Alliance is resilient, but fails
Gowan 15 – Richard Gowan, Research Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. to Europe: Don’t Go Soft on American-Led Global Order”, World Politics Review, 3-16, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15297/u-s-to-europe-don-t-go-soft-on-american-led-global-order
The United States sent its European allies some stern signals about their obligations to the American-led international order last week. On Monday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power visited Brussels, where she warned NATO members to halt their “dangerous” defense cuts and called on European powers to offer more troops to United Nations peace operations. Power argued that European armies, which currently provide less than 10 percent of all U.N. peacekeepers worldwide, could have a “momentum-shifting” impact on beleaguered blue helmet missions in trouble spots such as South Sudan. Instead, she underlined, “European countries have drawn back from peacekeeping,” while the European Union has shied away from high-intensity missions. This was an accurate but uncomfortable message for EU and NATO members, whose appetite for stabilization missions remains very low after their Afghan nightmares. Power emphasized threats from the Middle East and North Africa to bolster her argument. Later in the week, anonymous U.S. officials sent a reminder that they expect European assistance in Asia, too. This time, the sore point was economic cooperation rather than military affairs. Washington has taken umbrage at Britain’s decision to invest in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a new organization proposed by China to offset the U.S.-backed Asian Development Bank. A U.S. source told the Financial Times that the U.K. seemed to be adopting a stance of “constant accommodation of China.” British journalists seemed shocked that the U.S. might question Washington’s “special relationship” with London. In reality, the relationship has been on the rocks for some time, as U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration has worked out thorny but productive alternative relationships with Paris and Berlin on political, security and economic matters. Yet the U.S. criticism of the U.K. involvement with the AIIB revealed a deeper concern about potential challenges to U.S. leadership in the international system—and Europe’s commitment to sustaining American primacy in particular. The current multilateral system rests on two basic pillars. The first of these is a U.S. political commitment to work through international institutions, even if this is often more a matter of rhetoric than reality. The second is the continued willingness of Western European governments and Japan to pay a large chunk of the costs of this system, in addition to backing the U.S. against challengers such as Russia and China. This has never been an entirely stable set-up. It has most obviously broken down over individual crises such as the 2003 Iraq War, when France and Germany lined up with China and Russia to oppose the U.S.-led invasion. More fundamentally, it has been clear ever since the long process of decolonization brought waves of Asian and African states into the U.N. and other international institutions in the 1950s and 1960s that the “global order” could not rest on a trans-Atlantic bargain indefinitely. It has nonetheless proved to be a remarkably durable arrangement. The U.S., EU members and Japan combined continue to pay nearly 80 percent of the U.N.’s main budget. Their shared grip on the institution remains powerful. Non-Western powers have invested in elements of the international system: China has aimed to expand its limited role in the International Monetary Fund, while Arab countries have focused on humanitarian aid in response to the crises in their neighborhood. But the overall U.S. and European dominance of these institutions is extremely hard to break. The benefits to Western policymakers are also clear. Non-Western officials at the IMF believe that the fund has been far too deferential to the EU over the eurozone crisis, even if the European Commission has at the same time argued that the IMF has been unduly critical of EU efforts. In the meantime, close observers of the U.N. believe that Britain, France and the U.S. are now actually more powerful in the Security Council than they were 10 to 15 years ago, despite collisions with Russia and China over matters such as Syria, as they have consolidated their powers to draft resolutions and control the organization’s peace operations and sanctions regimes. The Obama administration, with its emphasis on building relations with non-Western powers, seemed intent on challenging this state of affairs. It did so to some extent in its early years. Washington ganged up with Asian governments in the G-20 to impose IMF reforms that were meant to reduce European leverage in the organization, although the measures have subsequently been held up in the U.S. Congress. Obama’s team also tried to show greater sensitivity to Russia’s positions on crises like Syria than previous U.S. administrations. But the U.S. has failed to re-engineer international cooperation. Russia remains obstreperous, and China seems more interested in developing new organizations, such as the AIIB, than investing in existing U.S.-led bodies. Episodes such as the 2011 Libyan war, when Beijing and Moscow waved through the Western intervention and then went on to slam it, have left doubts about the chances of putting international institutions on a new political footing. Having looked for better partners elsewhere, the U.S. is stuck with Europe. And yet Europeans seem to be distinctly reluctant to play along. NATO countries appear likely to respond to Power’s plea and do a bit more for peacekeeping in the near future, as the Netherlands and Nordic countries have recently done in Mali. But “stay at home-ism” is still a credible power doctrine for some members of the alliance. Meanwhile, most EU members, with honorable exceptions such as Sweden and the U.K., severely cut their development and humanitarian budgets during the financial crisis. In economic terms, no EU member can afford to ignore China’s wealth and markets. So the European pillar of the international system looks very weak indeed. This does not mean that it is about to crack. European policymakers are not about to dump Washington, and they still take its criticisms to heart, as the attention given to Power’s speech demonstrates. If China’s ambassador to the U.N. gave a speech in Brussels, it would very likely go unnoticed. But the U.S. has to assume that, at best, European governments are going to be less consistent and predictable supporters of the post-1945 multilateral system—and that the system as a whole will suffer as a result.