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Their Ks of lib-ism lack scholarly rigor and have it backwards—lib-ism’s failings come from it not being vigorously defended enough and historical anti-colonial resistance explicitly reflected liberal values—their K independently dooms positive reform in the Global South

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml)

First is the claim that liberalism is a universalizing Enlightenment idea that has imposed itself on colonial societies. In displacing other forms of non-Western thinking, critics say it creates a hierarchy between a civilized/liberal subject and an uncivilized/illiberal one, thus allowing for the violence of colonialism. The most prominent writer in this vein is Uday Singh Mehta (1999), who argues that imperialism was not a contradiction within liberal thought but inherent in it.2 Through colonialism, he contends, liberalism “found a project, with all the grandeur of scale, implicit permanence, purposefulness, and the absence of a need to negotiate with what is extant” (12). Mehta based his account largely on a critique of British liberalism and its effects on colonial India. But others have applied his arguments to other liberal empires. By examining the United States’ colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, Julian Go challenges the narrative of an inclusive liberal nationalism in the US. He contends that one must think of “civic-liberal nations as liberal empire-states” (emphasis in original, 2017, 74). Drawing from the influential anti-liberalism of Losurdo (2014), Go claims that both “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not” (74). It is in this manner, he concludes, that US liberalism has excluded various subaltern groups, from African-American slaves to colonial-era Filipinos.

To the critique exemplified by Mehta and Go, I offer two replies. First, liberalism’s universalism does not necessarily lead to colonialism. In fact, is it reasonable for a liberal who believes in rational deliberation to violently impose a set of beliefs on entire peoples? Scholars like Mehta are wont to emphasize the universalizing desires of liberalism (its first face), but they have neglected its other face, what Gray calls liberalism as modus vivendi—a liberalism that allows for “common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist” (2000, 6). A modus vivendi cannot be colonialism. And neither is colonialism a way of ordering liberty through institutions that enhance individual and collective freedoms. I must concede that at various points in liberalism’s history, the pendulum has swung towards its more universalizing tendencies. Yet to contend, as anti-liberal postcolonial theorists do, that liberalism is a universalizing project that imposes itself on divergent belief systems relies on an incomplete vision of the liberal project.

A second reply relates to simple logic. It is, of course, true that liberalism creates “others.” But what political movement is bereft of an inside and outside? Marxism constructs the proletariat in relation to the bourgeoisie, nationalism has foreigners, various forms of identity politics insist on the primacy of specific subject positions over others, and religions have non-believers. In the sense that it sees the world through a political subject, liberalism is no different from other philosophies that create bonds of community. And while philosophers have theorized more fluid conceptions of political belonging— Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhizomatic” subjectivity (1988), which inspired Hardt and Negri’s conception of the amorphous “multitude” (2005)—it is not clear that these ideas have produced long-term movements or concrete agendas, especially in the Global South.

The second claim is that liberalism is a modernist credo external to the experiences of the Global South and postcolonies and thus out of sync with the necessities of today. We have already noted how de Sousa Santos views the “indifference” of liberalism as anathema to the radical needs of the South. And we have also examined how the Comaroffs view liberalism as a “parochial” remnant of Euro-American modernity inapplicable to the Global South, both because it comes from Europe and America, and because it is anchored on outdated beliefs about the rule of law. Elsewhere, the Comaroffs contend that the liberal belief in “the capacity for constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies to accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment” is a form of legal “fetishism” that is ultimately “chimerical,” especially in postcolonial contexts. This kind of politics, then, becomes nothing but a pyramid scheme: “The more it is indulged, the more it is required” (2001, 38).

Again I offer two replies. First, a history of liberalism shows that its potency as a political credo is not limited to the West. Of course, we cannot deny that much of liberalism’s early history lies in Europe and that the US became a major hub of liberal experimentation; liberalism’s place in what the Comaroffs label the “Euro-American” past is not up for debate. But because liberalism may encompass shifting subjectivities, political actors have been able to redefine liberalism within colonial contexts. Mehta is correct that imperialists deployed liberal rhetoric to justify expansionist policy. Nevertheless, the earliest anti-colonial movements were likewise liberal in nature, and, I would argue, more in line with the tenets of classical liberalism. Anti-colonial radicals in Spanish America, as Richard J. Evans notes, corresponded and collaborated with European liberals, forming a liberal and radical “international whose connections spanned the Atlantic” (2016, 17).

Spain was a crucial node in this liberal internationalism; its various patriotic societies, which emerged after the Napoleonic wars, inspired similar organizations throughout the continent (Evans 2016, 39). It is thus unsurprising that European liberalism spread to Asia through the Spanish colony of the Philippines. Historians John Schumacher (1991, 31) and Nick Joaquin (2005, 24–35) have posited that the propaganda movement that paved the way for the Philippine revolution of 1896 (the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia) was birthed within a local liberal tradition that mixed with nationalist anti-colonialism. Recent evidence has shown, moreover, that, like the French revolution, the Philippine revolution was also liberal in character.3

Critics view liberalism through the eyes of “liberal” imperialists, but they are silent about how colonized actors themselves articulated concepts of liberty and human rights from their subaltern positions. Philippine national hero, the polymath novelist and polemicist Jose Rizal, saw in the liberal tenets of the French declaration of rights a blueprint for a society after colonialism, translating the declaration for his countrymen during a sojourn in Hong Kong (Schumacher 1997, 270). He was a liberal who criticized colonialism on liberal grounds and believed that liberals who abetted colonial rule were untrue to their principles. Writing in 1890, Rizal claimed that if Spanish liberals in the Philippines had “more faith in their ideals,” they would resist the colonial rule of Catholic friars and that “modern ideas” would not “be asphyxiated upon touching the shores of Manila” (1964, 289).

If it is true that the one consistent feature of liberalism’s history has been the “constant opposition to assorted tyrannies,” then the more authentic liberals were those in colonial contexts, who argued that colonialism was tyranny writ large (Ryan 2012, 28). For the Filipino propagandists, there was a sense that liberalism could be purified in colonial contexts.4 “Liberals” in positions of power more easily succumb to tyranny, thereby turning their backs on their very own principles. A correction of liberalism could thus occur in places of disempowerment. What prevents Global South thinkers from appropriating this liberal anti-colonialism today? This appropriation would not be a wholesale adoption of modernity and Enlightenment. Rather, as in the case of Filipino propagandists, it would begin by grappling with rights and liberties in the postcolony, seeing how these can be enhanced and purified in these new contexts.

My second reply to the argument about liberalism’s inapplicability to the postcolonial politics of the present rests on pragmatism. Modernist politics based on principles like constitutionalism may be wanting, but what are our alternatives? This is a trite response, but it bears repeating, especially in the context of the Global South, where people starve and immediate, even palliative, change is urgent. Reformism is not anathema to postcolonial societies. A fairer legal system that allows the poor to be treated equal under the law— one that affords them worthy defenses in criminal trials, one that prevents them from being kicked off their land and denied their property—is a sustainable goal that we must aspire for. And the Global South would do well to aspire for social services like state-sponsored healthcare (more dysfunctional in the Philippines than even the United States) that curb the worst violences of the “neoliberalism” that anti-liberals decry.

Presumably, the advocates of non-modernist anti-liberalism from the Global South anchor their vision of change on a renewed revolutionary politics that challenges the core structures of contemporary capitalist societies. For them, another world is possible. But what are political actors in the Global South left to do while the theoreticians figure out how and when the revolutionary break will occur? Liberalism promotes a baseline of slow yet functional politics that tempers the nihilism of much radical thinking. But, a stable base of political rights may open new possibilities that may also tickle our collective imaginations. Slow does not mean uninspiring.

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