China threat discourse doesn’t cause war – BUT the ALT does
Hagstrom 14 – PhD, Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (Linus, “East Asia's Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them,” Asian Perspective, 38.3)
Pan argues that the "China threat discourse" is "always intrin- sically linked to how US policymakers/mainstream China special- ists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example)" (2004, 306). Hagström demonstrates how the discourse on Japan's "abnormality" and "weakness" reproduces a standard of "normality" in world politics that is centered on the ability to go to war. Postwar Japan is socially constructed as deviant from this norm and thus as a threat to itself. This discourse, which emerges in both Japanese and Western academia and in Japanese political debate, legitimizes a road map for a more "realistic," "active," "responsible," and "nor- mal" Japan (Hagström 2014).∂ The power of the power-shift discourse does not stop at the production of identities and standards. The point is that identities and standards produce effects. Pan illustrates this by showing how the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 was often understood as "further objective proof of the long-suspected 'China threat,'" but few acknowledged that "the 'China threat' discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis" (2004, 323, 320). Moreover, standards in Japan's "normalization" discourse have enabled Realpolitik changes in its foreign security policy. Chinese vigilance vis-à-vis Japan and the United States might also be interpreted as discursive phenomena-the theme of national reinvigoration is a product of the lingering notion that China has been continually humiliated and victimized by the great powers since the nineteenth century. As these examples illustrate, the ulti- mate power of discourse is the production of self-fulfilling prophecies. When self-fulfilling prophecies occur on both sides of a dyad, we might end up with a socially generated security dilemma (Johnston 2004).∂ Much research has warned of self-fulfilling prophecies in the East Asian context. Some observers suggest that US or Japanese discourses about China might produce policies of containment, Japanese "normalization" and "remilitarization," and US "rebal- ancing" toward East Asia (Pan 2004; 2012; Hagström 2012; Turner 2014a; 2014b). Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China. Instead, both countries have on the whole accommodated China's rise (Christensen 2006; Jerdén and Hagström 2012). In a similar manner, perceived increases in bellicose or nationalistic representations in Chinese discourses led some observers to jump to the mistaken conclusion that this had already resulted in a more assertive Chinese foreign policy (Jerdén 2014). As important as it is to remain vigilant against the emergence of socially constructed security dilemmas, we need to bear in mind that there is no deterministic connection between discourse and policy-just an enabling one. Dominant discourses create propensities for action but do not make any action inevitable. More empirically informed theorizing is needed to address the questions of how, when, and why discourses make some actions politically conceivable, easy to communicate, and sometimes even coercive (Holland 2013).∂ Reflecting on the possible power exercised through the alter- native approaches introduced in this special issue is also neces- sary. In this article we raise analytical and normative concerns about the ideas of a more "powerful" and "threatening" China, a "weak" Japan, and a "declining" United States. We argue that such representations risk offsetting balancing policies and a secu- rity dilemma in East Asia, in line with the self-fulfilling prophecy logic discussed above. These arguments clearly belong to another site of discursive power production. That we have not seen any obvious balancing policies in East Asia thus far might arguably be interpreted as one of its effects.∂ In fact, our critique of the power-shift debate might itself be criticized as denying or playing down Chinese power, which could have two effects: (1) China appears less powerful and thus less threatening, which allows it to arm itself with impunity and behave aggressively; and (2) the Chinese government can ignore calls to take on more international responsibilities with reference to the limited scope of its power. As William Callahan points out, attempts to counter the "China threat theory" within China often "refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the pro- duction of an American threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on" (2005, 711). Adopting a nonintentional power con- cept allows us to see how even critical scholars, inside and out- side China, who profess no interest in exaggerating threats against China but rather "seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat,'" might play a role in accelerating this process (Callahan 2005, 711). In other words, intentional attempts to prevent the emergence of a self-fulfilling prophecy may actually play an unintentional part in creating one.