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No disarm trade-off link – there’s ZERO uniqueness since it’s NOT on the table now – BUT our reps snowball to it, which is offense

Müller 18 Harald Müller, Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse, Associate Fellow and former Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, member of German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office, PhD international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, “Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol.1 A-H, ed. Cameron G. Thies, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190605919, p.77-80 /GoGreen!

The Permissive Effect of Prohibition Norms. One of the criticisms of critical security studies scholars has been that the prohibition of some weapons has had the effect of legitimizing non-prohibited weapons (Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011). Indeed, there is the ‘‘permissive’’ effect, which results from the stigmatization of the prohibited weapons as inhuman, which implies in turn that weapons not banned simultaneously are not equally inhumane. For material and psychological reasons, the focus on banning a specific weapon system will very probable prevent efforts to ban other weapons with comparable effects at the same time: The campaign to get rid of incendiary weapons (napalm) in the 1980s postponed action on landmines and cluster munitions for one and two decades, respectively. The material factor is the resource restraint (financial, time, diplomatic capital) of ban proponents (NGOs and like-minded governments), which makes it difficult to tackle more than one item at a time. The psychological effect is the impossibility of focusing and maintaining attention of both activists and the public (media and people) on more than one issue in a certain time-span (Rosert, 2015, 2016). As the sequence from incendiary weapons (prohibited in 1983), to anti-personal mines (prohibited in 1997), to cluster munitions (prohibited in 2009) demonstrates, however, this permissive/preventive effect is determining only temporarily. In the long-term, the opposite effect can be observed, “issue cascading”: the successful subjection on one type of weapon under the anti-humanitarian stigma makes it easier for a follow-up campaign to frame the next candidate for a ban in a way that promises success. The framing of a weapon type in analogy or comparison with an already stigmatized one (grafting) becomes easier as more weapons fall under a ban, and more characteristics and attributes are available to draw parallels to a weapon that is still permitted (Price, 1998, pp. 627-631). If permissive or preventive effects mean that old Arms Control stands in the way of new Arms Control, the cascading effect shows that old Arms Control can engender new Arms Control. Real World Effects. So far, the discussion has dealt with the effects of Arms Control on state behavior. Changed state behavior, of course, has effects on the physical world: Due to the implementation of Arms Control agreements, there are fewer nuclear weapons (between 15,000 and 16,000 instead of more than 60,000, at the height of the Cold War), fewer chemical weapons, fewer biological weapons, and fewer states possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the world, and fewer conventional weapon systems in Europe than would have been the case otherwise. The most impressive numbers come from humanitarian Arms Control groups: According to the Red Cross, the number of victims of landmines was at 20,000 the year before the Ottawa Convention. It has gone down to 3,500 per year since. By the end of 2015, international production and transfer of these weapons had commensurately shrunk, including by some non-members producers, quite a remarkable external effect of the norm; even 48 non-state armed groups have renounced the use of mines on the initiative of the NGO Geneva CalL Twenty-nine states were declared to be mine-free through efforts under the Ottawa Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). By the end of 2014, 3.68 million anti-personal mines had been destroyed in operations pursuant to the Convention (Landmines Report, 2009, p. 1; Landmines Report, 2015, p. 2). Surprisingly, in light of so many lives saved, some scholars belonging to the Critical Security Studies school contend that humanitarian Arms Control constitutes a well-concealed submission of civil society to the imperatives of Western militarism (Beier, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011, 2012, 2014). This assessment of the mine campaign as "reconstitution of the West (and Western interest)” having “played a crucial (even decisive) role in the construction of the 'landmine crisis’” (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 44) remains mysterious: First, both the Ottawa and the Oslo conventions were opposed by the quintessential Western power, the United States. Second, both were enthusiastically supported by the main victims of the prohibited weapons, namely the countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Price, 1998, pp. 640-641). One could suspect that, based on ideological doctrine, some scholars are critical of all but their own perceptual biases, a strong similarity to some of the realist and neo-conservative critics of arms control, which they so enthusiastically condemn. Back to the independent-dependent variable relationship: The structurationist school of constructivism, orientated to the work of Anthony Giddens, takes the middle ground by constructing a dialectical relationship by which processes of Arms Control and processes of broader policy would mutually influence each other. As Arms Control has been conceptualized as a way to mitigate the security dilemma, its likely effects should be tangible there. Measures that reduce the ambiguity of intention and capabilities, and measures that, notably, reduce the capability for large-scale, speedy offensives should have strong positive impacts on mutual perception and help to foster security cooperation on a broad scope (Peters, 1992). They give signals of the absence of aggressive intentions and thereby help overcome the fundamental uncertainty, which is at the heart of the security dilemma (Lamb, 1988, pp. 225-234). The "Gorbachev effect” on the West was exactly that. ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSES Academic and political discourses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in general, as well as in specific political fields of action, are framed in four different perspectives: deterrence, defense, disarmament, and humanitarian discourses.2 The deterrence approach is dominated by nuclear weapons: The regulation of arms is seen as maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, understood as the mutually assured capability to strike back after a first strike, accompanied by measures that make a first strike as unlikely, unprovoked, and unattractive as possible. Consequently, nuclear weapons, seen as embodying the greatest deterrence value, enjoy a legitimate existence (e.g., Quinlan, 2009; Riihle, 2009; Tertrais, 2011), though the idea of conventional deterrence has also been pursued (Gerson, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1985). Where the deterrence discourse prevails, certain Arms Control measures fall in disregard. For example, de-alerting (putting strategic nuclear forces on low alert) or even de-mating the nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, could be seen as destabilizing deterrence against a first strike. Shifting to a no first-use doctrine could be interpreted as opening one's nuclear forces for a first strike conducted by non-nuclear means. Arms control in a deterrence discourse could even advocate, under •certain circumstances, a build-up of nuclear forces if numbers have diminished below a perceived minimum that is seen as vulnerable to the combined offensive capabilities of potential enemies. The Chinese aversion against transparency is also stability-motivated, lest transparency could facilitate first-strike targeting against Bejing s comparably small arsenal. Arms control is a servant of deterrence and is limited by the perceived requirements of the latter. The defense discourse means the capability to react once deterrence fails and a ruthless enemy pursues conquest or extermination. Arms control, in this discourse, must recognize the need and serve the maintenance of a robust defense posture, which nowadays must inevitably include defense against missiles. At the conventional level, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty came closest to the ideal arms control agreement: By reducing, and establishing an exact balance for, those five weapon systems needed for a large-scale, territory-grabbing land attack, while not touching those weapons indispensable for defense (like air defense or anti-tank systems), it granted the two participating alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a chance for successful conventional defense This formula, however, is hardly applicable to the nuclear sector: deterrence can only be upheld through the offensive capability to strike even after having suffered an attack. Effective defenses could annihilate this capability for the party forced to strike second. It is hardly possible, therefore, to achieve conventional defense and nuclear deterrence on the basis of the same discourse, but only by combining the two. The defense discourse on Arms Control is structured in a way that Arms Control advocates must always fight an uphill battle against the argument of military utility/necessity. This burden of justification has hampered and frustrated advocates of international humanitarian law in the context of the Geneva Protocols and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) time and again (Mathur, 2012; see below). The disarmament discourse has a moral overtone in that weapons are seen as immoral and dangerous items that, whatever their military value, must be dismantled. They are framed in discourses of stigmatization (Shamai, 2015), in which the stigma is connected to their destructive power (WMD as threat to [human]mankind), cruelty that causes unnecessary and lasting suffering (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons), and indiscriminate effects on civilians (all WMD, antipersonal mines, cluster munitions) (Borrie, 2009; Price, 1998,2007; Rosert, 2015,2016). Stigma is not confined to WMD, but can be glued to other weapons systems as well; hence, weapons singled out for disarmament discourses are not dependent on the particular strategic value; to the contrary, part of the discourse consists of contesting this value to disempower arguments of military utility, which are usually deployed by opponents of the prohibition. Proponents of disarmament are even busy denying the utility of nuclear weapons for both warfare and deterrence (Harrington, 2009; Wilson, 2007, 2008). Today, disarmers rely strongly on humanitarian arguments; the disarmament and humanitarian discourses tend to amalgamate. The humanitarian discourse; finally, asks for measures that serve best the goal of human security: the survival, well-being, and integrity of individuals, notably civilians; consequently, the weapons that have the most devastating effect and discriminate least between combatants and civilians are subject to the demand for elimination, notwithstanding their ascribed military value. It is noteworthy that today's humanitarian discourse, manifested in a broad array of weapon types from antipersonal mines to nuclear weapons, has evolved from the tradition of the legal discourse on the humanitarian law of war that prevailed into the 1990s. There, the basic formula was to weigh humanitarian concerns and military utility. The humanitarian discourse was thus dominated by the defense and deterrence discourses. Today’s humanitarian Arms Control discourse gives priority to human concerns over military utility and links humanitarianism with disarmament, not with constraints on weapons use. Given the weight of military considerations in the attitudes and decision making of nation-states, this does not eliminate completely the weighting of military aspects. But, the burden of proof has shifted. In the old humanitarian law discourse, humanitarians had to argue against "military utility." In the new discourse, opponents of prohibition have to argue for indispensability and irreplaceability of the weapons in question (Price, 1998, p. 632). As a consequence, in the nuclear weapons field, a majority of states is not satisfied anymore with small steps of arms reduction, transparency measures, and confidence building; rather, they push for a fast elimination of nuclear weapons, preceded by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons ban (Borrie, 2014; Kmentt, 2015). The reason for the conservatism of the classical discourse on humanitarian law is not so much the past practices of the legalistic discourse of international humanitarian law (Mathur, 2012) as the result of the balance of political power, with great powers prevailing that wanted their utilitarian concerns (fighting and winning wars) to weigh heavily in the resulting treaties. The new discourse, in contrast, was created by a coalition of humanitarian and disarmament NGOs, and smaller and middle powers that push their causes because they have more moral concerns than stakes in fighting and winning wars, or in the weapons needed for war or for deterrence (Borrie, 2014). The intrinsic nature of the discourses has not engendered the change, but shifts in coalitions and discursive power (Mathur, 2012).

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