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Even successful attribution fails to deter

Sweijs & Zilincik 19 --- Tim Sweijs Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, and Samo Zilincik, associated research fellow with a new article in the Texas National Security Review, “Report Part Title: Deterrence by Democracies in a Hybrid Context”, Published by: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep24191.6.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aac9305baa499cc4635e8cc7dc28c6da2&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1

The opaqueness of hybrid activities typically complicates any deterrent efforts which benefit from transparency and clarity.79 After all, only if actions can be observed by the deterrer and attributed to a particular actor, is it possible - relying on backwards inductive logic - to deter that actor from taking that action in the first place. Hybrid conflict challengers, it is said, can easily circumvent any red lines laid down by the deterrer and rely on plausible deniability for cover.80 Examples that are sometimes pointed at include both the Russian government’s denial that green little men invading the Crimean peninsula were Russian,81 chemical attacks on UK soil, cyberattacks on critical US infrastructure of various origins, and a variety of attempts to manipulate the information domain in various European countries and in North America. But both for traditional and new domains that argument does not necessarily seem to hold up. In fact, as we have seen in many of these cases, the perpetrator either could have been identified or was in fact identified. In other words, attribution took place. Despite Putin’s denial that the green little men invading the Crimean Peninsula were Russian, this was not - or should at least not have been - hard to verify for Western military intelligence services. In the Skripal chemical attacks on British soil in March 2018, the UK government announced within eight days that the toxin was of Russian provenance, and the perpetrators were identified and charged later that year. Attribution in the cyber domain poses more challenges.82 As Joseph Nye explains:

“If [..] attackers do use the Internet, they can mask the point of origin behind the flags of several remote servers, which can be located in a variety of jurisdictions. They can use nonstate actors as proxies and create false flags. … Moreover, knowing the true location of a machine is not the same as knowing the ultimate instigator of an attack.”83

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