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Disclosure allows vendors to patch up vulnerabilities --- this weakens innovation and the discovery of new vulnerabilities

Cushing 14 --- Seychelle Cushing, B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2011, Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security”, Fall 2014, http://summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems1/14703/etd8726_SCushing.pdf (accessed via wayback machine)

Cyber defence is an initially disadvantaged position167 given that cyber barriers cannot stop all attacks from penetrating its systems. The ability to absorb a cyber attack, while inconvenient, helps America identify holes in its own security. Although America may be aware of a number of vulnerabilities, additional unaccounted for vulnerabilities will always exist in its systems. A cyber strike thus helps the United States identify where additional previously unknown vulnerabilities exist and, as a result, the US can direct its security apparatus to develop counter-capabilities.

The United States, through the Department of Homeland Security, has launched both passive and active cyber sensors to detect network intrusions. EINSTEIN 2, the passive sensor, was launched in 2008 to detect network intrusions.168 Building on the capabilities of EINSTEIN 2 was EINSTEIN 3, an active sensor designed to provide realtime threat detection capable of stopping known malware before it reaches the targeted government network.169 Passive defences “scan, firewall, and patch” in an attempt to protect a system. These defences, however, have little utility against sophisticated cyber attacks, such as Stuxnet, or against attacks employing zero-days. Active defences, in comparison, build on passive defences to try and stop the cyber attack170 but the success rates of such measures in the US security architecture remains unknown.171 In reality, the EINSTEIN systems only detect and (in the case of EINSTEIN 3) stop known malware entering through known vulnerabilities.172 Nevertheless, every vulnerability subsequently discovered through attack absorption allows EINSTEIN 3 to erect new cyber barriers in its systems.

A cyber-capable adversary may undertake multiple attempts to create sustained access to a target system or network.173 Absorbing the initial attack becomes necessary to find and fix the exploited vulnerability to avert subsequent strikes. If only the first intrusion succeeds, the attacker will be forced to adjust its strike strategy to reopen the system access it once had. By erecting cyber obstacles, one is able to discourage weaker actors from exploiting the same vulnerability before it is patched. Adapting from vulnerabilities to defensive barriers may not stop cyber attacks altogether but it can frustrate cyber-capable states from “easily succeeding in […subsequent] attacks.”174

Allowing a cyber attack, while counterintuitive, allows the US to gather valuable information on its attacker. By identifying how an attacker got into an American system or network and what information was sought, the US is positioned to better understand not only its vulnerabilities but also the capabilities and intentions of its adversaries. Resiliency through attack absorption diminishes the prospect of long-term disruption to American networks. As a result, the benefits to an attacker diminish.175 What was an initial disadvantage can be converted into a long-term security gain.

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