligence gathering and review, the NATO Alliance will be better equipped to determine the threshold for an Article 5 response. Creating and implementing NATO guidelines and strategies to evaluate, identify, and respond to cyber threats, allows NATO the ability to compare and contrast previous attacks against present threats to determine thresholds in each case. NATO should then publish a statement that all NATO member states have come together to determine the threshold for a cyber Article 5 response and are committed as an Alliance to respond to such an attack. Determining a threshold and then reaffirming commitment to retaliating to an Article 5 attack extends the longstanding strength of the Alliance, which in turns solidifies its legitimacy as an institution.
Not every cyber threat or cyberattack will warrant an Article 5 response, but in order to display the strength and commitment of the Alliance, a measured response is a critical tactic from the Alliance. For Russian attempts to interfere with the domestic electoral proceedings of a NATO member the Alliance could invoke Article 4 which states “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”326 This allows the Alliance to come up with a unified response to a threat to a member state. Cyber operations involving influence operations or critical infrastructure threats warrant individual evaluation. NATO needs to develop guidelines for responding to cyber operations against member states that handle operations on a case by case basis. Not all operations are undertaken for the same purpose and therefore require strategic responses. NATO has exercised responses to issues below the threshold of Article 5 for conventional matters; implementing guidelines and strategies in response to a cyber threat below this threshold would strengthen the legitimacy of NATO in cyber while deterring future adversaries.
3. Strengthen Intelligence Sharing Cooperation
Intelligence sharing is a key element of any alliance, and NATO member states are obligated to continually improve and strengthen intelligence cooperation. Greater cooperation between NATO states strengthens the Alliance as well as prepares states to defend against cyber operations while creating a deterrent. Greater intelligence cooperation will lead to further strengthening NATO resiliency and defense as specified in Article 3 which states “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”327 Cooperation and collaboration between partner states makes it more difficult for an adversary, such as Russia, to carry out a cyber operation against a NATO state. In the French presidential election, the U.S. government was able to communicate with the French government to alert it to Russian cyber activity meant to interfere in the election.328 Continual intelligence sharing between NATO members enables them to design and implement cyber defenses resulting in a stronger Alliance.
Cooperation between NATO states is crucial to strengthening cyber defenses; additionally, it is critical that policies identify cooperation between state and private entities. Private cybersecurity firms as well as areas of critical infrastructure of a state need to work closely with government agencies to create a stronger defense network. Dragonfly wasfirst discovered by cybersecurity firm Symantec, a discovery which led to governments being able to track the cyber operation back to the Russian government.329 Private entities may discover suspicious cyber activity and through close cooperation with government agencies could deter, defend, and even attribute cyber operations before an attack or effective information operation could take place. Intelligence sharing and cooperation within a NATO state can then be taken to the Alliance to be shared with other states and private entities. Close collaboration and intelligence sharing benefits the Alliance and further strengthens its commitment to the defense of NATO states.