No prolif link – empirics disprove and it’s NOT racist to say others are just as likely as we are to make mistakes and argue pragmatically that more prolif is worse
Müller 18 Harald Müller, Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse, Associate Fellow and former Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, member of German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office, PhD international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, “Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol.1 A-H, ed. Cameron G. Thies, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190605919, p.80-81 /GoGreen!
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND ARMS CONTROL Arms Control does not completely discard self-help as the basis of national security, but entrusts a more or less significant piece of it to cooperation with potential enemies.3 For this reason, Arms Control is a difficult subject for (purist) realism and neorealism, but also for post-modernism. Realism and neo-realism expect states to pursue self-help as the only reliable basis for their national security. Cooperative security efforts admit that at least part of one's own security is dependent on the partners' compliance with agreed rules. Arms Control also requires a more relaxed attitude toward the problem of relative gains, the somehow unequal distribution of gains emerging from cooperation (Grieco, 1990). Since it is extremely difficult to (define exact balances (numerical balances, for example, neglect differences in geopolitical situations, qualitative aspects, or intangibles like differences in training, etc), relative gains are not only certain to occur, but difficult to assess exactly. Even the notion of an exchange of renunciation, in exchange for a security guarantee, is implausible in the face of the security dilemma, as the guarantor might defeat or may mutate into the enemy of tomorrow. That Arms Control happens in reality is thus somehow puzzling. For post-modernists, Arms Control is only thinkable as a hegemonic project to maintain power differentials, not as a non-hegemonic common endeavor that serves all participants well. Both realists and post-modernists are only at ease with unilateral, hegemonic Arms Control imposed on others, notably on defeated states after war (for example, Iraq in 1991). For post-modernists, post-colonialists, and critical security scholars, non-proliferation is the paradigm of hegemonic Arms Control as an attempt to prevent others from obtaining the weapons that oneself possesses, and the conceding of the difference by middle powers like Canada or Sweden is only explainable by the discursive hegemony of the nuclear weapon states (Keeley, 1990). These critics are right to see roots of non-proliferation thinking in the racist ideology of the colonial era, parts of which have been transported into the 20th century and resonate still in the "rogue state” discourse, with the thrust that “civilized” states must keep “barbarians” at bay by maintaining the difference in military power (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Gusterson, 1999; Mathur, 2014). This critique, however, has several weaknesses. It ignores that non-proliferation was deployed first with Germany and Japan, then already members of “the West,” as the primary targets,4 that the first victims of U.S. export controls in the 1970s were advanced European states and Japan, and that controversies over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the first two decades of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) were between Western governments more than between the West and the non-aligned (Bccker et al., 2013); moreover, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a main organ of Western nuclear export controls includes today Brazil, China, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and South Africa, non-Westem members that are more than fig leafs. It is the United States that is pushing the membership of India and has terminated “nuclear apartheid" as far as India is concerned. Conversely, most European states have not joined the “rogue state" discourse, and many Western Arms Control and non-proliferation experts have never accepted the distinction between “reasonable" Northern nuclear weapon states and “irrational” Southerners. To the contrary, they have warned against the risks in South Asia because of the proven risks of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, where only a lot of luck saved [human]mankind from a global nuclear holocaust (e.g., Gavin, 2010; Muller, 2013a).s It should also be noted that multilateral Arms Control treaties apart from the NPT have been negotiated in a North-South forum such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC/CWC), and that recent conventional disarmament treaties such as the Ottawa Convention (anti-personal mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster munitions) were initiated and pushed by coalitions of Western and Southern middle powers against the express will of Northern and Southern great powers (United States, Russia, China, India). The simple categorization of West against South is no less ideological and misleading than the traces of racist thinking in a limited part of the Arms Control discourse. In contrast, Arms Control presents a solvable puzzle for rationalists with their emphasis on absolute gains and their acceptance of positive sum games and the-information and transparency providing function of institutions that manage and administer Arms Control agreements (e.g., the classic Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). The exchange of renunciation and guarantee appears more plausible to a rationalist when the guarantee is embedded in institutions that render faithfulness more probable (like institutionalized alliances), or in deployment patterns that make use of armed forces in response to an attack more likely (e.g., tripwire-type deployment). Rationalist liberal institutionalism finds good empirical confirmation in Arms Control regimes. Indeed, most agreements are endowed with organizations that serve as channels for communication, arenas for sorting out behavioral ambiguities of members and clarifying ambivalences in the language of prescriptions and prohibitions, and supply transparency by reporting and verification and can, after all, take decisions. Not only multilateral treaties have such organizations (like the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] working for the NPT or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] working for the CWC), but even the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are usually managed by bilateral standing commissions.