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CP solves --- state department can share cyber intelligence with allies

Ford 22 --- Christopher A. Ford, Distinguished Policy Advisor at MITRE Labs and a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “Conceptualizing Cyberspace Security Diplomacy”, SPRING 2022, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_spring/03_Ford_CDR_V7N2.pdf?ver=jPNxXAqiUZX7kFHLgxwpUw%3D%3D

A less well known but growing component of the West’s cyber defense, however, is also diplomatic, in the form of cyberspace security diplomacy. As exemplified by the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (CCI)5] this work involves engaging with foreign counterparts to develop and articulate common understandings of peacetime norms for cyber activity; this includes the principles set forth by United Nations experts in 2013 that states should not attack each other’s civilian critical infrastructure in peacetime.[6] It also involves promoting the adoption of common positions in attributing cyberattacks to malicious cyber actors and in imposing penalties (e.g., sanctions, public condemnation, or prosecution) upon those actors.

Cyberspace security diplomacy was responsible for a 2019 agreement reached by 28 Western countries expressing support for the “evolving framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace,” supporting “targeted cybersecurity capacity building to ensure that all responsible states can implement this framework and better protect their networks from significant disruptive, destructive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activity,” and pledging to “work together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they act contrary to this framework.”[7] It is now not unusual for US officials to impose sanctions upon malicious cyber actors in other countries, nor for US law enforcement agencies to issue criminal indictments.[8] Work by US diplomats, intelligence officials, and law enforcement officers to engage their international counterparts, moreover, has helped encourage foreign governments impose concrete international steps to penalize such malefactors as well.[9]

In the US, such cyber-diplomacy has been undertaken under the aegis of the 2018 National Cyber Strategy, which called for “an international Cyber Deterrence Initiative” that would include building “a coalition [of states] and develop[ing] tailored strategies to ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their own malicious cyber behavior.”

The United States will work with like-minded states to coordinate and support each other’s responses to significant malicious cyber incidents, including through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements of support for responsive actions taken, and joint imposition of consequences against malign actors.[10]

Such diplomacy cannot solve all today’s problems of rampant cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber assaults, of course, but it is a key piece of the puzzle as Western societies build effective responses.

Cyber diplomacy involves convincing others to agree upon cyber threat assessments, the attribution of specific attacks to specific actors, and what sorts of response may be appropriate in any given case. While there are extremely technical aspects of this work (such as the analysis of cyber-attackers’ TTPs and intelligence-derived information in connection with attribution assessments) cyber diplomacy is not only a technical matter but also a persuasive and even political exercise, in which international counterparts work to develop areas of agreement and decide upon courses of action. Because cyberspace security diplomacy is a relatively new field, though, little study has hitherto been done of the persuasive aspects of this work.

The Diplomacy of International Cyber-Collaboration

Cyberspace security diplomacy revolves heavily around international efforts to come to agreement on cyber threats – and on the attribution of a cyber-attack to a particular malicious cyber actor. “Attribution diplomacy” is critical to the State Department’s cyberspace security engagements. Though the conventional wisdom used to hold that such attribution was all but impossible in cyberspace,

… [i]t actually is possible to do more by way of attribution than most observers once thought possible. It is sometimes even possible to share enough information with one’s friends and partners that they, too, can have a reasonable degree of confidence in the source of an attack.[11]

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