Attribution lacking --- Makes consensus building and cohesion impossible
Brunner 22 --- Isabella Brunner, PhD Candidate in International Law, Researcher and Lecturer at University of Vienna, “The Prospects for an International Attribution Mechanism for Cyber Operations – An Analysis of Existing Approaches”, Date written: Date Written: July 3, 2020, Date Published: 11 Feb 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3986297
In cases of cyber operations below the threshold of an armed attack, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty calls on the NATO members to ‘consult together’ if the ‘territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. 47 Here as well, attribution is important. The process of consultation includes exchanging information and opinions, 48 and might also be used to discuss the attribution of the act to a state prior to launching a collaborative NATO operation. Article 4 thus likewise enables the sharing of intelligence especially in the context of cyber attribution.49 At least once, NATO has arguably already joined a collective attribution initiated by the Dutch and British governments in the cyber context, condemning the Russian hacking activities against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2018.50 There is, however, no public information available whether NATO resorted to Article 4 in this context, nor whether it considered adhering to any evidentiary standards for attributing the act to Russia.
The consultation process can, in some circumstances, lead to a joint decision or action, 51 which may include condemning acts of the wrongful state (after having attributed the activity successfully). It is clear, however, that this would have to happen in consensus with all NATO allies, which could require that – especially in the context of attribution – all NATO members are equally equipped with the necessary information and capacities to make a profound decision. To build this community of trust where NATO members can share information without hesitation, the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge was adopted at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, where member states pledged to invest in the improvement of their national cyber defence capabilities. According to the NATO website, ‘almost all Allies have upgraded their cyber defences’ since adopting the Pledge.52 Measures such as these further facilitate intelligence sharing between states, as states with a higher level of security will trust other ‘more cyber capable Allies’ more than those with less secure cyber defense mechanisms. 53
NATO is also cooperating with regional organisations, such as the EU, on questions regarding better intelligence-sharing to counter cyber threats. In a Joint Declaration in 2016, the EU and NATO noted the ‘urgent need to: Boost [the EU’s and NATO’s] ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response.’ 54 Also, amongst other initiatives, the EU Computer Emergency Response Team and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability have concluded a ‘Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence’ in 2016, providing a framework where both sides can better exchange information and share best practices on cyber defence.55
In sum, NATO has realised that there is a need to increase its capacities to become an effective platform of assistance and cooperation for its members to counter cyber threats (which also includes attribution). Measures such as the Cyber Defense Pledge or cooperation agreements with other organisations seem to help with capacity-building and better cooperation. However, it is evident that an institutionalised system comparable to the EU’s ‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’ does not exist.