Turn --- hoarding vulnerabilities DECREASES cybersecurity --- makes our own systems more exploitable
Jardine 20 --- Eric Jardine Assistant Professor, Political Science, Virginia Tech, “Optimizing Cyber Deterrence”, In The Cyber Deterrence Problem, Aaron F. Brantly, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), page 87-104, 2020, https://osf.io/ns7b3
Deterrence is not straightforward in cyberspace. Maximizing deterrence by trying to maximize the retaliatory potential of the NSA will fail. Upwards of 20 percent of the weapons that the NSA attempts to hoard for a rainy day are likely to be found by adversaries and could then be used to target American systems. By keeping this 20 percent of zero-days under wraps, the NSA weakens the US deterrent by diminishing the costs that an adversary would need to undertake in order to successfully target US networks and devices. Punishment and denial are interconnected. Simple maximization of deterrent outcomes by maximizing the inputs to deterrence does not work.