Russia won’t and cant expand hybrid attacks
Dr. Samuel Charap 16, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oxford, M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, B.A. in Political Science and Russian from Amherst College, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”, Survival, Volume 57, Number 6, December 2015 – January 2016
Secondly, the setting of eastern Ukraine made Moscow’s objective far easier to pursue. In fact, the region is the most permissive environment outside Russia’s borders for this kind of operation. The Donbas shares with Russia a common language, as well as historical and cultural traditions. It is connected to Russia by thick cross-border interpersonal ties. Russian business and intelligence networks deeply penetrate the region. The Russian military had near-complete knowledge of the battlefield, and, given the highly porous border, thousands of kilometres of access to the theatre. Ukraine’s already weak governance had essentially collapsed in the east after the revolution. And there was already widespread resentment among the population towards the post-Maidan government. Polling data from April 2014 showed that over 70% of residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions considered the new government in Kiev ‘illegal’.11 In short, eastern Ukraine is perhaps the only place beyond Russia’s borders where Moscow can sustain an insurgency, and events in early 2014 made it an even softer target. As a counterfactual, one could imagine the fate of a hypothetical deployment of ‘little green men’ to Lvov, the traditional home of Ukrainian nationalism located in the west of the country. They would likely have ended up hanging from the lamp posts, not leading an armed insurgency.