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Their self-authorization internal link is backwards – NATO’s liberal identification empirically constrains exceptional justifications for violence – which do NOT map to a West/non-West divide

Gill-Tiney 22 Patrick Gill-Tiney, Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics, St. John’s College, Oxford, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(3), 2022, pp.413-442 /GoGreen!

This article shows that liberal interpretations of sovereignty, which emphasize international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms, have become increasingly prevalent in UN Security Council resolutions since 1970. Given that two non-western states, Russia/Soviet Union and China, are permanent members, I argue that the content of these resolutions reflects broad consensus between major powers—both western and non-western—as how these norms should be interpreted. This is not the same as arguing that these states share preferences or interests, rather, substantial differences remain, largely along the cleavage between the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and China and Russia on the other (Einsiedel and Malone 2018, 156-58).1 Yet, the collective positions of these states have evolved over time, suggesting a shift in how sovereignty is understood. The dominant role that these states have in shaping the international order means that their collective understandings may be taken as representative of the normative structure of international society at any point in time, with the expectation that this impacts all states in the system.2

I argue that as liberal interpretations of these fundamental norms increase, the likelihood of a dispute participant resorting to violence decreases. Through content analysis of all UN Security Council resolutions between 1970 and 2014 I first create a measure of the strength of liberal interpretations of sovereignty. This is then utilized in quantitative analysis of dispute participants in the period to explain the variation in the level of violence employed. I find statistical and substantive support for my theory, showing empirically that the growth in liberal norm interpretations is negatively associated with the likelihood of a state resorting to violence in an interstate dispute.

This is not to argue that structural arguments are wrong, far from it, nor is it to reject the roles of conventional and nuclear capabilities in shaping interstate conflict behavior. Rather, state power does matter, that is why the collective interpretations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council are used to understand the system. Domestic veto players, intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms, and trade dependency all do shape the responses of policymakers during an interstate dispute. However, the intersubjective ideas they carry with them into disputes are also crucial to understand why some disputes escalate, and others do not.

This article contributes to our understanding of the role that ideas have in shaping interstate conflict in two ways. Firstly, I contribute to the large literature which has sought to understand the role which norms play in selecting for certain behaviors over others. Most of the work within this area has been qualitative and has either charted the development of specific bundles of norms over long periods (Keene 2012, 2013; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sandholtz 2007) or focused on the life-cycle of specific norms (Eckstein 1988; Finnemore 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Krook and True 2012; Nadelmann 1990; Sandholtz 2007; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008). I build upon these insights by arguing that the norm of sovereignty has been re-interpreted over time, and that the collective nature of reinterpretation means that it can be used to examine its impact in interstate conflict.

Secondly, this article provides an innovative means of exploring ideas in a quantitative framework. The quantitative interstate conflict literature has heavily favored structural and power-based explanations for actor behavior. This has come at the particular expense of norms. Whilst there is widespread acceptance that norms matter amongst these scholars, they have tended to set aside norm-based explanations given the difficulty of objective measurement. This difficulty revolves around the problem of having surety that multiple actors share an idea, that is, intersubjective understanding. The most obvious sources of data to assess this would be a survey of policymakers or the content of international legal documents. This first avenue is incredibly difficult to gain anything but anecdotal responses too. Policymakers are hard to get access to and may misrepresent their own thoughts and actions to show themselves in as best light as possible. Ensuring that any respondents have understood the survey in the same way is difficult given language differences, whilst response rates are likely to be so low as to prevent a non-random sample from being acquired, even if the potential pool of relevant participants is widened to include all senior politicians and bureaucrats, both incumbent and preceding.

Some of these problems are resolved by utilizing the texts of international legal documents. Given that these are generally carefully and cautiously written the researcher is more certain that the drafters actually share an understanding of the topic. Recent work by Allee and co-authors (Allee, Elsig, and Lugg 2017; Allee and Lugg 2016) have innovatively utilized content analysis of interstate trade deals to explore how much is replicated in subsequent deals, which sheds light on the relative power of the participants. This has certainly gained deeper understanding of the topic, but is not a suitable approach for this research questions for two reasons. Firstly, these deals are generally drafted by small numbers of states, that is, they may not be assumed to represent the preferences and interests of nonparties. Secondly, whilst interpretations are spelled out, these may be mechanistic rather than ideational, making it unclear what the broader normative position may be. This is made more acute by the drafting being down by bureaucrats and lawyers rather than policymakers themselves. Whilst some direction is no-doubt given by the latter, assuming a high level is problematic. Utilizing the content of UN Security Council resolutions addresses these problems because the documents may be assumed to be political, that is, though member states are represented by ambassadors, a high-level of involvement by their state governments is typical given the importance attached to security issues. Moreover, since the permanent membership is diverse in interests and preferences, and these members can veto unpalatable resolutions, they may be reasonably assumed to provide insight into intersubjective understandings.

Existing Explanations of Interstate Conflict and the Role of Norms

Two existing literatures are built on here, firstly, the broad democratic peace literature, including its offshoots and opponents, and secondly, scholarship on the evolution of international norms. The former literature initially focused upon regime type, and over time has been widened to include more fine-grained analyses of domestic political structures in any state (Bell and Quek 2018; Fearon 1994; Gries et al. 2020; Huth and Allee 2002; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Weeks 2012; Weiss 2013; Weiss and Dafoe 2019). However, the approach in all of these works is to examine structures, that is, formal institutional constraints encountered by decision makers, rather than norms, that is, the role of shared principles, perceptions and expectations of behavior. The distinction between norms and structure is not rigid. This is most clearly seen in the term “institution” which is commonly used to mean both formal structures which limit the agency of decision makers, but also a set of norms, rules, and practices which govern a specific area. To clarify the distinction being made in this article, I adapt the nomenclature used by Reus-Smit (1999) who distinguishes between constitutional institutions, norms without which a society of states could not exist, and fundamental institutions, which facilitate cooperation. The former includes sovereignty, as well as the rights of self-determination and nonintervention, and the latter contractual international law and the organizations which enforce it (both internal and external to states). In this article, I term the former “norms” and the latter “structures.”

The democratic peace literature has spurred several offshoots, the most relevant of which are those which have argued that rather than regime type the “peace” is generated by economic factors including trade interdependency and level of development (Gartzke 2007; Hegre 2000; Kim 2014; Kinne 2012; McDonald 2009, 2010; Mousseau 2013; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010) or shared intergovernmental organization membership (Appel 2018; Kinne 2013a, 2013b; Prorok and Appel 2014). More general critiques have argued that any effect seen is due to the prior settlement of territorial disputes (Gibler 2012; Gibler and Tir 2014; Owsiak 2012), nuclear weapons (Waltz 1990), alliances (Kydd 2005), unipolarity (Monteiro 2014) or military power (Layne 1994; Rosato 2003) instead. With the exception of the latter critiques, this debate has broadly accepted the importance of norms (Doyle 1986; Moravcsik 1997; Owen 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001), especially as the “good” functioning of domestic and international structures, particularly veto players, requires political actors to have the right norms.

This relationship between norms and structures has been more closely addressed through the focus on contracts, that is, to hone in on specific economic norms and structures characterized as allowing an economic market to function “with extensive and regularized transactions among strangers that require an element of trust” (Mousseau and Xiongwei 2018, sec. Emergence Contractualist Peace). This literature argues that the relationship between peace and democracy is spurious, and rather, that both are explained by “contracturalist” norms and structures (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Mousseau, Hegre, and O’Neal 2003), which builds upon the work of (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Dahl 1997; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Yet, the literature still relies upon operationalizations which are essentially structural, that is, whilst recognizing the importance of norms, the empirical testing has fallen short.

A comparatively small subset of the literature has examined norms as an explanation for the democratic peace. For Deutsch (1957), though NATO is understood as a structure, a security community is more crucially formed around shared values (norms). Kahl argues that the basis of the democratic peace is collective identity rooted in liberal democracy interlinked by intergovernmental organizations (1998). For Risse, the influence of NATO allies upon the foreign policy of the United States demonstrates the importance of liberal norms, through a mechanism which relies upon the similarity of domestic political institutions in these liberal democracies and coalition-building (1995). Though valuable additions to the literature, and in Deutsch’s case systematic in its treatment of the subject, these works fail to tackle the question of whether the democratic peace is structural or norm based since the two are entwined throughout. The difficulty in conceptualizing, isolating and operationalizing norms is a clear problem. Broadly, it is hard to isolate a norm from either the structure in which it exists or from other norms for analysis. It is also a challenge to show that any norm is truly intersubjective in understanding or to measure its effect upon some outcome of interest. Yet, without attempts to do so we are left with a partial picture, particularly for those emphasizing the importance of structures—be these domestic or international—for reducing interstate conflict. In short, the existence of a domestic legislature, independent judiciary, or interstate treaties, is only relevant if the individuals which employ them do so appropriately. To understand this necessitates exploring the ideas in the heads of these individuals, and particularly, how these ideas are shared.

In contrast to the large, predominantly quantitative, literature which has examined the democratic peace and wider questions linking regime type to the onset, conduct and termination of interstate disputes and wars, the broader literature on interstate norms has tended to be qualitative and highly focused. This has resulted in detailed work on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2000), and nuclear weapons (Rublee and Cohen 2018; Tannenwald 1999). There is no doubt that this has contributed to our understanding of interstate relations, yet the clear shortcoming is generalizability. That is, the specificity of these approaches, necessary to make any form of causal claim, is in a sense also the undoing.

In this article I focus on the reinterpretation of the sovereignty norm by powerful states. I argue that they have a dominant role in shaping the normative landscape of the international system by being tasked with the interpretation of norms and the maintenance of international society (Hurrell 2007; Wight 1978; Saunders 2006). Operationalizing this, I utilize UN Security Council resolutions as a means of assessing what the consensus position of the permanent members is. Content analysis is used to examine the normative framing of resolutions, allowing both an exploration of change over time, and quantitative measures of the relative strength of these ideas to be derived which can then be used in regression analysis.

The Constraining Effect of Liberal Interpretations of Sovereignty

Norms are dynamic, and undergo processes of evolution, creation and destruction. Change may occur gradually as actors shift their understandings towards an alternative, or suddenly through systemic, and thereby social, change. In international relations, the latter is tightly linked to sudden shifts in great power authority, which has typically occurred due to defeat and a subsequent realignment of international order. War, and its aftermath, can lead to substantial rearrangements of international order, meaning both a new distribution of power, but also a re-interpretation of international society. In examining change in understandings of sovereignty I term gradual change “evolution” and sudden change “tectonic.”

Interpretations of Sovereignty

The post-World War Two era allows examination of both evolutionary and tectonic change in understandings of sovereignty. Evolution occurs during relative peace, whilst tectonic change is part of major realignments of international order. The end of the Cold War, though non-violent certainly led to significant power shifts, resulting in a tectonic change. The pre- and post-Cold War eras are eras of evolution. Assessing rivalrous interpretation of norms is crucial to understanding these changes. I outline a divergence between traditional and liberal interpretations which are used to examine change in norms, and the effect upon international conflict.

Over the post-World War Two period two interpretations of sovereignty have existed, firstly, that emphasizing territorial sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and secondly, that emphasizing international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms in international affairs. I term the former approach to sovereignty “traditional,” and the latter “liberal.” A liberal interpretation of sovereignty, therefore, is one which places emphasis upon the actions of states, particularly those between a government and its citizens. Sovereignty in this understanding implies not only the exercise of power over a territory and people (as in the traditional understanding), but also that there are limits to the exercise of power and duties to a people (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008, 287-88).3 This has been most clearly stated in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. I examine the relative balance between these two interpretations over time, arguing that this balance alters how sovereignty is understood, and thereby is related to the likelihood of escalation in interstate disputes.

My expectation is that the relative balance between these two modes of interpretation has shifted over the post-World War Two period to favor a liberal interpretation. This does not mean that traditional interpretations are irrelevant, rather, that they have been de-emphasized in international discourse relative to the latter. A spectrum in which purely traditional and purely liberal interpretations mark the poles is conceived of as existing, with great powers occupying positions between the two. The effect that this shift toward a liberal interpretation of sovereignty has occurred on international conflict escalation is now examined.

Understandings of Sovereignty and Conflict Escalation

How understandings of sovereignty impact international disputes may be explored in terms of the conflict life-cycle, that is, why a dispute emerges, why violent conflict breaks out, and how the conflict ends, or in terms of participant conduct during war. Here, I examine the effect of change in the collective understanding of sovereignty upon escalation, meaning that I assume the prior existence of international disputes. Whilst the effect of norms upon the onset of disputes is an important question, very few disputes result in the use of violence, that is, though onset is a necessary condition for violence, it is far from sufficient. I examine escalation from a nonviolent dispute to a violent dispute—the use of armed force in international relations—because this is of greater substantive significance to state leaders and their citizens. Moreover, whilst reducing the likelihood of dispute onset would likely result in less international violence, the more normatively important question is how to avoid escalation, as this reduces the costs of war: human death and economic destruction.

This is not to trivialize dispute onset, and logically we might expect the growth of liberal understandings of sovereignty to also reduce onset rates as well as escalation likelihood. However, there are two reasons why we may doubt the substantive significance of this, firstly, dispute onset is a relatively low threshold, and secondly, onset is often triggered by events beyond the direct control of a state. To this first point, a dispute simply means that two or more actors disagree over something, oftentimes the behavior of the other side or the distribution of some good (for instance, territory). This article utilizes Militarized Interstate Disputes as the operationalization of dispute, and many disputes are comparatively minor events, with the threshold being that one of the two parties has a minimum level of militarization as part of the dispute (for example, the issuance of a deterrent, or compellent, threat). A focus on onset, therefore, would prevent observation of substantively more important actions, that is, the actual use of force against another. Secondly, many disputes begin due to accident and/or the decision making of low-level military commanders or political officials who are neither in the position to consider national interests nor strategic interactions. This means that onset may essentially be an apolitical decision which takes little or no account of the broader strategic landscape nor the structural and normative context. It is after onset, that is, when escalation is considered by policymakers, that the stakes are higher and when causal mechanisms common to this topic are most active.

Escalation then, is a political decision. In making the choice to escalate, or not, policymakers are impacted by a range of strategic factors, but crucially, are also constrained by norms. The use of force in international relations must be justified, and since 1945 the UN Charter specifies just two: self-defense and collective peace enforcement. To this, we might also add humanitarian intervention, though this remains contested. As a baseline, therefore, when faced with dispute onset, policymakers must justify their actions with reference to one of these reasons. Moreover, in making the decision to escalate, policymakers are also constrained by liberal values which emphasize diplomacy, cooperation, international law, international organizations, the rights of the individual, and to question the legitimacy of the march to war. Taken together, this slows the decision to escalate, since legal justification is needed, diplomacy is necessary, and potential economic and human costs understood, calculated and defended. A shift toward liberal interpretations thereby means a reduced probability of escalation to violence, tacitly assuming that the risk of a dispute arising in the first-place is unchanged. This leads me to my first hypothesis, which relates to the evolution mechanism of change:

Hypothesis 1: Given an international dispute, the risk of escalation decreases as liberal interpretations increase.

An alternative explanation is that any impact of normative change is actually a result of the end of the Cold War, that is, the redistribution of power between great powers, typically resulting from system-wide conflict results in qualitative differences in interpretations of fundamental norms between peace-periods. Whilst the end of the Cold War did not involve a system-wide war, it did mark the end of sustained rivalry between great powers. The pre- and post- periods can thereby be compared. Given the rivalry of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the relative dominance of the United States post-Cold War, we might expect qualitative differences in conflict behavior to be observable in the two time periods, attributable, perhaps, to a greater emphasis upon liberal interpretations in the post-Cold War era. The dramatic change in the distribution of power triggered a significant change in the consensus surrounding interpretation of fundamental norms of international society. This leads me to my second hypothesis, which captures the tectonic change mechanism:

Hypothesis 2: The risk of dispute escalation decreases given a systemic increase in liberal interpretations of sovereignty attributable to the end of the Cold War.

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