Bad strategic studies terminology turns the case.
Stoker and Whiteside '20 [Donald and Craig; Winter 2020; Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College's Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey; associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College at Naval Postgraduate School, senior associate with NWC’s Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, fellow at the International Centre for Counter-terrorism; "Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War-Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking," Naval War College Review, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 19-54]
Commentators frequently use the gray zone phrase to describe the war Vladimir Putin launched against Ukraine in 2014, implying that the actions were opaque enough to cloud perceptions about whether war had erupted in the Donbas. Commentators also use gray zone and its variations to describe China's moves to cement its extralegal territorial claims in the South China Sea against weaker opponents, as well as Iranian moves in Syria and the Persian Gulf.
The popularization of the term gray zone appears to have been inspired by its incorporation into military documents and speeches. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review references challenges that occur in an "ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace."16 But it took the remarks delivered five years later by General Joseph L. Votel, USA, the then head of Special Operations Command, to bring the term into the public eye. He incorporated the concept into his briefing to Congress on the unique challenges posed by Russia and the Islamic State, noting that "our success in this environment will be determined by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional peace-or-war construct"17
An article discussing "a 'gray zone' between traditional notions of war and peace" appeared soon after.18 More publications quickly followed; they seem to be an elaboration of General Votel's remarks and to discuss conflicts "that fall between the traditional war and peace duality"19 Collectively, this work gave us a generally accepted definition of the term. Other publications arrived before the end of 2015.20 After these instances, use of the term exploded.21 One article arguing for a place between peace and war did appear in August 2014, but it does not mention a gray zone specifically.22 The earliest example of this delineation (which does not appear to underpin the key relevant literature) appeared in a 1995 international law article that mentions "the gray zone between war and peace"23 Japan's 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines took a slightly different tack, pointing out that "there are a growing number of so-called 'gray-zone' disputes-confrontations over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests that do not escalate into wars"24 There is also a related October 2014 Stars and Stripes article.25
The key academic text seems to be Michael J. Mazarr's Mastering the Gray Zone, which does not provide a sufficiently clear definition of the gray zone. The best that can be derived from it is that a "new standard form of conflict" is emerging from "revisionist states" that are "competing below the threshold of major war."26 Moreover, gray-zone war is defined in relation to an undefinable term: major war.27 A commonly accepted definition of this in certain academic circles is as follows: "Major war means an operation where the United States deployed over fifty thousand troops and there were at least one thousand battle deaths."28 This definition is arbitrary and means based, and thus unusable.
Mazarr derived the term-at least in part-from the work of the special operations community.29 But our inquiries have failed to determine any inspiration for other recent American users of the term. It could derive from a 2005 book by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, American and Italian Marxist scholars, respectively (Negri is a devotee and former student of Michel Foucault). Hardt and Negri related the gray-zone concept to the post-Saddam Iraqi insurgency and wrote that "most of the current military engagements of the United States are unconventional conflicts or low-intensity conflicts that fall in the gray zone between peace and war"30 Ironically, here gray zone is used by critics of America to describe what is seen as deliberate efforts to blur recognition of what is clearly a military action: the occupation of a sovereign nation. Even more ironically, Russian officials frequently depict hybrid war as something "the Americans do" with "their advocacy of color revolutions"-which demonstrates the crossover contagion effects of the use of both terms.31
GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY
There are several fundamental problems with use of the term gray zone.32 The first has to do with theoretical considerations. Again, the advocates of the concept-whether or not they realize it, and whether or not they insist they are doing so-are creating new theory about what is and is not war.33 The advocates of the gray-zone conflict terminology fail this test because, as we will see, they are not clarifying concepts but instead creating confusion.
As with some discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone publications haphazardly swirl and mingle the levels of war. Mazarr mixes strategy and tactics when he calls Chinese actions in the South China Sea the "use of gradual, multi-instrument strategies" then in the next sentence states that Russia's moves against Ukraine "also constitute a variety of the tactic" and in the next sentence avers that Iran's search for regional power and nuclear weapons is "a variety of gray zone strategy" He also writes that "gray zone conflict involves the holistic application of a mosaic of civilization and military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual progress toward political objectives." Here, as in other places, the author is partly writing about grand strategy, because he is examining the various tools of power a nation can employ in pursuit of its political objective.34
All this produces a critical problem in logic. If you do not define your terms and stick to a valid use of them, you have not presented a basis for rational discussion. Failing to differentiate among grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics compounds this problem. A challenge on the tactical level must be addressed in ways starkly different from those applicable to a strategic threat.
Mazarr also argues that revisionist powers "are creating a new approach to the pursuit of aggressive aims, a new standard form of conflict" by undermining foes gradually on their periphery.35 The reality is that there is nothing new here. The Nazis used subversion to undermine Austria and Czechoslovakia before World War II. This was a standard Soviet practice against NATO countries. Mazarr himself writes that the ancient Greeks behaved in the manner now associated with gray-zone conflict. Revisionist or aggressive powers certainly are a problem today, but they always have been a problem and always will be.
None of this, of course, counters the fact that Mazarr and others indeed are correct about the danger from revisionist states. But we must parse the problem in a clearer manner to develop proper responses. If one identifies the problem incorrectly, one very likely will deliver the wrong answer. The most important and useful part of Mazarr's text provides superb analysis of the threat to the international order from several aggressive, revisionist powers. The challenges from China and Russia today resemble those of the 1950s. Both the Soviet empire and China had, on their respective borders, weak states that were not tied to any alliance system. Both also had revolutionary, and thus revisionist, regimes, as does Iran. Today, Russia, China, and Iran all have weak, often unaffiliated states on their borders, or ungoverned or disputed areas, such as parts of the South China Sea. The methods one uses to go about obtaining control of these areas fall under the realms of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is also here where the ideas of the original gray-zone writers, as we will see shortly, are very applicable.
The gray zone, as Adam Elkus observes, is "just another example of the strategic studies community needlessly confusing itself by generating new terminology to replace what is not broken"36