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Information sharing is insufficient now

Faesen 22 --- Louk Faesen et al, Senior Strategic Analyst at the Cyber Policy and Resilience Program of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “The Promises and Perils of a Minimum Cyber Deterrence Posture Considerations for Small and Middle Powers”, April 2022, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Promises-and-Perils-of-Minumum-Cyber-Deterrence-Posture-HCSS-2022.pdf

At an international level, the challenges are compounded even when the interdependence of cyberspace and a commonality of threats and interests makes the imperative to cooperate highly salient. The transatlantic alliance, broadly construed, has oftentimes struggled to arrive at a consensus around what constitutes acceptable behavior and appropriate responses in cyberspace. More directly pertinent from a deterrence perspective, there are operational limitations to meaningful cooperation between allies about intelligence-sharing around cyber threats and coordinating responses to malicious cyber behavior. The nexus between cyber and intelligence operations, and the deep ties between the cyber and signals intelligence worlds, creates significant impediments to sharing intelligence even among close allies that would enable timely and effective attribution, defense, and other responses. For offensive cyber operations in particular, the challenge is most delicate. Allies vary in terms of the level of maturity of offensive cyber programs (if at all); perspectives on the application of sovereignty to cyberspace and, by extension, how other states should approach maneuvering in others’ networks; and potential sources of mistrust about allies’ cyber activities. The latter is evident in debates about how new US cyber concepts, such as persistent engagement and defend forward, which were debuted in Cyber Command’s 2018 Command Vision and the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, might affect US allies.181 Issues about the extent to which US cyber forces may be maneuvering in allied owned and operated networks, doctrinally defined as “gray space” by the US military, and appropriate mechanisms and timelines for notification about these operations, remain unresolved.182

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