Independently --- Attribution through information sharing allows NATO to counter hybrid war --- the alternative is an ineffective response
Underwood et al 22 --- Andrew Underwood et al, Major Underwood is Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), Europe, NATO, Russia, “All Quiet on the Eastern Front: NATO Civil-Military Deterrence of Russian Hybrid Warfare” April 14, 2022, National Defense university Press, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2999367/all-quiet-on-the-eastern-front-nato-civil-military-deterrence-of-russian-hybrid/
Information Operations. Another critical aspect of imposing costs and limiting options available through Russia’s hybrid warfare approach is effective IO attribution and response. IO is substantive enough a factor in Russian hybrid warfare to be considered beyond comprehensive defense. Staying abreast of Russian hybrid objectives, methods, and tools prevents Allies and partners from being caught [unprepared] flat-footed. It also enables a better understanding of Russian intent and options for hybrid activity, both in traditional spheres and within the gaps and seams of 21st-century technology as an information platform. This analysis focuses on the intelligence- and information-gathering and strategic communication aspects of IO. Intelligence- and information-gathering are critical to identify Russia’s hybrid options and intent and to mobilize NATO member states toward the activity. Conversely, strategic communication is a proactive, comprehensive defense measure to specifically limit Russian hybrid options and to broadcast the costs Russia would incur if it moved forward with them.
For intelligence-gathering to be effective in today’s operating environment, countries must be willing to break down stovepipes and widely share information within their own government structures as well as with Allies and partners. The coordinated actions of hybrid warfare allow Russia to exploit regional, national, and international seams. Building intelligence-sharing apparatuses both within and without ministries among and across countries helps to close those seams. Effective intelligence-sharing could occur at levels ranging from joint/multinational collection teams to finished intelligence analysis at ministerial or national levels. In other words, information-sharing does not always have to be top-down driven; sometimes bottom-up is effective.
One goal of shared intelligence is to reduce the time required for NATO to consult and respond in part or as a whole. This effort could be facilitated by a common intelligence picture shared by all parties. Partial, inconsistent, or stovepiped intelligence might slow NATO’s response process by creating doubt or failing to correctly attribute malign activity to the Russian government. In addition, whether internal to a state or between allied states, stovepiping challenges coordinated action against hybrid warfare. Better intelligence-sharing would allow states to deny Russia the benefit of using IO techniques in hybrid warfare to isolate specific states or populations. A common intelligence picture also makes it more likely, for example, that a Russian intelligence operative or team preparing to assassinate a dissident would be identified and detained, and have the network and messaging compromised. An example of intelligence-sharing success within NATO nations against hybrid activity is the Baltic Special Operations Forces Intelligence Fusion Cell, a budding Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish initiative that operates with assistance from the United States.20 If implemented properly, such intelligence fusion cells might provide key indications and warnings of Russian hybrid warfare operations across the spectrum of IO, denying Russia the benefit of being able to claim noninvolvement/noninterference and could serve as a template for future initiatives among other Allies and partners. Furthermore, such fusion cells provide a path for connecting information across the Alliance’s multiple stovepipes, that is, the intra- and inter-bureaucratic inertia and the multilingual nature of the information environment. This enables a common intelligence picture and, consequently, the ability of the Allies to collectively deny Russian IO to access seams unfettered and without attribution.
Once Russian hybrid warfare IO activity is recognized and NATO agrees a response is appropriate, strategic communication would likely be employed as the principal countermeasure and vanguard to prevent Russian activity. The situational awareness derived from the shared information and intelligence discussed in the previous section would be critical to crafting targeted messages. Strategic communication would likely be split between two audiences: external actors and an audience internal to the conflict (that is, the targeted population). Internal strategic communication efforts should focus on countering the information aspect of hybrid warfare. Prior to a campaign, successful strategic communication might limit the vulnerability to target audiences, such as the Russian-speaking minorities of the Baltic states, or a Russian hybrid campaign. This is achieved by negating Russia’s plausible deniability concerning the sponsorship of the conflict’s version of “little green men” (or whatever the aggressor looks like in that campaign). Internal strategic messaging campaigns must be swiftly organized and executed because they are most effective if they prevent Russia from gaining a tactical advantage during the initial “fog of war” period. Once a hybrid warfare campaign has begun, the focus of external strategic communication should be to expose Russian activities to NATO (and the rest of the world). This might undermine Russian public support for such activities, would inform decisionmakers during NATO deliberations, and should unite the international community against the malign actor.