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Cyber capabilities are key to deterrence and defending against China

Gompert and Libicki 15 --- Gompert, David C. and Libicki, Martin. David C. Gompert is the Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence. He is a Senior Fellow at RAND and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Gompert received his BA in Engineering from the US Naval Academy and his MPA from Princeton University. Martin Libicki received his PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley, his MA in City and Regional Planning from UC Berkeley, and his BSc in Mathematics from MIT. He is a Professor at the RAND Graduate School and a Senior Management Scientist at RAND. “Waging Cyber War the American Way,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. August–September 2015. Vol 57., 4th ed, pp 7-28. 07-22-2015. http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2015-c6ba/57-4-02-gompert-and-libicki-eab1

At the same time, the United States regards cyber war during armed conflict with a cyber-capable enemy as probable, if not inevitable. It both assumes that the computer systems on which its own forces rely to deploy, receive support and strike will be attacked, and intends to attack the computer systems that enable opposing forces to operate as well. Thus, the United States has said that it can and would conduct cyber war to ‘support operational and contingency plans’ – a euphemism for attacking computer systems that enable enemy war fighting. US military doctrine now regards ‘non-kinetic’ (that is, cyber) measures as an integral aspect of US joint offensive operations.8 Even so, the stated purposes of the US military regarding cyber war stress protecting the ability of conventional military forces to function as they should, as well as avoiding and preventing escalation, especially to non-military targets. Apart from its preparedness to conduct counter-military cyber operations during wartime, the United States has been reticent about using its offensive capabilities. While it has not excluded conducting cyber operations to coerce hostile states or non-state actors, it has yet to brandish such a threat.9 Broadly speaking, US policy is to rely on the threat of retaliation to deter a form of warfare it is keen to avoid. Chinese criticism that the US retaliatory policy and capabilities ‘will up the ante on the Internet arms race’ is disingenuous in that China has been energetic in forming and using capabilities for cyber operations.10 Chinese criticism is disingenuous Notwithstanding the defensive bias in US attitudes toward cyber war, the dual missions of deterrence and preparedness for offensive operations during an armed conflict warrant maintaining superb, if not superior, offensive capabilities. Moreover, the case can be made – and we have made it – that the United States should have superiority in offensive capabilities in order to control escalation.11 The combination of significant capabilities and declared reluctance to wage cyber war raises a question that is not answered by any US official public statements: when it comes to offence, what are US missions, desired effects, target sets and restraints – in short, what is US policy? To be clear, we do not take issue with the basic US stance of being at once wary and capable of cyber war. Nor do we think that the United States should advertise exactly when and how it would conduct offensive cyber war. However, the very fact that the United States maintains options for offensive operations implies the need for some articulation of policy. After all, the United States was broadly averse to the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, yet it elaborated a declaratory policy governing such use to inform adversaries, friends and world opinion, as well as to forge domestic consensus. Indeed, if the United States wants to discourage and limit cyber war internationally, while keeping its options open, it must offer an example. For that matter, the American people deserve to know what national policy on cyber war is, lest they assume it is purely defensive – or just too esoteric to comprehend. Whether to set a normative example, warn potential adversaries or foster national consensus, US policy on waging cyber war should be coherent. At the same time, it must encompass three distinguishable offensive missions: wartime counter-military operations, which the United States intends to conduct; retaliatory missions, which the US must have the will and ability to conduct for reasons of deterrence; and coercive missions against hostile states, which could substitute for armed attack.12 Four cases serve to highlight the relevant issues and to inform the elaboration of an overall policy to guide US conduct of offensive cyber war. The first involves wartime counter-military cyber operations against a cyber-capable opponent, which may also be waging cyber war; the second involves retaliation against a cyber-capable opponent for attacking US systems other than counter-military ones; the third involves coercion of a ‘cyber-weak’ opponent with little or no means to retaliate against US cyber attack; and the fourth involves coercion of a ‘cyber-strong’ opponent with substantial means to retaliate against US cyber attack. Of these, the first and fourth imply a willingness to initiate cyber war. Counter-military cyber war during wartime Just as cyber war is war, armed hostilities will presumably include cyber war if the belligerents are both capable of and vulnerable to it. The reason for such certainty is that impairing opposing military forces’ use of computer systems is operationally compelling. Forces with requisite technologies and skills benefit enormously from data communications and computation for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, navigation, weapon guidance, battle assessment and logistics management, among other key functions. If the performance of forces is dramatically enhanced by such systems, it follows that degrading them can provide important military advantages. Moreover, allowing an enemy to use cyber war without reciprocating could mean military defeat. Thus, the United States and other advanced states are acquiring capabilities not only to use and protect computer systems, but also to disrupt those used by enemies. The intention to wage cyber war is now prevalent in Chinese planning for war with the United States – and vice versa. Chinese military planners have long made known their belief that, because computer systems are essential for effective US military operations, they must be targeted. Chinese cyber capabilities may not (yet) pose a threat to US command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks, which are well partitioned and protected. However, the networks that enable logistical support for US forces are inviting targets. Meant to disable US military operations, Chinese use of cyber war during an armed conflict would not be contingent on US cyber operations. Indeed, it could come early, first or even as a precursor of armed hostilities. For its part, the US military is increasingly aware not only that sophisticated adversaries like China can be expected to use cyber war to degrade the performance of US forces, but also that US forces must integrate cyber war into their capabilities and operations. Being more dependent on computer networks to enhance military performance than are its adversaries, including China, US forces have more to lose than to gain from the outbreak of cyber war during an armed conflict. This being so, would it make sense for the United States to wait and see if the enemy resorts to cyber war before doing so itself? Given US conventional military superiority, it can be assumed that any adversary that can use cyber war against US forces will do so. Moreover, waiting for the other side to launch a cyber attack could be disadvantageous insofar as US forces would be the first to suffer degraded performance. Thus, rather than waiting, there will be pressure for the United States to commence cyber attacks early, and perhaps first. Moreover, leading US military officers have strongly implied that cyber war would have a role in attacking enemy anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities irrespective of the enemy’s use of cyber war.13 If the United States is prepared to conduct offensive cyber operations against a highly advanced opponent such as China, it stands to reason that it would do likewise against lesser opponents. In sum, offensive cyber war is becoming part and parcel of the US war-fighting doctrine. The nature of US counter-military cyber attacks during wartime should derive from the mission of gaining, or denying the opponent, operational advantage. Primary targets of the United States should mirror those of a cyber-capable adversary: ISR, command and control, navigation and guidance, transport and logistics support. Because this mission is not coercive or strategic in nature, economic and other civilian networks should not be targeted. However, to the extent that networks that enable military operations may be multipurpose, avoidance of non-military harm cannot be assured. There are no sharp ‘firebreaks’ in cyber war.14

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