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Chinese tech leadership risks war over Taiwan or the East and South China Seas—these scenarios risk nuclear escalation.

Matthew Kroenig, 2021 (Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Similarly, Moscow and Beijing would likely use any newfound military strength to advance their preexisting geopolitical aims. Given their very different positions in the international system, however, these states are likely to employ new military technologies in ways that are destabilizing. These states have made clear their dissatisfaction with the existing inter¬national system and their desire to revise it. Both countries have ongoing border disputes with multiple neighboring countries. If Moscow developed new military technologies and operational con-cepts that shifted the balance of power in its favor, it would likely use this advantage to pursue revisionist aims. If Moscow acquired a newfound ability to more easily invade and occupy territory in Eastern Europe, for example (or if Putin believed Russia had such a capability), it is more likely Russia would be tempted to engage in aggression. Likewise, if China acquired an enhanced ability through new technology to invade and occupy Taiwan or contested islands in the East or South China Seas, Beijing’s leaders might also find this opportunity tempting. If new technology enhances either power’s anti- access, area- denial network, then its leaders may be more confident in their ability to achieve a fait accompli attack against a neighbor and then block a US- led liberation. These are precisely the types of shifts in the balance of power that can lead to war. As mentioned previously, the predominant scholarly theory on the causes of war—the bargaining model—maintains that imperfect in¬formation on the balance of power and the balance of resolve and credible commitment problems result in international conflict.52 New technology can exacerbate these causal mechanisms by increasing uncertainty about, or causing rapid shifts in, the balance of power. Indeed as noted above, new military technology and the development of new operational con¬cepts have shifted the balance of power and resulted in military conflict throughout history. Some may argue emerging military technology is more likely to result in a new tech arms race than in conflict. This is possible. But Moscow and Beijing may come to believe (correctly or not) that new technology pro¬vides them a usable military advantage over the United States and its Al¬lies and partners. In so doing, they may underestimate Washington. If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global com¬mitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commit¬ments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pres¬sure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could re-taliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56 There are similar risks of nuclear escalation in the event of a US- China conflict. China has traditionally possessed a relaxed nuclear posture with a small “lean and effective” deterrent and a formal “no first use” policy. But China is relying more on its strategic forces. It is projected to double—if not triple or quadruple—the size of its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade.57 Chinese experts have acknowledged there is a narrow range of contin-gencies in which China might use nuclear weapons first.58 As in the case of Russia, the US Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the possibility of limited Chinese nuclear attacks and also holds out the potential of a lim-ited US reprisal with low- yield nuclear weapons as a deterrent.59 If the nuclear threshold is breached in a conflict between the United States and China, the risk of nuclear exchange is real. In short, if a coming revolution in military affairs provides a real or perceived battlefield advantage for Russia or China, such a development raises the likelihood of armed aggression against US regional allies, major power war, and an increased risk of nuclear escalation.

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