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Ks of lib-ism link to themselves by dismissing post-colonial liberal perspectives and the concrete needs of colonial subjects—rejecting lib-ism all too easily feeds into the growing wave of global fascism

Claudio, 19—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Conclusion: Resurrecting Plants,” Jose Rizal: Liberalism and the Paradox of Coloniality, 71-77, SpringerLink, dml)

Too often, with liberalism, we throw the baby out with the bathwater. In contemporary critical and cultural theory, criticisms of liberalism are almost mandatory. This is most true in the field of postcolonial theory or in philosophies of the Global South. For many postcolonial scholars, “western” liberalism is the common enemy of the politics and ideas from the margins of global knowledge production. At times, one may be led to think that, without liberalism as a common target, postcolonial theory would lose its cohesion. Postcolonies are, after all, different, and the philosophies their intellectuals have espoused have likewise been varied. Without a positive notion of theory from the Global South, scholars have turned to denigrating “liberal” modernity.1

Of course, some anti-liberal scholarship has surfaced dark legacies of the European tradition. But even these turn critique into blanket dismissal. For example, the scathing work of Uday Singh Mehta (1999) proves how British liberal intellectuals like Jeremy Benthan, James and John Stuart Mill, and Lord Macaulay defended imperialism, particularly in India. The idea of Western tutelage for “backward” societies, he contends, stems from the liberal embrace of universal values to the exclusion of different cultures and belief systems. Hence, “the liberal involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself” (ibid., 4). Echoing Mehta, the sociologist Julian Go (2017, 74) contends that “civic-liberal nations” are “empire-states” (emphasis in original) because they “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not.”

These scholars are sympathetic to the concerns of postcolonies and the Global South. But they have unwittingly wedded themselves to the study of the Global North. In studying liberalism, they privilege the voices of liberals from Europe, while neglecting how liberalism has been articulated in postcolonies themselves. A global history of liberalism must acknowledge the contributions of colonial thinkers in its development. True enough, we may condemn thinkers like Mill for their defense of imperialism, but we must also celebrate their counterpoints from within the liberal tradition. We must celebrate thinkers like Rizal.

Rizal would have accepted many of the objections of scholars like Mehta and Go. He too knew how liberals from colonial metropoles could use their ideas to support colonialism. But Rizal would have rejected the reduction of liberalism’s vast history to the actions of colonizers. In this book, I hope to have shown that, while Rizal criticized Spanish liberals, he never abandoned the liberal project. Rather, he believed that liberalism could be renewed, even purified, in the colony, through the painful experiences of colonials like himself.

Rizal too would not have dismissed liberalism simply because it could create “Others.” For he knew that any political community needs to have an inside and an outside: nations have foreigners, religions have non-believers, and socialist movements have class enemies. In this regard, liberalism is no different from other political ideals that form bonds of community. Rizal knew, however, that the bonds of community within liberal republics could be expansive and cosmopolitan. He saw how the category “Filipino” could expand from only referring to creoles to include all those who identified with the emergent nation. He believed in communities not bound by race or religion, but adherence to Enlightenment philosophy.

Such a worldview is simple, but it comes to us with a certain urgency today, at a time when “illiberal democracy” is one the rise. For much of the post-Cold War world, progressive and radical thinkers insisted that there was more to human political development than the mere liberal “end of history.” There had to be more radical ways to imagining politics. Amid this desire, much anti-liberal thinking became nihilistic, and those who condemned liberalism rarely thought of concrete alternatives. At worse, they denigrated the basic tenets of liberalism, without care for the possible repercussions.

The disillusionment with liberalism is, of course, nothing new. Even as Rizal was articulating a liberalism for the colonized in the nineteenth century, many Europeans were already becoming sick of the liberal project. Francois Furet (2000, 11) explains that many radicals from that period had come to believe “that modern liberal democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred.” This disillusionment would eventually lead to the twin illiberal philosophies that dominated the twentieth century: fascism on the right and Communism on the Left.

History, of course, does not repeat itself. But there are echoes of the illiberal early twentieth century today. If the present moment prompts comparisons with the 1930s and 1940s, it is not because we are about to enter another period of global warfare. Rather, it is because, our present, like those years, teems with illiberalism. And, like the early twentieth century, intellectuals in the West have been averse to defending liberal values, preferring instead utopian visions of politics that can neither be tested nor implemented. For much of the twentieth century, as Hollander (2016) explains, the illiberalism of intellectuals was evident in the hero worship of dictators in places like Germany, China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and Venezuela. Western intellectuals looked to strongmen on both the left and the right as figures of inspiration because of a “painful awareness of the inability of Western, pluralistic, capitalist societies to deliver sustaining values and beliefs that would enable them to confront and weather the endemic crises and frustrations of life, and especially modern life” (ibid., 294).

These same frustrations not only led Western intellectuals to admire dictators; they also brought them to nihilistic positions against Enlightenment traditions like liberalism. The identification with authoritarian figures and the rejection of “Western liberalism” are impulses of what Pascal Bruckner (2010, 21) calls a masochistic “penitential class,” who, because of their guilt about colonialism, turn their back on the values of the Enlightenment. Today, radical scholars from the Global North seek to theorize the Global South in opposition to a static, liberal North/West. Some are so cavalier that they dismiss even the most humane of Enlightenment traditions such as human rights. For example, Jean and John Comaroff (2001, 39–40), purveyors of “theory from the south,” diminish the value of human rights by comparing rights-based thinking to contemporary capitalism, contending that “If law underpins the langue of neoliberalism, constitutionalism has become the parole of universal human rights, a global argot that individuates the citizen and, by making cultural identity a private asset, rather than a collective claim, transmutes difference into likeness.”

Such purple prose is merely academese for the tired argument that individualistic human rights are incompatible with collectivist societies. In fact, the same argument was better phrased by the spokesperson of the authoritarian Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, when he was justifying the murder of thousands of drug suspects. “The liberal Western values being imposed upon an Asian nation that places premium on common good,” he argued, “is both insensitive and displays a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (Quoted in Esmaquel 2017). Western intellectuals do not always directly endorse demagogues, but they are tempted by cool detachment to speak like them.

Hollander (2016, 9) contends that many pro-dictatorship intellectuals endorsed authoritarianism from a distance, and many of them “had little to gain, or lose” in their judgments. Until today, many illiberal commentators on the Global South from the Global North do so from far away, secure that constitutional rights do not collapse overnight in places like the United States or Europe—Donald Trump and the European far-right notwithstanding. Unfortunately, for those of us in places like the Philippines, a human rights regime may disintegrate overnight, as in the case of Duterte’s Philippines. Rizal’s country was once a broken, if relatively stable, liberal democracy. After the collapse of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship in 1986, it slowly inched its way toward some semblance of a liberal democracy, where regular elections occurred, civil society movements focused on institution building, and relatively open elections occurred (Quimpo 2008; Curato 2015; Thompson 1996). In 2016, the country was taken over by a murderous demagogue.

This collapse of liberal democracy occurs amid thunderous applause, with Duterte remaining popular despite a drug war that has killed thousands. Because Duterte has devalued his country’s human rights tradition—“If it concern human rights, I don’t give a shit”—he once claimed (Quoted in Holmes 2016)—he has also devalued life. Survey data shows that the majority of Filipinos believe that extra-judicial killings are occurring under the drug war, yet a significant majority remain supportive of the government’s draconian campaign (Pulse Asia Research Inc. 2017). Such is the moral crisis that Duterte has created.

When Rizal argued that pain purified liberalism, he was expressing a profound but obvious insight: Those who have had liberty denied them value it even more. Those who believe that liberty may slip away are more cautious in their criticisms of basic freedoms. For a liberal in the Philippines, the truth of this message can be found in the most quotidian contexts. Many liberals in my country have had to fight for liberal values in religious schools, patriarchal families, and other conservative institutions. Under Duterte , they fight amid an electorate that is increasingly proving susceptible to the temptations of authoritarianism. It is an everyday struggle for everyday changes.

Liberalism continues to be pragmatic. It is pragmatic for those who see the concrete needs of postcolonies, for thinkers like Rizal who seek evolving modernities for their nations. For Nigerian philosopher Olúfẹmi Táíwò (2014, 10), seeking these modernities requires being less concerned with the provenance of ideas and more with their usefulness. He contends “that the countries of Asia and Latin America that have transformed themselves for the better are precisely the ones that have wised up to the idea that—regardless of what they think of modernity and the West, which has most benefited from its proliferation—a good way to improve their lot in the world is to borrow some pages from the West’s playbook.”

While liberalism is an inadequate philosophy—it constantly has to grapple with its bourgeois origins—many of its principles are necessary checks against the excesses of political power. The fault of liberalism’s critics has been to view it as an ends in itself instead of a system of guarantees, a bare minimum of treating citizens in a political community with what Orwell called “common decency.” The history of liberalism has shown how many ideas can be grafted onto the liberal project. Social democracy, for example, represented liberalism coming to terms with class inequality. And, indeed, as Tony Judt (2010, 52) has argued, it was the welfare that bound citizens to the state’s liberal institutions.

Liberalism grows. Liberal America once had slaves. Liberal countries from across the world refused women the right to vote. And many liberal states once had colonies, which they exploited. But because of anti-colonial liberals like Rizal, we now recognize colonialism as a contradiction of the liberal project. This recognition is a gift of the Enlightenment, and someone like Rizal had no qualms about appropriating what he saw in Europe, and grafting them into colonial contexts. He would have agreed with Bruckner (2010, 28) who contends that “There is no doubt that Europe has given birth to monsters, but at the same time it has given birth to theories that make it possible to understand and destroy these monsters.”

The rise of global populism and authoritarianism means we can no longer dismiss liberal principles as lightly, since anti-liberalism feeds into the rhetoric of present-day dictators. The Philippine liberal tradition runs deep, but it is always in a precarious position, especially now. For those of us who seek comfort amid the tribulations of the present, we may return to Rizal’s enigmatic vision of liberalism being a “plant that never dies.” The liberal tradition may be in tatters, but we only need to replant its seeds and await its resurrection.

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