CP solves NATO-Russia escalation
Kubiak 19 --- Dr Katarzyna Kubiak et al, Policy Fellow on nuclear and arms control policy at the European Leadership Network. Previously, she was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), , “Towards a More Stable NATO-Russia Relationship” EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY REPORT, Feb 2019, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/31012019-Towards-a-more-stable-Russia-NATO-relationship.pdf
There are functioning channels of communication between NATO and Russia, including meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at ambassadorial level. But these channels are of limited effectiveness. The intensity of NATO-Russia contacts has been drastically reduced following Russia’s actions against Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent April 2014 decision to suspend practical cooperation with Russia. With increased military activities and what each side perceives as pressure or probing of its limits and ‘red lines’ by the other, whether intended or not, the existing communication channels are inadequate and insufficient to clarify concerns or deal with uncertainties, especially during periods of increased tension. The level of mutual understanding between Russia and NATO is low, and the deterrence signalling of each side can be misunderstood by the other side or dismissed by them as posturing.
NATO and Russia will have to navigate better a space filled with substantial and genuine disagreements, ballooning mistrust regarding the other side’s intentions, and continued prioritisation of deterrence and strengthening of respective military potentials.
In navigating safely, the priority should thus be given to “deepening” and multiplying the current channels of communication and making the best possible use of the existing instruments such as the NRC or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its Structured Dialogue. None of the actions suggested below would breach the ‘red lines’ constraining the conduct of the bilateral relationship, as currently understood by NATO or Russia. They can be also pursued in parallel with efforts to utilise better all other available instruments such as the OSCE-wide and bilateral confidencebuilding measures and the Open Skies Treaty. These proposals may appear trivial or modest, but their implementation would mark an improvement in comparison with the current situation, moving Russia and NATO towards more stability and predictability.
Better quality of dialogue While respecting the existing limitations, for example regarding NATO’s de facto decision not to resume working-group level NRC contacts, the following measures could be pursued:
• Schedule regular meetings of the NRC at the level of ambassadors
Between 2014 and 2018, ten meetings of the NATO-Russia Council were held. Three took place in both 2016 and 2017 and two in 2018.3 Topics included the situation in and around Ukraine (featured as the fixed first point of the agenda); transparency and risk reduction in the context of military activities, other issues of concern including the situation in Afghanistan, aviation security in the Baltic region, hybrid challenges or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
While this may suggest increased efficiency of contacts, the exact timing and agenda has had to be laboriously negotiated each time before the NRC met. The infrequent and adhoc character of the meetings increases the risk of important concerns not being raised in a timely way or of falling off the agenda. It does not give enough scope to prepare the meetings, ensure proper follow-up, or develop any positive dynamics between them.
Setting a firm timetable with a specified number of regular meetings (either bimonthly or quarterly, with additional emergency meetings scheduled as needed) would provide more consistency, avoid divisive deliberations on the timing, make the channel less vulnerable to political storms and allow more continuity of work.
As Chairman, the NATO Secretary General could take a more leading role in setting the agenda, with NATO’s Deputy Secretary General working with the Russian Permanent Representation to develop the preparatory materials for the meetings.
The first NRC meeting in 2019 took place on 25th January, with the INF Treaty crisis high on its agenda. While there was no progress on resolving the crisis, the meeting illustrated the need to discuss issues of mutual importance in a timely and efficient manner.
• Russia to ensure ambassadorial level representation at the NRC
Since January 2018, there has been no Russian ambassador to NATO.4 Such a long gap without a senior Russian diplomat with a direct connection to Moscow’s decisionmaking circles hinders a constructive dialogue in the NRC and seems to signal Russian disinterest in improving relations with NATO. It may also hamper communication during any period of increased tension.
Russia could immediately appoint a Permanent Representative to NATO to signal the importance of maintaining relations and make sustained engagement possible. Alternatively, Russia could assign one of the two Russian ambassadors currently in Brussels (one responsible for bilateral relations and one for the European Union) to take over responsibility for the NATO portfolio, or appoint a Moscow-based ambassador to participate in the NRC meetings. Even under the NATO limits on the Russian delegation, Russia could also bring in more senior diplomats, military and civilian experts to brief the NRC on topics of mutual interest and to prepare its meetings. The participation of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in the January 2019 NRC meeting was a welcome development.
• Ensure that there are multiple channels of military-to-military communication
More military-to-military contacts would add to the stability of the relationship by improving understanding of the other, offering options on channels to be used in a crisis and creating some trust at a personal level. Dialogue and technical contacts between the uniformed personnel of Russia and NATO should not be a victim of lack of trust at the political level. So far, there have been sporadic telephone conversations and direct meetings between the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Curtis Scaparrotti, as well as with previous Chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Petr Pavel.
The new Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach could re-establish communication with the Russian Chief of the General Staff, in parallel with the existing SACEUR-Gerasimov channel. Based on a clear political mandate with a clearly understood separation of functions, these contacts could be made routine and prepared at deputies’ level. While the SACEUR-Gerasimov channel could focus on the most pressing military activities, operations-related issues and current concerns, the Peach-Gerasimov exchanges could focus on more political and longer-term questions related to military doctrines, postures, development of capabilities and concepts of operations. Improved and multiple contacts would serve as another instrument to clarify concerns, increase transparency and build up mutual understanding and personal trust.
• Use the existing NATO-Russia hotline in case of serious cyber incidents
NATO and Russia lack established joint procedures to deal with serious cyberincidents and allegations of cyber-attacks, despite the fact that these can have disastrous consequences and despite the increase in the scale and sophistication of cyber-attacks, sometimes attributed to states. In some cases, particular NATO states and Russia would rather use bilateral instruments to communicate and react, but in case of a major or widespread attacks against military targets, it may be useful to have the possibility to interact at the NATO-Russia level as well.
Due to the technical nature of any conversation about a potential incident, a separate cyber incidents hotline between NATO and Russia may be preferable. Since this may not be feasible to set up, the already existing NATO-Russia military-to-military hotline should also be activated in the event of a cyber-contingency. Both NATO and Russia could agree that they would be prepared to use the hotline for that purpose, and that issue-experts would be available to advise the leadership of each side in case of its activation. The use of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in Washington and Moscow to facilitate inquiries about cybersecurity incidents could serve as a blueprint.
While it would not solve the bigger problem of establishing rules and norms in the cyberdomain, the hotline would help to control the risk of escalation in the event of a serious cyber-attack against a NATO member state or Russia conducted by a third party or a non-state entity. It could become crucial in such cases to prevent a false attribution of the attack and retaliation against the wrong target.
More substance to dialogue Increasing the frequency of NATO-Russia meetings or military-to-military contacts would have limited impact unless the two sides look anew at the topics and potential of the conversation. While not requiring any major policy changes, these recommendations would enable both sides to reflect on their goals for NATO-Russia relations:
• NATO’s homework: clarify the content of ‘no business as usual’
NATO Allies want to avoid any impression of getting back to what they call “business as usual” with Moscow, in other words resuming cooperation with Russia while putting aside the current disagreements, notably over Ukraine. Without a clearer meaning of the term, however, any activity or topics beyond the current agenda can be presented as crossing the line. At the same time, individual NATO states continue, to varying degrees, to pursue bilateral contacts with Russia on topics of mutual interest. That may with time create a gap between limited exchanges at the NATO-Russia level and closer engagement at national level in some cases. It may therefore be in NATO’s interest to review its approach to dialogue. The North Atlantic Council could clarify through internal discussion what NATO understands by “no business as usual” and “no practical cooperation” with Russia.
While clearly delineating areas of no engagement (for example, no cooperation on sensitive issues like missile defence or joint exercises), that could open up space and give an impetus for business that needs to be done. This could include increased political and military-to-military contacts, risk reduction measures, arrangements for crisis prevention and management, and engagement in confidence-building and arms control talks with Russia.
• Russia’s homework: address the credibility gap in its dialogue offers towards NATO
While Russia maintains that it makes attempts to pragmatically engage the Alliance and its members, including on crisis management, and is open to resumption of working-level contacts, it has a serious credibility problem. Many Allies see Moscow as not engaging seriously on some issues (such as specific questions on military exercises or military build-up), cherry-picking topics or making proposals calculated to divide the Alliance rather than to be constructive. NATO also frequently claims that Russia’s actions on the ground are inconsistent with its engagement initiatives.
Russian decision-makers are certainly entitled to conclude that dialogue with NATO is pointless. But if they are going to engage in dialogue at all, and especially if they are interested in stabilising the relationship with NATO and addressing the threat of escalation, they will need to reflect on the effectiveness of their overall approach towards NATO and its member states. A review could ensure that diplomatic overtures are not unintentionally undermined by assertive propaganda or military moves on the ground. Regarding specific topics, Moscow could provide credible information on its military activities at the NRC briefings and constructively address more of the questions raised by the NATO side.
• Run a Table Top Exercise on the Management of Air Incidents
Significant steps have already been taken to reduce risks of collision between military and civilian aircraft (for example, through the Baltic Sea Project Team and the International Civil Aviation Organization), but more should be done in the military-to-military sphere where dangerous incidents continue to be an issue.5 While so far escalation has been avoided, real-time management of an incident or accident involving the air forces of NATO countries and Russia would prove to be challenging, as the November 2015 Turkey-Russia incident demonstrated.
A table top exercise focused on air accident/ incident response could develop a much needed procedural knowledge for handling such situations. A non-governmental panel of experts could be convened from both sides (including retired senior military with the requisite expertise, as well as civil aviation experts) to scope the problem, run a table top exercise with scenarios involving reacting to an air incident or accident, and prepare recommendations. Such a panel could report to the NRC, with results made available to the OSCE and other interested organisations. This exercise could provide a blueprint for perfecting procedures (such as the preparation of a code of conduct) that could be discussed at the governmental level in order to improve the handling of air incidents.
• Invite experts to brief the NRC on cyberspace regulations
The scope for advancing NATO-Russia discussion on crisis stability by acting “from within” the NRC seems limited. This is particularly true for the cyber domain, where the NRC conversation so far has apparently been unproductive. At the same time, the need for greater regulation of cyberspace activities is growing more acute, and a number of international initiatives have been launched to work on solutions. To move forward the discussions related to the cyber domain within the NRC, it may be beneficial to draw on the experience of external experts such as members of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security6 or the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC).7
When it comes to air safety, the briefing by the Baltic Sea Project Team helped the NRC to better comprehend the topic. Similarly, independent cyberspace experts could brief the NRC on their work and lessons-learned, making recommendations relevant to the NRC which could be further discussed by the Council.
Intensifying NATO-Russia dialogue beyond the official government level contacts
There are contacts between individual experts, think tanks and academic experts from Russia and NATO countries, as well as sporadic joint initiatives. Yet deterioration of the relationship has increased the tendency to instrumentalise expert discussions as opportunities for trading accusations rather than for engaging in a constructive dialogue. This seems to consolidate rather than help to overcome the existing diplomatic stalemate.
Non-governmental initiatives and those with the informal participation of officials do not always require official blessing or implicate governmental positions yet can provide valuable insights and suggestions for intergovernmental work. They can operate at a more technical level, outside the political limelight.
Initiatives to consider could include setting up a “Track 2 NATO-Russia Council” of NGOs, think tanks and scientific organisations; establishing a group of retired officials and experts to advise the officials on both sides, or setting up a Wise Persons Study Panel to offer recommendations on the future of the NATO-Russia relationship. Additionally, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Bureau could maintain contacts with the Russian Parliament in order to cultivate dialogue and explore the potential of ad-hoc meetings.
Significant value-added can be derived from joint simulations (table top exercises, war games or scenario-based discussions) involving experts, former officials and retired military from NATO states, partners and Russia. For example, simulations with the participation of retired officials and officers could “test” responses to a developing crisis between NATO and Russia, examine escalation scenarios and crisis management procedures. Such exercises could help assess the dangers of inadvertent escalation, the likelihood or otherwise of a rapid move to a devastating conflict, and the adequacy of the current communication arrangements. A potential post-INF Treaty escalation of tensions in Europe caused by deployments of INF Treaty-class missiles could serve as one possible scenario.
On another track, taking the Polish-Russian project “White Spots―Black Spots: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations” as a point of departure, a semi-official study of the history of NATO-Russian relations could be initiated. The participation of historians from NATO countries and Russia, with a broad access to archives, could help to analyse the roots of some misunderstandings and myths about the past, or at least illuminate better the conflicting narratives and historical perspectives.
III Taking one step further in stabilising NATO-Russia relations
The limited character of the recommendations in the previous section stems from a realistic assessment of what is feasible in the current circumstances. NATO's and Russia's approaches to their relationship are based on deeply-held views about the other side and their own interests. It is difficult to see how the present confrontational relationship can be significantly improved unless its trajectory is changed by internal developments or external events.
The simplest but also least likely scenario for improvement would be a major reconceptualisation of the relationship on either side. From NATO's perspective, the change on Russia's side would most likely need to include reversing the policy decisions of recent years including the annexation of Crimea, restraint in its force deployments and exercises, ceasing Russia's destabilisation campaign, accepting NATO as a partner rather than a threat, reversing Moscow's negative stance on NATO's enlargement and addressing the numerous issues brought up by the Allies. From Russia’s perspective, such a change would probably have to involve NATO accepting Russia’s recent territorial gains, significantly restraining its military activities along its Eastern flank, and accepting a halt on Eastern enlargement and limitations on partnerships with countries bordering Russia. It is implausible to expect either side to make such a dramatic U-turn.
It may thus be more realistic to envisage increased stabilisation of the relationship as stemming from a gradual build-up of greater predictability between NATO and Russia. Implementation of the recommendations from the previous section would be one step in that direction. Parallel progress on resolving some of the contentious issues, such as the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the situation in the Azov Sea, or the INF Treaty, would be another. A partial “détente” would mean a slow, careful and reversible broadening of the areas of engagement, dealing with some of the sharpest points of difference and avoidance of new tensions.
If and when political space opens up that makes such increased engagement possible, maintaining movement would require both sides to respond step-by-step to the opportunity. That supports the case for having ‘in the air’ ideas that have already to some extent been sifted. These might range from additional channels of communication, potential political pledges, declaratory measures, or crisis management procedures, to initiating limited cooperation on issues of mutual interest.
Our exercise identified a short menu of ideas that did not meet the requirement of immediate political feasibility but that were nonetheless seen as practical and realistic enough that they might become applicable at a certain point. If they were implemented, NATO-Russia relations would still be adversarial but would be much more stable and somewhat less expensive.
Enhanced quality of dialogue Assuming new willingness on both sides to move beyond the current model of NATO-Russia dialogue, the following measures can be suggested:
• Convene a high-level NRC meeting to provide direction
Summit and ministerial-level contacts are not excluded by the April 2014 NATO Foreign Ministers decision on suspending practical cooperation with Moscow.8 Many NATO Allies would currently see a ministerial level NRC as a totally unacceptable ‘reward’ to Moscow. But in other circumstances such a meeting could be reframed not as ‘business as usual’ but as ‘business that needs to be done’ to provide direction in reducing risk in a continuing adversarial relationship. It might be convened, for example, to address the ‘rules of the road’ for stability or even to give momentum to a stabilisation and deescalation process.
• Establish a dialogue on cyber activities within the NRC
There are no commonly accepted rules guiding NATO-Russia conduct in cyberspace and response towards hostile cyber activities. At the same time, there are several cyberrelated risks and challenges relevant to the NATO-Russia relationship: the risk of crossdomain escalation; the risk to command and control, communication, and early warning systems; the possibility of wrong or politicised attribution of a cyber-attack; the problem of third-party attacks and the lack of deterrence rules in cyber space. A formal dialogue could serve transparency, confidence building and risk reduction.
NATO and Russia could establish an NRC Cybersecurity Working Group to discuss possible risks involved in cyber activities and ways to mitigate their escalation. This certainly falls into the category of ‘business that needs to be done’. This group could start by working on a cyber-domain glossary of terms. Both parties could also work on a prohibition of cyber-attacks on command and control infrastructure. NATO and Russia could also use the working group to provide some transparency regarding their cyber policies and the mechanisms and criteria they will use to assess alleged cyber-attacks.
In the event of any future updates of the Tallinn Manual, which aims to identify rules for cyberspace activities, the facilitator – the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence – could potentially invite Russian experts to participate, in order to broaden the range of the exercise.