Increased sharing improves attribution and trust --- key to collective response
Ford 22 --- Christopher A. Ford, Distinguished Policy Advisor at MITRE Labs and a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “Conceptualizing Cyberspace Security Diplomacy”, SPRING 2022, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_spring/03_Ford_CDR_V7N2.pdf?ver=jPNxXAqiUZX7kFHLgxwpUw%3D%3D
I. Improved information sharing is a way to help drive situations rightward along the information strength (X) axis in ways that would, all other things being equal, create a greater likelihood of agreement. This could mean doing more to share with international partners intelligence reporting that supports attribution analysis, either passing it directly to partners with whom one has good cyber-intelligence relationships (e.g., within the “Five Eyes” partnership) or by downgrading information to be shared with others. Information sharing can also occur via public criminal indictments—which must meet due process standards and ultimately survive beyond a reasonable doubt proof standards for conviction if they get to court—or perhaps in connection with the imposition of sanctions.[43]
Whatever the means, however, building more effective mechanisms for secure sharing of attribution-relevant information would probably have the effect of making attribution agreement more likely. It can also help strengthen interlocutors’ perceptions of trust in the sharer, potentially causing agreement-conducive movement along the graphical Y-axis as well. (A country sharing more information with a second-party partner that is more trusted by the third-party target of diplomatic suasion than is the first country can also help spur movement along both axes: it enables the recipient of this information to leverage its own relationship of trust with the ultimate target.) Augmented information sharing can thus result in movement within the cubic situational space along both the X and Y axes, as depicted in Case I in Figure 13.
To the degree that attribution-relevant information can be shared publicly, or at least very widely within the broad open-source cybersecurity community, one might expect this to also support more positive outcomes in attribution diplomacy. The MITRE Corporation’s “ATT&CK Matrix,” for instance, compiles and displays information about known malicious cyber activity TTPs for cybersecurity professionals on an open-source basis,[44] providing a resource for cybersecurity officials around the world whose job it is to defend against such attacks. In cases where private sector or governmental attribution assessments have been made about specific intrusions, however, it might be possible in the future to include not just information about specific TTPs themselves but also an indication of which bad actor originated a given technique and with whom that technique’s use is most frequently associated. To the degree that subsequent attribution diplomacy relies upon analysis of cyber-attack techniques, such a public record of past associations between bad actors and specific TTPs could help increase the credibility of subsequent attribution assessments, strengthening diplomatic persuasiveness.[45]