Integrating AI into nuclear weapons systems helps avoid the risks of nuclear escalation.
Jessica Cox, 2021 (Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY)
Traditionally, nuclear deterrence relies on a country having credible nuclear capabilities plus the political will or resolve to use them if necessary (and only if necessary), therefore persuading an adversary to not attack. Integrating AI into nuclear systems can enhance nuclear decision-making, improving percep¬tions of both capability and resolve. Early Warning and Detection: Avoiding Unnecessary Use and Escalation Most significantly, integrating AI into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais¬sance (ISR) systems and using AI as part of the analytical tool kit for early warning and detection could improve target identification, prevent false positives or close calls, and increase understanding of adversary actions. AI can be used to increase a nation’s ability to understand the nature of its environment as well as speed of analysis and development of courses of action in a conflict, thus improv¬ing its overall capabilities in the nuclear space and reducing the risk of unin¬tended escalation in the midst of a crisis with a nuclear dimension. In a nuclear exchange, national leadership may have just minutes to assess a situation and determine whether to launch its own nuclear response. Nuclear weapons states such as the United States have sought to increase this decision-making time to reduce the potential for misunderstanding or miscal- culation in a crisis, given the immense consequences of using nuclear weapons.21 Incorporating AI into early warning and decision-making analysis may improve both the speed and quality of information processing as well as eliminate potential biases from military leadership, which will be crucial in a crisis to allow time for de-escalation and tension reduction between sides. AI can similarly enhance the ability to discriminate between real and false information, which is critical to preventing miscalculation or mistake in a crisis. A number of “close calls” have occurred throughout the years, in which nuclear weapons use was only avoided through human intervention based on uncertain information.22 In 1983, NATO undertook Command Post Exercise Able Archer to “practice command and staff procedures, with particular emphasis on the transition from conventional to non-conventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons.”23 At the time, Soviet paranoia about a US nuclear first strike, with preparations under cover of a war game, was at an all-time high. When NATO began its Able Archer exercise, Soviet officials thought the exercise was real and put mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on a three-minute alert.24 The same year, the Soviet early warning com¬puter system signaled five incoming US Minuteman ICBMs. The watch officer on duty, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, did not report the incident, concluding that it must be a false alarm. If he had reported that US nuclear missiles were inbound, the Soviets would have followed their nuclear doctrine and retaliated with no time to double-check or negotiate with the United States.25 Petrov ulti¬mately made the right call—as the Soviet early warning system had mistaken sun shining off clouds for incoming missiles. Even after the end of the Cold War, in 1995, a Norwegian civilian research rocket launch was detected by the radar crews from the Russian Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS) and mistaken for a US Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. Command and control procedures were enacted, including notification of President Boris Yeltsin and activation of the Russian “cheget” system—essentially its nuclear football. Russian authorities eventually determined that this was not a nuclear-armed ballistic missile launch after reviewing satellite and other intelligence information.26 While these and other incidents were ultimately resolved successfully through the intervention of military experts and political leaders,27 they illustrate the dangers of imperfect systems that rely on human analysts with potentially inac¬curate or inadequate information. As defense researcher Jaganath Sankaran argues, “future applications of AI to nuclear command and control should aspire to create an algorithm that could argue in the face of overwhelming fear of an impending attack that a nuclear launch isn’t happening.”28 Such an approach could both reduce the fog of war and reassure decision-makers that their course of action is correct in the face of uncertain information, either using nuclear weapons or refraining from it. Although most nuclear-armed nations now use multiple systems to reduce the chances of a false positive warning signal, advancements in AI could significantly improve confidence in and functionality of these systems when integrated with human decision-making. AI tools could play a significant role in helping to ident¬ify patterns of life and reduce potential operator biases in conducting analysis. For instance, in order to be able to quickly discriminate between a country’s launch of a sounding/research rocket as opposed to an ICBM, which have very similar radar signatures, big data analytical tools could be used to collate and process massive amounts of electronic data—including signals, imagery, and open source collec¬tion—over time to identify patterns of behavior unique to each type of launch. Then, if there is an ambiguous or unexpected launch, these systems would be able to quickly determine whether or not the current circumstances more closely resemble one type of launch over the other—actually preventing future close calls or misinterpretations of data, as occurred in Able Archer in 1983. A human analyst would likely still need to make a final determination, but through the use of AI and data analytics, they would have a more accurate, timely, and complete picture on which to base any decisions.