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NATO CTI sharing solves resilience

Abraham & Daultrey 20 --- Chon Abraham Associate Professor of Management Information Systems William & Mary Sally Daultrey Chief Intelligence Analyst Adenium Group, “Considerations for NATO in Reconciling Challenges to Shared Cyber Threat Intelligence: A study of Japan, the US and the UK”, in “Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis”, Dec 2020, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDOE), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf

While the requirement for multinational cyber cooperation is challenged by unbalanced technical capabilities, strategic cultures and legal frameworks, NATO is well-positioned to enable partner and allied nations to share CTI, particularly by assisting with enabling use of its MISP and encouraging best practice in provisioning cyber authority structures for threat intelligence sharing as part of a potential international cyber security maturity, resilience development and assessment programme. For this programme, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence could take the lead in:

(1) reconciling incompatibilities and promoting level setting of threat intelligence capabilities across partner and allied nations to speed the flow of information;

(2) coordinating agreements to ensure trusted threat intelligence information is acted upon;

(3) enabling partners and allied countries to adopt a minimal set of classification standards, compatible ontologies and comparable personnel security clearances management programs that enable threat intelligence sharing;

(4) encouraging the development of a threat intelligence maturity scale that addresses technology, process, and workforce capabilities to aid nations in readily identifying specific improvements to benefit the international threat intelligence ecosystem; and

(5) developing mechanisms to promote accountability in global industries to build threat intelligence capacity and trusted sharing with public entities for the international cyber mission.

Making CTI sharing viable requires that partner nations start talking the same language and allow for some compromise on blaming, naming and shaming, to encourage the private sector to take more responsibility and contribute to the national cyber mission of their respective governments. Implications for NATO partnerships include identifying structures and practices among partners that are not constrained by strategic culture and exploring the scope for NATO’s role—as a non-state actor—in defining a ‘common operating language’ for CTI architectures and practices. Building comparable threat intelligence capabilities under the constraints we have identified in this study is extremely difficult. Yet, the requirement to accelerate and facilitate effective global cooperation in cyber defence is urgent. Thus, in undertaking this charge NATO can truly be unfettered in deliberation to thwart the ability of any entity to weaponise the cyberspace domain.

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