Counterplan forfeits NATO’s norm-setting power
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf /GoGreen!
But ad hoc approaches also pose challenges to organizations like NATO. Madeleine Albright warned against the “three Ds” in the 1990s when she highlighted the risks of de-linking from, or duplicating NATO efforts, as well as discriminating among members.24 These issues remain an important concern—particularly in U.S. policy discussions – when it comes to more recent ad hoc or minilateral formats focused on European defense. A more concerted NATO role in guiding flexible efforts within the alliance could help address this concern to minimize redundancies and buttress cohesion.
NATO should work as much as possible with members and partners to ensure minilateral formats complement, rather than compete with, the alliance. Moreover, NATO should consider how it can more effectively apply the lessons of these formats to its partnership policy to craft a more flexible approach. This includes lessons from previous efforts to create flexible formats within the alliance.
There are few metrics to evaluate a model’s success. In many ways, weighing the differences between minilateral arrangements outside larger multilateral frameworks and flexible formats inside them is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges. But there are a few factors that are instructive, including mutual interest in cooperation, shared threat perceptions and security priorities (which are often aligned with geographic location), and a high level of ambition of all involved participants. Moreover, on a procedural level, clear, defined goals and a focus on outputs, coupled with regular consultations, can help drive success. Ad hoc formats with lean and focused structures that are built around voluntary participation allow for quicker responses—especially in crisis situations—but they may be less suited to driving and verifying success on long term deliverables and capability goals.
Flexible formats embedded within NATO, like the FNC and the NATO+N model, or alongside NATO in the case of PESCO can increase agility for member and partner cooperation. But the diminishing enthusiasm around the German FNC and challenges surrounding PESCO funding indicate continued hurdles. The NATO+N model has proven effective in engaging two or three partners around common regional security challenges (for example, NATO members, Finland, and Sweden). Yet, its limits risk a default bilateralization or trilateralization of NATO’s engagement with partners and may fail to leverage a broader capacity of partnerships.
In its effort to create greater political cohesion in Euro-Atlantic defense, NATO cannot ignore the application and improvement of its flexible partnership engagement. The tendency of NATO members and partners to participate in various minilateral formats has significant implications. If NATO cannot figure out how to engage partners more effectively and flexibly, they and members may increasingly be inclined to engage in various minilateral formats rather than NATO or simply pursue bilateral ties. In this context, NATO partnerships could end up as little more than a “talk shop,” forfeiting the alliance’s agenda-setting power.