Information sharing and management are critical to NATO cyber resilience and attribution capabilities --- countries will follow-on the US model
Brown 19 --- Sarah Brown et al, Senior Scientist at the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency where she works on cyber security capability development for NATO, with a particular interest in cyber threat intelligence, “Towards Mature Federated Cyber Incident Management and Information Sharing Capabilities in NATO and NATO Nations”, MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9020814
For the past decade, cyber security teams around the world have recognized the growing importance of sharing cyber security information. Data regarding recently discovered vulnerabilities, cyber threats, and even cyber incident information has been recognized as vital for cyber security teams to stay resilient in the face of the ever-changing threat landscape.
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need to share information with each other and to work collaboratively in order to investigate potential cyber security incidents. Particularly in the course of joint missions, it is recognized as a key requirement to allow mission commanders to build situational awareness and to make more informed decisions in response to threats or vulnerabilities.
The Federated Mission Network (FMN) framework aims to enable the rapid deployment of mission networks by federating NATO, NATO Nations, and Mission Partner capabilities. Federated cyber information sharing and incident management are included as key cyber security requirements.
The focus of this paper is to discuss incident management and information sharing challenges, and to highlight the value added by the Cyber Information and Incident Coordination System (CIICS) system to support these capabilities.
SECTION II.Federated Cyber Incident Management
Cyber incident management (IM) can be defined as the ability to plan and control activities that ensure detected attacks and faults are addressed. Incidents need to be managed from start to finish to ensure that systems and services can be returned to a normal state, any undesired effects are addressed, and future reoccurrences are prevented. The results from these activities is a key information source for improving effectiveness and efficiency of cybersecurity.
Cyber information sharing (IS) refers to sharing of reference information about systems, networks, and interdependencies, as well as threat intelligence to include indicators of attacks as they progress, to support partners in their own defence activities.
In a federated mission context, establishing these capabilities supports collective defence, which is essential in support of mission objectives. However, in a federated design these capabilities require very high levels of interoperability to support quality interaction between participants. In a federated environment closely connected networks of teams operate as a decentralized, multi-team system.
It may be difficult to execute relatively simple tasks such as checking a range of systems for signs of an intrusion. While each federation participant organizes collaboration between its own team members, the success of the federated cyber IM function hinges on the interaction between component teams (across the different FMN participants) that make up the capability.
SECTION III.Federated Cyber IM Best Practices
Previous NCI Agency work [1] on best practices for achieving successful IM&IS in a multi-team system provided recommendations that apply across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facility, and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) spectrum.
Two key recommendations address roles and responsibilities and technical interoperability.
Defined roles and responsibilities, as well as communication channels, are required for the federated cyber IM&IS capability to achieve interoperability between teams. Ideally, all individuals with a role in the IM capability will have the details of all the other individuals, including contact information, role, and position in the overall hierarchy.
Technical interoperability is also an essential and inseparable element in capability development and system implementation for FMN. Cyber IM&IS systems operating in an FMN environment may need to transmit data to and receive data from a variety of other systems, units or forces of any service or Nation, and use the exchanged data to operate effectively together. Without it, it is not possible to work together effectively collaborating in a multi-vendor, multi-network, multi-service environment [5].
SECTION IV.Capability Development with Ciics
It is this shared challenge (and requirement), among Nations and within NATO, for federated cyber IM&IS, that formed the basis of development of the CIICS project in 2014.
The CIICS project was initiated by three (3) Nations: Canada, The Netherlands, and Romania, as part of the Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) smart defence program1, in which a group of Nations, supported by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) pooled resources to develop solutions to common challenges.
CIICS is a tool to support cyber IM&IS, both within and beyond organizational boundaries.
CIICS is built around four (4) key functional requirements required in NATO and by the MN CD2 CIICS Nations.
A. Federated Design
CIICS is designed with a federated architecture to support multi-team collaboration, such as in an FMN scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 1. CIICS nodes are able to exchange data with other CIICS nodes by directly establishing a communication channel to each other (peer-to-peer mode). A dedicated public key infrastructure (PKI) allows strong certificate-based authentication between CIICS nodes. CIICS nodes manage the data and provide a web application to front-end to users.
B. Ability to Work Collaboratively on Cyber Securiy Incidents and to Share Key Cyber Information
From an information sharing perspective, Nations can directly feed threat intelligence, email alerts, and other relevant cyber defence information directly into their CIICS instance. This information will be stored in a knowledge base and is automatically replicated to all other Nation's CIICS nodes. The reference library is indexed with Elastic Search to enable efficient searching of large amounts of data.
From an IM perspective, CIICS contains a ticketing system designed specifically to track cyber defence incidents. Tickets can be handled locally on the CIICS node, or can be shared with one or more participants (e.g., in a federated mission environment), facilitating both local cyber incident handling, and joint coordination of incidents as necessary.
C. High Degree of Customization
CIICS is highly customizable. It support custom configuration of workflows, permissions, notifications, presentation language, structure and fields. Incident information is stored in an incident ticketing system component with many “facet” templates which can be added to support different incident types, as required. General knowledge (in human or machine readable formats)can be stored in a wiki-based knowledge repository, with configurable Communities of Interest with varying privacy / sharing levels.
D. Standards-Based Design
CIICS is standards-based, with the ability to import and export data in standard formats as well as enabling other systems to exchange data with CIICS nodes via its API.
SECTION V.The Incentive to Share
CIICS was designed with a number of target user groups in mind. These include National military Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), other National defence organizations, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Center (NCIRC TC), and FMN teams.
As with all organizations with a defence or security focus, the need to know tends to dominate. That is, information is limited to only those who are believed to have good business reasons to access the information. Sharing sensitive security outside of the organization is considered not worth the risk.
Usually, sharing will only start to happen when an organization is not able to solve an incident or needs extra information to be able to solve it. A tipping point it reached when the need to share exceeds the need to know. That is when incident sharing becomes clear and precise, and supplied and / or requested information will be handled and addressed properly.
This need to share will also occur when an infrastructure or application is shared, meaning there is a chance of being impacted by the same incident.
In most other circumstances common needs for incident information will be unclear, and requesting or supplying actionable information is really a challenge. This will either result in the sharing of massive amounts of incident information, since we are not sure what to share, so might as well share everything, or very risk-averse sharing of only very few pieces which we feel do not expose our own systems or vulnerabilities. As a result this shared information will be not directly actionable by the receiving party thus hard to address and filter.
So trust and sharing incident information only really becomes viable when there is a common goal that is collectively well understood and articulated.
SECTION VI.Federated Incident Management and Information Sharing in Action
Following its successful development and release, the CIICS sponsoring nations deployed a federation between themselves and the NCIRC TC which operates across the Internet at UNCLASSIFIED. A number of other nations have since joined this federation, and a community continues to grow. It has been interfaced to the open source Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) to draw in various pieces of structured cyber threat information which can then be linked to incidents within CIICS, and allows the users to explore overall links (for example, if certain indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been seen associated with multiple incidents, these incidents may infact also be linked).
As described above, however, in peacetime, and with the limitation of the classification, only very limited information sharing is viable through this system. The federation nations and NCIRC TC continue to work together to define the information sharing parameters for such a system.
In the meantime, the NATO Headquarters Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S) recognize the overwhelming requirement for cyber information sharing platforms, and indeed the requirement for potentially more classified information sharing, as they are in the process of implementing a MISP for access by NATO Nations and partners via BICES. Similarly, they are working on the development of the precise information exchange requirements for such circumstances.
On the domestic level, the Netherlands and Romania have found great use in the CIICS system for cyber information sharing and incident handling between government departments.
In the Netherlands, a national UNCLASSIFIED CIICS federation allows the various military domains to share relevant (nationally sensitive) cyber incidents, as they recognize the commonality between their different network infrastructures, and the potential benefits from this collaboration. More sensitive incidents can be escalated up to, and be handled on, their highly classified CIICS federation, while they can transfer nonsensitive elements back to the international CIICS as deemed appropriate. More details are provided in Section VII.
Romania's National Cyberint Center (CNC) implemented a CIICS federation between 55 central government agencies, again recognizing that the institutions have a shared goal to identify and analyze cyber threats. An interface to the UNCLASSIFIED international CIICS system allows them to selectively share non-sensitive details, as described in more detail in Section VIII.
To further explore use cases on classified systems, the sponsoring nations also provided the CIICS system for trial in a number of NATO exercises, which are discussed in Section IX.
SECTION VII.NLD National Experience
In The Netherlands Ministry of Defence (NL MOD) each military branch as well as the Military police (Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF), Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), Royal Netherlands Military Police (RNLMP), Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA)) has their own cyber security challenges within their own specific working area.
While the different forces use different hardware - tanks, airplanes, ships, armored cars - they do all use a shared communications infrastructure. Here there is a common interest and an implicit need to share incident information about that infrastructure as well as the technical details that can threaten it.
Within the NL MOD, multiple infrastructures are being used, which are not necessarily interconnected - for example, as a result of different classifications. But these are built upon the same building blocks, probably suffering from the same vulnerabilities.
While information that relates to a specific operational command may not need to be shared to other organizations, there will always be information that is important to share.
Being interconnected and being able to share incident information when needed is key here and CIICS is used to meet this requirement. Each operational command determines from its own authority whether to share or escalate an incident to the other organizations.
Furthermore, at the national level, NL MOD has identified multiple requirements for CIICS instances - at the “National Restricted” level, at the “National Secret” level, and also requirements to pass across the unclassified international federation, as well as potential classified (mission) federations. In trying to balance this plethora of business requirements, NL MOD has come up with an interesting solution, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
From this perspective all operational commands will run their own unclassified CIICS instances “National Restricted area” in Fig. 2), and these will be federated to one another.
To be able to handle and share classified incident information a federated national classified CIICS environment is also set up “National Secret area” in Fig. 2). This classified
CIICS system will be able to receive information from NATO partners and the unclassified CIICS system through data-diodes. This highly classified CIICS-system-high environment will contain the most relevant and complete actionable and historical incident information for each operational command and for the NL MOD CERT in an incident escalation role.
The NL MOD CERT's CIICS systems play an additional role in that they have additional interconnections with other CIICS federations (illustrated in Fig. 2 by the diodes), so that they can get or share incident information with other organizations, (e.g., governmental or peers). Sharing declassified incident information from the higher classifications downwards is done via air-gapped processes, following policies.
SECTION VIII.ROU National Experience
In Romania, following its designation as a national authority in the field of cyber intelligence, the Romanian Intelligence Service, through a specific unit, the National Cyberint Center (CNC), has endeavored to identify, prevent and counter the vulnerabilities, risks and threats to Romania's cyber security.
The team from Cyberint Center's objective is to collect, identify and understand cyber events from Cyber Infrastructures of National Interest (CII). Hence in2015, CNC implemented a project to build a National security system for the protection of Communications and Information Systems (CIS) critical infrastructures against cyber security threats. The project was implemented across 55 public infrastructures used by 55 institutions across Romania, bringing them together for a shared goal to identify and analyze cyber threats.
CIICS was implemented in a federated architecture, supporting joint incident handling, coordination and collaboration between the CNC organization and any of the 55 CIIs. When there is a common interest, CNC has the ability to share related aspects of cyber incidents with all organizations, helping them to have a proactive defence against specific threats.
The federated network between all the CIIs is a dedicated and isolated network between the 55 institutions and associated CIICS instances, together with a MISP instance, which is the main CNC tool used for sharing of indicators of compromise (see Fig. 3).
As with the Dutch, the Romanians have implemented a slightly bespoke CIICS deployment to best suit their national requirements. In this case, all instances are hosted and managed by the CNC, as a national authority for cyber defence. The federated system model allows the institutions to manage local incidents on their own system, and only share information that they believe might be of interest to other parties. The CNC acts as an escalation / central control hub to facilitate appropriate decision-making for sharing.
CIICS was also used during the last 3 editions of the main Romanian cyber defence exercise, CyDEx. The ability to conduct federated cyber defence information sharing as well as cyber incident artefacts, were the most appreciated aspects from the participating teams.
SECTION IX.Exercising Mission-Based Federated Incident Management and Information Sharing
The CIICS system has also been provided to NATO for use by National CERT teams during the Cyber Coalition (CC) Exercise (2014–2018), the Cyber Focus Area of the Cyber Warrior Interoperability eXercise (CWIX)(2014–2017), and NATO Response Force (NRF) in Steadfast Cobalt Exercise (2019). As described previously, a joint mission environment is the perfect scenario to necessitate joint cyber incident handling and information sharing.
Lessons learned during these exercises have been valuable to further refine what is needed by NATO and Nations across all DOTMLPFI aspects for federated incident management and federated information sharing.
Through use in Cyber Coalition exercises, users demonstrated a far richer appetite for joint IM&IS than is usually demonstrated during daily operations on fixed national networks. The tool proved a success in that teams progressed though the storylines faster than expected due to the rich collaboration. Lessons were learned in terms of the need for guidance on what information should, and should not, be shared [7].
At CWIX, the Cyber Focus Area is a test-bed by nations for new cyber capabilities. A federated network is formed, and proof of concepts are trialled, for example honeynets and honeytokens. A red team is then allowed to attack the federated blue teams, and they can exercise protecting themselves - and working together - for mutual defence. The red team attacks give the blue team participants good reason to share incident information, and the new capabilities help exercise the CIICS tool, to make sure it can support all types of cyber information sharing.
Steadfast Cobalt 2019 provided an opportunity to address a Cyber Defense (CD) IM&IS shortfall identified during the evaluation of the security domains NRF2020 and Joint Command and Control Capability (JC2C). NATO CIS Group (NCISG)Cyber Directorate, in coordination with NCI Agency Test Directorate, set up a feasibility test for existing CD IM&IS processes to determine if it meets operational network requirements.
These processes were complimented by a single CIICS instance, managed by NATO, deployed at the Mission Secret level, as a tool to facilitate the FMN teams in the absence of other tooling designed for this purpose. While this isn't the ideal implementation for CIICS - which would be for each mission network partner to have its own locally managed system, federated to the equivalent systems of the other partners such that information can be exchanged between them when required - this simple deployment enabled selective sharing via “visibility groups” and further helped the community to establish escalation processes, and to further determine agreements on when and what to share. Indeed, the requirement to have national ownership and privacy over a nationally-controlled, federated system, was highlighted by some partners, and this deterred them from using the system to handle nation-level incidents.
Fourteen (14) National deployed units from 10+ countries in Bucharest Romania along with several static entities (NCISG, JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples) tested their processes and ability to coordinate and work together on cyber security incidents that may affect a joint mission they are in together [3] [4].
The CD IM&IS process was assessed as capable for management and information sharing in future NRF-/FMN-networks and it was recommended that these requirements be endorsed as operational requirements for future NRF-rotations [6]
At a national and multinational level, cyber defence teams from NATO, NATO Nations, and Partners increasingly have a requirement to share cyber defence information and to coordinate on cyber incidents, particularly when they are engaged as coalition partners (e.g., the FMN Spiral 3 requirement for Nations to be able to conduct joint incident coordination and cyber security information sharing in a federated environment [2]).
SECTION X.Conclusion
Therefore, NATO and Nations must find ways to work seamlessly as a closely connected network of decentralized teams, as reflected in the FMN concept.
Collaborative work to date has made significant steps in establishing joint information sharing requirements, national and joint incident handling processes and procedures - and the definition of the interfaces between them, and requirements for the definition of escalation processes.
Three Nations, NLD, ROU, and CAN have developed a valuable tool in CIICS to support NATO and Nations in addressing requirements.
NATO and Nations must continue to invest in maturing existing capabilities (e.g., roles and responsibilities, what to share, workflows, interoperable tools and systems, training, etc.), to achieve mature federated incident coordination and information sharing capabilities.
NATO is also encouraged to use common funding to further the development of these capabilities, because of the federated aspect to the capability requirement.