Trade resilient
Lawrence 21 --- Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment, Harvard, “The Unappreciated Trend Toward Unilateral Trade Liberalization”, Peterson Institute For International Economics, March 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb21-6.pdf
During the 2008 financial crisis, the volume of world trade initially plummeted by more than it had during the Great Depression in the 1930s (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2010). Since many developing countries could legally raise their applied tariffs without violating their WTO commitments, there were widespread fears that the protectionist responses that had occurred during the Great Depression were likely to be repeated. Yet the system displayed remarkable resilience. Undoubtedly the disastrous experience of the 1930s served as an important consideration motivating the G20 countries to issue statements pledging their opposition to protectionism.12 But their actions spoke even louder than their words.
As shown in figure 1, the crisis is simply not evident in the average global tariff data for 2008 and 2009: The average applied MFN tariff rates in the immediate aftermath of the crisis were no higher than they were before it. This is not to say that no countries raised their tariffs, but the increases were offset by other countries’ reductions.13 In addition, as chronicled by the Global Trade Alert (a network of trade analysts that monitor trade policy actions), some countries did use temporary tariff measures such as safeguards antidumping and countervailing duties.
But studies that take such actions into account still conclude that there was remarkable restraint with respect to import barriers. For example, using an overall Trade Restrictiveness Index that includes not only MFN tariffs but those applied in free trade agreements and other preferential arrangements, Hiao Looi Kee, Cristina Neagu, and Alessandro Nicita (2013) found that together the impacts of tariffs and antidumping measures accounted for less than 2 percent of the collapse of world trade in response to the crisis. Among their explanations is that “countries are likely to take account of the diverse impact of tariffs in raising input costs for products used in their exports” (p. 343).
Looking back from the vantage point of 2019, the Global Trade Alert found that in response to the crisis, “transparent import restrictions were placed on just 1.4 percent of world trade, with another 6.9 and 20.8 percent of world trade being subject to subsidies to import competing firms and state largess to exporters respectively.” However, almost all the temporary import restrictions and half of the subsidies to import-competing firms were unwound by 2013.
Simon Evenett and Richard Baldwin (2020) note that patterns of trade have remained more heavily distorted by export subsidies since the financial crisis; but while they do distort trade, in principle export subsidies should increase rather than reduce trade.
While the declining growth in trade volumes relative to GDP since 2011 has been the focus of much discussion, increased trade protection does not appear to be the reason. As shown in figure 1 there was a small increase in average global tariffs in 2009–11, but it was more than fully reversed by 2012, and by 2017 global trade-weighted average applied MFN rates were considerably lower than they had been in 2008.
Marc Auboin and Floriana Borino (2017) studied the falling elasticity of global trade to economic activity and found that while the slowdown in the growth of global value chains and changes in the composition of demand were important parts of the explanation for slower trade responses to growth after 2011, “protectionism does not come up as statistically significant.”
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This Policy Brief has provided evidence that even setting aside participation in regional and multilateral trade agreements, developing countries have steadily narrowed the differences between their tariffs and those of the United States. They have also revealed a preference for lower tariffs by consistently applying tariffs that are much lower than those obligated by the WTO. Their commitment to lower tariffs was shown by their discipline in not, on average, raising tariffs in response to the financial crisis in 2008 and their continued reductions in applied tariffs between 2011 and 2017. The available data at the country level show additional reductions in 2018. The commitment to these lower rates is also evident in the regimes for administered protection instituted by several countries, requiring proof of serious injury and other conditions before safeguard protection is provided.
All this liberalizing behavior reflects widespread changes in views of trade protection. The spread of global value chains, which have increased the import content of both exports and domestic production, have convinced many that increased protection can reduce domestic output and employment.
In many industries supply chains consist of production facilities that produce highly customized goods and services that are not easy for firms to produce in other countries or to shift back to their home country. It is noteworthy that, for all their talk about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) being a disastrous trade agreement, both President Trump and many Democrats agreed to a US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that made far fewer modifications to the original agreement than might have been expected from their rhetoric.14
Since 2018, however, global supply chains have been subjected to two major shocks: the first from US trade policies and the countermeasures other countries have taken in response, and the second from the COVID-19 pandemic, which initially set off a global scramble for medical equipment. Some commentators have responded to these disruptions by arguing that countries should now be more self-sufficient (Rapoza 2020).15 And it is common to see predictions that the world has now passed the high point of globalization. But it is too soon to tell whether these developments will lead to a reversal of the policy trends discussed in this Policy Brief.
The recent shocks certainly point to the desirability of diversification of supply chains and the need for adequate domestic strategic reserves of essential products. Pinelopi Goldberg (2020) makes the case that they have also underscored the extent to which countries are interdependent. And they have shown the ability of an open global system to enable more resilient responses than those based on self-reliance—the WTO has documented that, in response to the pandemic, trade-facilitating measures undertaken by the G20 have far outweighed trade-restricting measures.16
Indeed, despite the talk of deglobalization, many countries have recently increased their commitments to further trade liberalization, albeit at the regional level. Since 2018, for example, 11 Asia-Pacific countries have implemented the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, more than 50 countries agreed to the African Continental Free Trade Area, and 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific concluded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in late 2020.
As Mark Twain said about his death, reports of the end of globalization may be greatly exaggerated.