Info sharing is key to proper attribution --- solves false flags
Skopik and Pahi 20 --- Florian Skopik, Senior Scientist of the research program “IT Security, & Timea Pahi “Under false flag: using technical artifacts for cyber attack attribution”., Cybersecurity volume 3, Article number: 8 (2020), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s42400-020-00048-4
The challenges related to false flags have been investigated before (Pihelgas 2015). Especially (Bartholomew and Guerrero-Saade 2016) takes a closer look into the problem and also surveys noteworthy actors in the field. Cyber Information sharing (Skopik et al. 2016; Wagner et al. 2016) is a common means to gather important data to aid the attribution process, for instance, information on attackers, their capabilities, used TTPs and so on.
It is important to note that attack detection is very much different from attribution, in that sense that not all sources (Zimmermann 2014; MITRE 2019) relevant to detect attacks (Caltagirone et al. 2013) are also appropriate for attribution. In contrast to pure detection of attacks, attribution sets its focus to relating actions to actors. A particularly important piece are therefore actor profiles (Chiesa et al. 2008) used to correlate identified actions to known capabilities and applied tactics and techniques of actor groups. The main problem of the attribution is a potential misattribution. Since the perpetrator attempt to cover up their tracks through a mixture of evasiveness, deception, and destruction of records or though false flags. This issue is well known among agencies and secret services. The NSA and NCSC released for instance a joint advisory APT group to avoid possible misattribution Footnote1. The information sharing, especially threat intelligence, is one essential aspect to detect false falgs. There are some initiatives worldwide, such as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act in the USA Footnote2, Cyber Security Information Sharing of ENISA Footnote3, or Cyber Information Exchange in the NATO Footnote4. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is also aware of the issue and developed own definitions for false-flag, no-flag cyber operations (Pihelgas 2015) and influence cyber operations (Brangetto and Veenendaal 2016). Influence cyber operations are designed to influence the behaviour of a target audience. These false flag operations are part of the hybrid threats today, such as Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and its intervention in Syria in 2015. One of the latest false flag operation is the TV5Hack (see “Illustrative application of CAM to identify false flags” section).