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Abdicating a defense of lib-ism’s self-correcting capacities leaves the vacuum open for authoritarianism while removing any checks on its rise

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]

In all the criticisms cited above, critics reduce liberalism to a static idea, holding it up to the most stringent criteria, which are not equally applied to other existing political models. (To muster such vitriol against Marxism would certainly elicit accusations of fascistic anti-Communism). But any nuanced history of liberal thought must acknowledge the steady expansion of liberalism’s political and ethical horizons. Edmund Fawcett, for example, has shown how liberalism, which began as a credo of the elites (liberty for a select few) grew into liberal democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus became a grammar for mass politics (2014, 143). Thus, while we may concede that liberal ideas have previously marginalized women, the poor, and various racial others, we must also note its historical capacity for self-correction. Scholars like Mehta or Go are quick to point out liberalism’s sins but neglect how relatively quickly some of these sins were rectified.

Liberalism’s expansiveness is present even in the US-based civic-liberalism that scholars like Go deride. For, as Richard Rorty reminds us, while the United States has had a history of subjugation and hypocrisy, its greatest minds, such as Walt Whitman and John Dewey, constantly infused their critiques with a vision of what a more inclusive US society could be in the future (1997, 8). The liberal experiment, always in the process of becoming, was premised on “replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what might become real” (18). Liberalism is an idea centered on progress, and progress assumes that mistakes were once made. Otherwise, what are we to progress from?

Much of anti-liberal postcolonial theorization is built on straw men [straw persons], based on incomplete histories of both Northern and Southern liberalisms, and on assumptions about political models that have not or cannot be tested. More importantly, these critiques do not seriously consider their implications in the Global South, where problems like poverty and violence are immediate and pressing, making ameliorative reform more urgent. Moreover, the institutional blueprint of a liberal democracy is necessary to maintain a baseline of politics that prevents the excesses of authoritarianism and the ethical relativism that enables it. As Dipesh Chakrabarty prosaically yet correctly concedes, “we do not in modernity and as yet, know of desirable institutional arrangements in public life that could be seriously built on principles other than those of liberalism” (emphasis in original, 2001, 126). When those desirable institutional arrangements collapse, polities enter periods of violent crisis. This is currently happening in the Philippines.

Duterte and the Attack on the Liberal State

Anti-liberalism in aid of authoritarianism has a long tradition in Asia. Pitting “Asian” communal values against Western individualism has served to justify various repressive measures, from racist bumiputra laws in Malaysia to press censorship in Singapore. In India, the communalist rhetoric of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) positions itself against the “foreign” liberalism of intellectuals. For this final section, I want to examine how this same rhetoric has been reproduced in the Philippines by the populist strongman Rodrigo Duterte, who has not only prosecuted a bloody war on drugs, but has also denigrated and weakened the liberal democratic institutions of his country.

As we saw earlier, the anti-colonial liberalism of figures like Rizal birthed the Philippine nation. The prominence of liberal intellectuals continued throughout the American colonial period and the postwar period of independence. Educators pushed for pedagogy that was informed by John Dewey’s liberal internationalism (Claudio 2015a), diplomats were integral to the formation of a global human rights architecture at the United Nations (Claudio 2015b), and economic debates were centered on the liberal management of an export industry (Claudio 2017, 45–71). For many Filipinos, the claim that their country represented the success of a US-style liberal democracy in Asia was more than postcolonial lip service.

The country’s liberal experiment ground to a halt in 1972, when President Ferdinand Marcos implemented martial law to perpetuate himself in power. The dictator padlocked congress, arrested activists and opposition leaders, and shut down what many considered the freest press in Asia. Marcos’s downfall in 1986 restored liberal democracy, but this restored democracy was fragile. Thirty years after the fall of Marcos, another budding dictator has emerged to challenge the country’s liberal tradition. As a candidate in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte ran on a wave of popular disillusionment with the liberal reformism of his predecessor, Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III (2010–2016)—son of former president Corazon Aquino (1988– 1992) and martyred anti-Marcos opposition senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Though President Aquino and his Liberal Party were consistently popular for the majority of his six-year term, a congressional corruption scandal and a botched military operation dented the president’s reputation during his final years in office. Moreover, quotidian problems such as worsening traffic in the already gridlocked Metropolitan Manila area raised frustration with government.

Duterte emerged seemingly out of nowhere, a little-known mayor from the southern city of Davao. Commentators thought he would fail to compete with the popularity and machinery of the three leading mainstream candidates, which included the daughter of the country’s most famous action star, the incumbent vice president, and Aquino’s interior secretary. Duterte’s rise was first a blip that became unstoppable, and it caught Filipino pundits off guard. Yet his campaign tapped into multiple dormant impulses in the electorate: authoritarian nostalgia, a disdain for Manila-based politicians, and impatience with reformism. His campaign tagline, “change is coming,” as Anne Applebaum correctly notes, had “the same empty appeal as ‘make American great again’” (2016). Like the United States’ Donald Trump, it was this emptiness, couched in unbridled anger, which turned Duterte into an empty canvas for various forms of disaffection.7

From the fall of the Marcos in 1986 to Duterte’s assumption of power, the Philippines had been involved in a slow if uneven process of redemocratization. Within this period, memories of the bloodless EDSA “People Power” revolution that unseated Marcos became the organizing mnemonic template of the post-Marcos state.8 Its heroes, particularly Corazon Aquino (widow of a slain opposition senator and Marcos’s successor), became enshrined as the secular saints of the post-authoritarian republic in a Manichean divide that separated the forces of democracy and those of the dictatorship (Claudio 2013). During this period, the country developed a robust, grassroots democratic culture—largely a product of the various civil society organizations that emerged from the ashes of the anti-Marcos opposition. Despite the vibrancy of what political scientist Nathan Quimpo labeled the Philippine “contested democracy,”—led by a free-flowing, non-Communist Left—certain problems remained intractable (2008). In particular, violent political dynasties and local machine politicians continued to dominate regional politics. As Benedict Anderson explains, the end of the Marcos regime may have ended authoritarianism, but it brought back the system of oligarch-led “cacique democracy” (1998). Many voters and commentators saw Duterte as a cure to the dominance of the oligarchs. That Duterte himself came from a local oligarchic background became irrelevant. His anti-elitism manifested in a rough-talking rhetorical style that separated him from the cultivated candidates of the “establishment.” The violence began even before Duterte took office, with drug-related vigilante killings spiking mere days after the election. As president, Duterte has overseen the bloodiest display of state power in Philippine history. Conservative estimates place the death toll at 7,000 as of August 2017 (Kine 2017). Although there are no accurate statistics for the death toll under Marcos (the mass killings occurred in remote provinces), the velocity of killing under Duterte is unprecedented. Beyond the violence, Duterte has also poisoned public discourse and damaged political institutions. Apart from destroying the reputation of Aquino’s Liberal Party, he has also challenged the country’s liberal tradition by glorifying the late dictator Marcos, whose remains the president buried in the country’s hero’s cemetery. As with most populists, it is sometimes difficult to determine what Duterte stands for. It is clear, however, what he is against. For Duterte, notes Walden Bello, “the target is liberal-democracy—the dominant ideology and political system of our time” (2017, np). Much like Trump and Vladimir Putin, Duterte’s propaganda machinery relies heavily on networks of social media trolls who share fake news and promote conspiracy theories. A primary target of trolling operations and presidential pronouncements has been the beleaguered Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent constitutional body that seeks to investigate the state’s alleged human rights violations. In late 2017, the Duterte-controlled House of Representatives (the lower house) voted to allocate a mere P1,000 Philippine pesos (20 USD) for its annual budget, a stunt celebrated by Duterte’s online supporters (Cupin 2017). Though the defunding was soon corrected by a more circumspect Senate (upper house), it sent a message that the liberal constitutional framework of the Philippines was collapsing with thunderous applause. Duterte and his allies represent institutions that promote human rights as hindrances to the president’s mission of national renewal. When the United Nations special rapporteur on summary executions requested to investigate the killings, Duterte’s government rejected the offer. The president’s spokesperson justified the decision by claiming that the UN was seeking to impose “liberal Western values” on “an Asian nation that places premium on common good” The UN was, he concluded, “both insensitive and display[ed] a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (quoted in Esmaquel 2017, np). Always more pithy, Duterte himself claimed that, “if it involves human rights, I don’t give a shit” (quoted in Holmes 2016, np).

Alas, Duterte’s rhetoric has worked. Into his second year in office, the President enjoys over 80% approval rating (“Pulse: Duterte...” 2017), largely from a population that does not care how many die as long as it does not affect them. The triumph of what commentators have called “Dutertismo” is complete, and it proves that there are, indeed, alternatives to liberal politics. Whether these alternatives are desirable is a different matter.

Conclusion

Global liberalism is in crisis. Duterte’s rise in the Philippines is just one example of the illiberal, populist backlash triggered by multiple causes, including the inequalities of economic globalization, the smugness of the liberal elite, and the appeal of strongman rule.

It would be extreme and certainly false to claim that anti-liberal postcolonial theory or theory from the South caused or even contributed to the rise of global populism. Doing so would confuse the symptom for the cause. Yet we must also hold intellectuals to task for failing to rise to the defense of basic common principles anchored on liberal ideals of dignity, tolerance, human rights, and, yes, a certain degree of universalism. For the historian Tony Judt (1988), what is necessary is a renewed moralism in intellectual life—the responsibility to confront political excesses and intellectual flights of fancy. Such an approach would temper the cynicism, cool detachment, and disdain for the Enlightenment that defines much writing on the Global South.

The anti-liberal theorizing on the Global South by scholars working in the Global North may be a safe exhaust valve for their frustrations and boredom with the liberal democracy they experience every day. Trump notwithstanding, liberal institutions are stronger in places like the United States and Europe and can therefore be taken for granted, even maligned. But the same cannot be said of the Global South, where liberal democratic institutions can collapse almost overnight, as they have in Duterte’s Philippines. To put things in blunt and moralistic terms: my president is slaughtering my countrymen by the thousands, justifying the murders by dismissing liberalism and human rights as “Western.” I do not have the luxury of “problematizing” human rights as symptomatic of the era of “neoliberalism.” Scholars should be careful of the illiberalism they wish for in the Global North, because we in the Global South just might get it in the form of a bloodthirsty autocrat.

A restoration of liberal democratic principles in my country is urgent—a matter of life and death. And it is with this sense of urgency that we must rethink liberalism in the Global South, not as an endpoint of political development (“end of history”), but as the bare minimum of democratic politics. A liberalism for the Global South must be simultaneously anchored on realism and hopefulness. A moralist’s liberal stance must be anchored on, to corrupt what Gramsci said for Marxist ends, a pessimism of the intellect conjoined with an optimism of the will. Except, since liberalism refuses to foreground a revolutionary break along the horizon, it leaves more room for optimism. As modus vivendi, liberalism has no telos; it is never fully complete. Hence it is never fully a success or a failure.

The Global South, like liberalism, is a provisional and syncretic project, built on imagined networks of solidarity yet anchored on the necessity of everyday political praxis. They are both open, because they are both in perennial translation. As Arjun Appadurai contends, it is in liberalism that we find seeds of cosmopolitanism, because it is premised on “self-expansion” (2005, 434). This self-expansion may lead us into new theoretical horizons (even new forms of socialism), but it will remain anchored on basic principles: the respect for autonomy, the tolerance of other opinions, and the primacy of human rights. We uphold these values in both the Global North and the Global South.

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