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NATO coop cant overcome the attribution problem

Horowitz 10 --- Michael Horowitz, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has also held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard. “A Common Future? NATO and the Protection of the Commons”. Transatlantic Paper Series No. 3 October 2010. https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/Trans-Atlantic_Papers_3-Horowitz.pdf

Cyberspace is also a realm where traditional notions of deterrence may break down. Deterring a threat by issuing counter-threats to deliver a devastating response to any cyber attack against the United States and its NATO allies may seem like an attractive solution to the cyber security challenge. The high costs associated with defending networks from cyber intrusions and the relatively low costs of launching a cyber attack have led many to analogize cyber deterrence to nuclear deterrence.31 However, cyber attacks lack the stable footprint of conventional military forces. The fact that terrorist attacks do not leave a “return address” is accentuated in the case of cyber warfare. In the case of a cyber attack, for example, even tracking down the specific computer from which an attack was launched might not give the attacked country sufficient information to distinguish whether a country, terrorist group, or rogue individual launched an attack from that particular computer. These concerns, in part, are why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that denying adversaries access to U.S. information systems in the first place, rather than planning to retaliate in case of an attack, encompasses the bulk of U.S. defensive efforts.32 The United States and its NATO partners must invest heavily in defending their networks from intrusion and cannot be confident that maintaining nascent retaliatory capabilities will suffice to deter attacks. Furthermore, while strong cyber ties between NATO members might not ensure that deterrence succeeds, weak cyber ties will almost certainly encourage adversaries to launch more cyber incursions against NATO members.33 Finally, since many future wars will likely include major cyber components, thinking about cyberspace as a very separate sphere of warfare delinked from other areas of conflict is counterproductive.34

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