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Hybrid warfare disrupts NATO’s ontological security---contingency planning solves by isolating NATO from existential fear

Maria Mälksoo 18, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, “Countering hybrid warfare as ontological security management: the emerging practices of the EU and NATO,” European Security, 27:3, 374-392, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/772169/mod_resource/content/0/malksoo.pdf

Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety about one’s ability to remain oneself and to continue to act. It is thus linked to “anxiety over the vulnerability of [Western] power” (Bell 2012, pp. 230–231), threatening the West about losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns “perceived threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual” (Giddens 1991, pp. 44–45, cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). Routines are instrumental here, as they “pacify the cognitive environment … ‘inoculating’ individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos” (Mitzen 2006, p. 347).

Being able to survive the “hybrid threats” is directly pertinent to the survival of the EU and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values – which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two organisations are somewhat distinctive. NATO’s history is occasionally told through its surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU’s ontological insecurity is a more recent phenomenon, stemming mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper 2018; Mitzen 2018); the actual UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning 2018); and the rise of populist politics within the EU (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itself to Europe’s dark past instead (Rumelili 2018, Subotic 2018, and Della Sala 2018). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm of intertwined risks rather than being focused more strictly on “the threat, use and control of military force” in the manner of a traditional defence alliance (Walt 1991, p. 212; Manners 2002). Regardless of its perpetual transformer’s self-image, hybrid threats represent the uncomfortable “hard” or “fundamental” uncertainty for NATO (cf. Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its self as a traditional alliance with a collective security pledge bound to “armed attack” against one or more of its member states.

In order to achieve OS, actors strive for “routinizing their relations with significant others” (Mitzen 2006, p. 342). Routines help to keep ontological fears at bay, out of everyday discursive consciousness (Mitzen 2006, p. 348). From this perspective, NATO’s naming and shaming strategy vis-à-vis Russia as part of its hybrid warfare countering strategy links the uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine relationship with its traditional antagonist.8 The incapacitating difficulties related to planning ahead in anticipating and countering hybrid engagements are thus somewhat alleviated by the latter’s attachment to a known rival. Russia’s hybrid intervention in Ukraine has concurrently provided NATO with the familiar parameters of the cognitive “cocoon” (Giddens 1991, pp. 39–40) which enables the alliance to reproduce its cognitively “knowable” world. A Mitzenian reading of NATO’s emerging response to hybrid threats/warfare thus points at the renewed routinisation of the “programmed cognitive and behavioral responses” to Russia as the alliance’s original nemesis.

Restoring traditional vigilance vis-à-vis Russia, buttressing the forward defence along the Alliance’s eastern flank with the respective military reinforcements, contingency planning and exercises, the emerging response of NATO to the hybrid menace could also be read as an attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North Atlantic Alliance. Hybrid warfare endangers the basic features of the said normative order (or that of the broadly conceived Western security community in general, including the EU as well) as its efficient countering would likely compromise the underlying principles for this order’s particularistic existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 450). As a threat of subversion, hybrid warfare exposes the internal vulnerabilities in the body of the traditional security alliance (NATO) and a self-proclaimed post-modern security actor (i.e. the EU; cf. Cooper 2004). This concerns, in particular, the ever-elusive (and contested) balance between national/organisational security and individual liberties (cf. Waldron 2003, Neocleous 2007), as strategic communication is inherently at odds with free speech as a core value of Western liberalism. Countering hybrid warfare is conducive of generating a security predicament of perpetual pre-emption which, by definition, would indicate pre-emptive gathering of all sorts of data, thus likely infringing on the privacy of the individuals for the sake of the organisational/regional/national security. This precautionary logic resonates with the risk society approach which characterises the struggling with a sheer volume of risks with potentially fundamental consequences as a key feature of modernity, implying that “decisions are … made not in context of certainty, nor even of available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, mistrust, fear, and anxiety” (Ewald 2002, p. 294).

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