No impact to securitization – hybridization and grafting undercut legitimation effects and extreme responses
Hynek 22 Nik Hynek, professor specializing in security studies at the Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University; and Anzhelika Solovyeva, lecturer specializing in strategic studies at the Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University; “Over-securitizing Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots,” Chapter 5, Militarizing Artificial Intelligence: Theory, Technology, and Regulation, Routledge, 2022, ISBN 978-1-003-04548-9, pp.113-128 /GoGreen!
A securitizing move is, according to the original definition by the Copenhagen School, a specific rhetorical structure or discourse – or, more precisely, a speech act – that frames an issue as an existential threat, i.e., a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 25–26). The central goal of this chapter is the identification and analysis of such speech acts because speech acts have indeed been the main means by which the Campaign has increasingly sought to securitize AWS. Since other means have also been employed, we will draw intellectual resources from other approaches to securitization theory too. There is still more, however, that we can borrow from the Copenhagen School. Wæver (1995) pointed to the performative dimension of the move: ‘the utterance itself is the act [emphasis added]’. He even defined the process as ‘[t]he performance of the security act’. Huysmans (2006: 147) accurately spotted the linguistic practice turning from mere description to performative acts as one of the organizing principles in social and political relations. One important caveat is that performativity is not the same thing as a theatre performance, but is about the ways in which the discourse is reiterated and networks are created (Ringmar 2019). In this chapter, we systematically illustrate how a particular communication within a distributed network produces and reinforces a shared understanding of insecurity. What deserves special note is that the emergent security issue is not necessarily linked to a real existential threat but has to be constructed and presented as such a threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 24). There have been insights showing that it does not stop with a politically and socially constructed threat. Discourses of insecurity are often about representations of ‘danger’ with material consequences (Campbell 1992). This concept is important for us too because the kind of threat we examine here has been constructed through, inter alia, discourses and representations of danger.
A person or a group that performs the speech act is a securitizing actor. Success depends to a great extent on the authority position held by the actor. Only a few actors and groups do in fact have ‘the power to define security’. Among them are political leaders, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 31 and 40). Therefore, the Copenhagen School gave us a hint as to the nature of securitizing actors. Wæver (1995: 57) insisted specifically, however, that ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, [typically] by elites’. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 21) reaffirmed the principle in their joint book: ‘Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative [emphasis added] declares an emergency condition.’ The limitation of the approach of the Copenhagen School is that it restricts the actors who can legitimately construct security primarily to political leaders. Also, the Copenhagen School provided initial instruction on how to assess the role the audience plays in constructing insecurity, yet this is another limitation. Success, in their view, depends on the audience being convinced that the issue is an existential security threat. The issue is securitized only if and when emergency measures that go beyond standard political procedures are accepted as justified (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23–25). The audience’s role is, therefore, limited to the mere fact of their accepting the truth of the discourse. Other approaches to securitization theory will allow us to compensate for these limits.
Another major contributor to securitization theory has been the Paris School, situated within the emerging field of international political sociology and mainly represented by Didier Bigo and Thierry Balzacq. Their ideas further advanced the understanding of securitizing actors endowed with the authority to securitize. New actors appeared on the stage who were professionals with expertise in a given field. The Paris School put emphasis on expert security knowledge and the ‘authority of statistics’ (Bigo 2006). Security professionals and security agencies, the ones who routinely collect and analyse data, were recognized as having the authority to determine what exactly constitutes security (Bigo 2000: 176). Particular attention was drawn to bureaucracies that serve as an ‘intermediary’ with the central government and are directly involved in the provision of security services (e.g., military and police services, border guards and customs agents, intelligence services, risk assessment experts, etc.) (Bigo 2006). Increasingly, security professionals, both researchers and military personnel, are becoming facilitators for the success of securitization, as we show in this chapter. Bigo (2002: 83) specifically highlighted that, even if NGOs intervene, ‘they can do so only by turning professional’. Our analysis here illustrates, among other things, the trend towards professionalization in NGOs, themselves collecting, distributing, and efficiently utilizing professional knowledge. The success of the securitizing move is, consequently, linked to the structural position of the speaker within a relevant institution (Bigo 2002: 73–74). Bigo (2006) also noted that such institutions can overstep national boundaries and form transnational bureaucratic links. Transnationalization represents, in his view, yet another source of knowledge and ‘symbolic’ power. The transnational advocacy Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which is the focus of this chapter, is perhaps the best illustration of how it can play out in everyday practice. Balzacq (2005: 178–179) listed the very same attributes of authorized security speakers: knowledge, trust, and the speaker’s power position, formal or symbolic. One of his key points was that ‘effective securitization is power-laden’. In addition, he carved out a more central role for the audience, focusing on ‘the power [emphasis added] that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’ (Balzacq 2005: 171–172). This insight is still not enough to accurately define the role of the audience for the purposes of this chapter, but it brings us closer to the task.
The conceptualization of the securitizing move itself extends beyond the single speech act, as claimed by the Paris School. Bigo (2002: 65–66) stressed the importance of bureaucratic practices performed by security professionals and involved in the creation of administrative knowledge (e.g., population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, etc.). Therefore, practical work, discipline, and expertise are certainly no less important than the discourse (Bigo 2000: 194). Here we concentrate less on bureaucratic practices and more on different discursive frames in play. However, we still note, for example, that the Campaign has also drawn quite heavily upon surveys done by the market research company Ipsos. The most significant observation that comes out of it, however, is different: the Paris School broadened the definition of the securitizing move beyond the single, typically political, speech act. Balzacq (2005: 191) also focused on the ‘manner’ in which the securitizing actor makes the case for the point and drew attention to two basic principles ensuring ultimate success: ‘emotional intensity’ and ‘logical rigor’. He also reminded us of the role of analogies, metaphors, stereotypes, metonymies, lies, gestures, and even silence as effective tools of persuasion (Balzacq 2005: 172 and 179). In this chapter, we illustrate the significance of such tools for creating the terrifying image of ‘killer robots’. The increasingly blurred lines between fact and fiction, rationality and emotion are of particular significance to our understanding of that image. Last, but not least, the Paris School pointed to the existence of numerous stakeholders with heterogeneous profiles who do not share the same logics and are often in competition with each other (Bigo 2006). In such ‘power struggles’, securitizing actors align to eliminate alternative voices and swing the audience’s support towards their preferred course of action (Balzacq 2005: 173 and 179). It is a relevant observation, but a careful analysis of such struggles between the ban Campaign and its opponents is the subject of the next chapter.
Other, especially more recent, supplements to securitization theory contributed to the development of a more sophisticated set of assumptions regarding the authority of securitizing actors and the practice of threat construction. Stritzel (2012: 553) summarized the general tendency as the development away from static understandings of the authority to securitize and single speech acts to more complex processes of authorization and more dynamic representations of existential threat. Pointing out such complexities is one of the key objectives we set for ourselves in this chapter. Vuori (2008: 76) assumed that even those actors who fall outside official authority, but have sufficient ‘social capital’, can become securitizing actors. Social capital is a special kind of asset available, for example, to NGOs. In this chapter, we deal directly and specifically with the ways in which such capital is being mobilized. Berling (2011: 386) convincingly argued, in addition, that science co-determines the status of the securitizing actor. He called it the ‘authority of objectivity’ (Berling 2011: 393). Brauch (2009: 94) also drew attention to the significance of scientific ‘reputation’. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a strong focus on raising a scientific profile within – and in association with – the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. This is achieved, inter alia, by joining forces with senior scientists and larger scientific communities. The so-called ‘epistemic communities’ can indeed draw on their knowledge and expertise to influence the outcome of securitization moves ‘through reason and facts on the basis of (objective) knowledge’ (Floyd 2020: 12). An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines with recognized scientific expertise and competence in a particular domain, according to the original conceptualization of the term (Haas 1992: 3). Haas (1992: 18) conceptualized epistemic communities as a separate category, inherently distinct from interest groups, social movements, and bureaucratic coalitions. Even though he equipped us with the appropriate concept, the definition is problematic. It is increasingly difficult to draw definitive dividing lines between scientists, political activists, and activist bureaucrats, as we clearly show here. A closer look reveals two serious problems: scientific facts are selectively used, twisted, or suppressed by political activists to serve their political purpose; and scientists themselves become willingly and directly involved in policy making and political manipulation. Berling (2011: 392) assumed that ‘scientific capital’ co-determines ‘the hierarchy [emphasis added] in the field of security and the chances of winning’. Yet the opposite is the case in this chapter. Hierarchies are being replaced with more horizontal heterarchies, as we will demonstrate. Science contributes significantly to the chances of success and successful claims for legitimacy, but scientists do not necessarily play a central role in the process of securitization.
There has, at the same time, been greater awareness that the audience can reinforce the authority of the securitizing actor. Salter (2008: 321–322) conceptualized interactions between the securitizing actor and the audience as ‘iterative’. He studied the process of ‘audience-speaker co-constitution [emphasis added] of authority and knowledge’. McInnes and Rushton (2011: 117) even introduced the idea that original audiences can, at some points themselves, act as securitizing actors. These insights help us conceptualize and, more importantly, analyse a much more active engagement on the part of the audience and the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences. We call it hybridization, as explained below, and show how it works in practice. We also clearly demonstrate that such hybridization has no clear boundaries. Floyd (2020) drew our attention to the role of ‘functional actors’, often confused with the audience but, in fact, seeking to positively or negatively influence the trajectory of securitization. The concept itself, though originally underdeveloped, is borrowed from the Copenhagen School. Floyd (2020: 10) stressed that media outlets can prioritize certain issues over others, decide how information is relayed, and, therefore, control what becomes public knowledge. Vultee (2011: 77–93) showed practically how the media ‘speak security’. Our intention through this text is to once again demonstrate that the media play a crucial role in shaping public threat perception and disseminating stereotypes. The very idea of ‘killer robots’ caught public attention and imagination through broad media coverage. Foreign politicians can, in turn, either provide or withhold external legitimation, according to Floyd (2020: 10). The most important consequence, as we show, is peer pressure, i.e., attempts by the truly pro-ban states to push the blocking coalition towards adopting the ban on AWS. Members employed in the relevant industry can equally facilitate or impede securitization by presenting reasoned arguments for one side or the other (Floyd 2020: 11). We have a perfect illustration here: many technology companies have supported the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and publicly committed not to engage in the development of AWS. Clearly, such statements have significantly strengthened the spirit of the Campaign. Floyd’s (2020: 12) interpretation also suggests that even ordinary people can affect the dynamics of securitization, for example, through social media activism. Here we illustrate how ordinary people can facilitate securitization by partaking in surveys and voicing their concerns about the perceived threat. We also highlight that the Campaign has closely aligned with a broad wave of public concern, which has further reinforced its legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.
Numerous studies have also sought to develop a more nuanced understanding of the core of securitizing moves. First of all, there has been a general awareness that scientific models, data, and facts ‘can be mobilized strategically’ (Berling 2011: 393). Stritzel (2012: 560) explored the link between power politics and popular culture as ‘a principal background of meaning’. In particular, he inquired into the use of pop culture and cultural myths by securitizing actors. Williams (2003: 526–527) suggested that images and other visual representations are also part of ‘a broader performative act’ and do play a significant role in the process of securitization. This chapter shows how scientific facts and cultural imaginaries, visual and discursive frames are all mobilized simultaneously to construct the threat of so-called killer robots. Some scholars have even sought to highlight the supposed links between different security agendas such as the ‘migration-terrorism nexus’ (Ihlamur-Öner 2019), the ‘terrorism-asylum nexus’, or even the ‘terrorism-immigration-asylum nexus’ (Tsoukala 2006: 612 and 618). This is an important, yet undeveloped, argument. It is a good starting point for us to properly conceptualize processes of grafting involved in a securitizing move, as further elaborated below. Salter (2012: 934), at the same time, reminds us of the fact that ‘securitization is a constant process of struggle and contestation’. In accord with his interpretation, the so-called securitizing move in fact consists of ‘overlapping … language security games performed by varying relevant actors’ (Salter 2012: 931). The same author noted elsewhere (2008: 321) that there are also distinct types of audiences and that the move may be successful with some of them, but not others. It is a reminder for us: systematic hybridization between different types of actors acting at different stages in the securitization process, as we illustrate, does not necessarily lead to greater homogenization. We show it here too.
Building on this rich and diverse body of knowledge, the insights we borrow primarily include the significance of scientific reputation, the varied and dynamic identities of securitizing actors, the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences, and the diversity of ways in which the threat can be constructed and presented. Yet we also go beyond to inquire into the process of over-securitization. There have already been efforts to understand and theorize over-securitization, so the term itself is not new. However, the existing literature approaches the problem from the perspective of referent objects of security. Hammerstad (2008: 1–2) was the first to point out that a security issue can ‘become over-securitised to the point where it is in danger of creating threats [to the referent object] where before there were none’. Ihlamur-Öner (2019: 210) concurred: ‘The securitization of irregular and forced migration has reached to the point that it can be described as over-securitization, which creates more threats where there were none, while putting the lives of migrants and refugee protection at risk.’
We take a different approach still and explore the dynamics of over-securitization from the perspective of securitizing actors and securitizing moves. In doing so, we distinguish two mechanisms through which over-securitization operates at these two levels: hybridization and grafting, respectively. Through the former, we demonstrate how complex hybridization of securitizing actors and target audiences produces circulatory, transepistemic, and post-truth configurations of security. When making this argument, we are inspired by Aradau and Huysmans. They accurately determined that ‘transepistemic relations create greater symmetry between various knowledges and dilute the superior authority of science in truth telling and factual knowledge about the world’ (Aradau and Huysmans 2018: 49). The same authors (2018: 54) defined the condition of post-truth as ‘a less hierarchical and more horizontal transversal practice of knowledge creation and circulation’. We have a practical illustration of their statements and argue that, when the tipping point is reached, the diffusion of authority decreases the likelihood of successful securitization. The concept of ‘grafting [a new norm onto existing norms]’ stands for a well-established legal practice and is borrowed from Price (1998: 617). Here it helps us conceptualize how a new security agenda can be grafted, through both discursive and visual representations, onto other security issues of immediate importance and even science fiction imagery. Such grafting techniques, as we show, reinforce the sense of insecurity but, quite counter-intuitively, can in some cases impede instead of facilitate the securitization process. The imprecise focus and reductionist paths make it more difficult to name the threat clearly, which is a precondition for successful securitization. Salter (2012: 938–940) gave an example of what it means if ‘the threat remains vague [emphasis added]’.
Here lies the paradox: success in broadening the stakeholder base and generating the sense of insecurity does not necessarily mean the success of securitization. In a nutshell, greater efficiency does not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness. Hence, over-securitization is about securitization efforts that are too intense and too ubiquitous, to the point of becoming counter-productive.