Even if it did, it’s too late now
Berls & Ratz 15 Dr. Robert E. Berls, Jr., Senior Advisor for Russia and Eurasia at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Colonel, U.S. Air Force, former air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, former special assistant to the Secretary of Energy for Russia/NIS programs, Ph.D. Russian Area Studies, Georgetown University; and Leon Ratz, Program Officer with NTI’s Materials Security and Minimization Program, former policy specialist on Russian nuclear security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Office for International Material Protection and Cooperation, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, M.A. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Boston College; “Rising Nuclear Dangers: Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Use in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Paper, October 2015, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Rising_Nuclear_Dangers_Paper_FINAL.pdf /GoGreen!
The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic region is on the rise—and it is higher than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War. This is the conclusion of leading security experts from the United States, Russia, and Europe who responded to a questionnaire from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in early 2015.1 While the experts disagreed on the scale of the increase in risk and the reasons for the change, nearly all shared the view that the significant deterioration in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation has led to dangerous conditions under which nuclear weapons use has become more likely— although the probability of this outcome remains low. This study examined the risk of use of nuclear weapons, not just the risk of nuclear exchange or nuclear war. In other words, the study did not exclude the possibility of unilateral nuclear use. Indeed, respondents identified the possibility of unilateral nuclear use by Russia to quell a conflict on its borders as a risk of particular concern.2 Other possible nuclear-use scenarios identified by respondents include a rapid escalation due to miscalculation or accident (such as a mid-air collision between NATO and Russian warplanes), an escalatory response to a Russian incursion into the Baltic States, and a Russian reaction to NATO military intervention in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. The study did not assess the relative probabilities of these scenarios. Of all the risks examined, it is the risk of miscalculation that is of most concern. Absent a major incident, the likelihood of deliberate nuclear exchange under current circumstances is low. But it is the possibility of a major transformative event, such as a mid-air collision or a skirmish along NATO or Russian borders, that is on the rise. Such an incident involving the world’s two largest nuclear powers could plausibly shift alert postures and lead to a rapid series of escalatory measures precipitated by miscalculation and exacerbated by mistrust. The following section describes in detail the circumstances that have led to a heightened risk of escalation and possible nuclear use in the Euro-Atlantic region. Risk Factors The security experts who responded to NTI’s questionnaire identified one or more of the following ten reasons as contributing factors to the heightened risk: 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions 2. A Deficit of Trust 3. Domestic Political Imperatives 4. Alliance Politics 5. Close Military Encounters 6. Broken Channels of Communication 7. Failing Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Use 8. Conventional Force Disparity 9. Reckless Nuclear Saber Rattling 10. Lack of Nuclear Experience The authors of this paper provided supplementary research to expand on topics raised in the responses. 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions Moscow and Washington diverge not only in their interpretations of recent events in Ukraine but also in the basic narratives that describe their relations during the entire post–Cold War era.3 The Russian narrative is characterized by a combination of grievance and resolve. Prominent Russians frequently claim that Western powers took advantage of Moscow’s weakness after the Cold War to shift NATO borders east and bomb Russia’s allies in the Balkans.4 Western support for Ukraine’s European Union association agreement, Western sanctions against Russia, and Western demonstrations of military support for allies on Russia’s borders (military exercises, supplies of arms) appear to reinforce this narrative of Russia as victim of Western bullying. Prominent Russian officials thus argue that they face no choice but to demonstrate resolve lest they invite further Western aggression against their most vital national interests.5 The Western narrative is starkly different. The United States and its NATO allies view Russia as a revanchist power aggressively attempting to reclaim influence and territory in neighboring countries that desire a break from their Soviet legacies.6 Western officials chastise Russia for employing tactics such as hybrid warfare, manipulation of gas exports, and other forms of economic and military intimidation to achieve its political aims.7 They argue that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine represent a major break with the post-war order in Europe, an order that has prioritized respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.8 Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and the potential for Russian intervention in the Baltic States necessitate demonstrations of resolve lest the West invite further Russian aggression.9 These competing, irreconcilable narratives breed heightened threat perceptions, driving a vicious cycle of confrontation and escalation. By themselves, these threat perceptions would not necessarily lead to nuclear use, but—combined with the factors described below—they create dangerous conditions under which misunderstandings could escalate to unprecedented levels of confrontation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. 2. A Deficit of Trust Russians and Americans have returned to Cold War-era levels of antagonism toward one another. According to a recent Gallup poll, Americans now view Russia as the greatest enemy to the United States, edging out both North Korea and Iran.10 The same poll showed that 49 percent of Americans view Russia as a critical military threat, and only 24 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Russia. By contrast, 62 percent of Americans held a favorable view of the Soviet Union in 1989 (see Figure 1).11 [ FIGURE 1 OMITTED – Figure 1. Americans’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of Russia ] In Russia, the trust deficit is even worse. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian public opinion research organization, only 15 percent of Russians have a favorable view of the United States and 73 percent of Russians hold an unfavorable view, a figure that nearly doubled in the last year (see Figure 2).12 Another poll released in late June found that 62 percent of Russians believe that Russia’s relations with the West will always be characterized by mistrust.13 [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED – Figure 2. Russians’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of the United States ] 3. Domestic Political Imperatives With such deep antagonism permeating public opinion, it becomes highly improbable for elected officials to support conciliatory measures. Instead, policy hawks who advocate resolve and confrontation tend to prevail in such environments. This is especially true in Russia where President Vladimir Putin brandishes a public image as Russia’s best guardian against Western bullying. Indeed, President Putin’s domestic approval ratings have never been higher. In June, a Levada Center poll revealed that 89 percent of Russians hold a favorable opinion of their President—Putin’s highest approval rating since he succeeded Boris Yeltsin 15 years ago.14 Considering that Russia’s economy continues to reel from the combination of low oil prices, Western sanctions, and structural economic problems, Putin’s high public approval rating indicates that the Russian people strongly support his handling of the Ukrainian crisis and his relations with the West. Any departure from the current course would almost certainly come with a heavy political price for Putin. In the United States, although anti-Russian rhetoric is much less prevalent, many public officials and political candidates also have voiced positions favoring resolve over restraint. For example, General Joseph Dunford, the Obama Administration’s nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 2015 told a Congressional committee that Russia poses the number one threat to the United States and that he favors sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. The Islamic State, by contrast, was fourth on his list of security threats facing the United States.15 In August, the outgoing U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno echoed General Dunford’s comments by labeling Russia “the most dangerous threat” facing the United States today.16 As the 2016 U.S. presidential election approaches, it is also unlikely that political candidates will depart significantly from this anti-Russia rhetoric given how closely it aligns with record-high public antagonism toward Russia. Such domestic political imperatives—from public opinion to political posturing—in Russia and the United States create strong incentives for demonstrations of resolve, diminishing the chances of a resolution to the current standoff and leading to a high risk of a continued cycle of confrontation and escalation. 4. Alliance Politics Alliance politics also contributes to the rhetoric of resolve and confrontation. NATO’s Eastern European and Baltic members increasingly view Russia as a major threat and voice concerns that NATO is ill-prepared to fulfill its Article 5 obligation for collective defense.17 Meanwhile, recent public opinion polls show that most Germans, Italians, and French believe that their countries should not use military force to defend a NATO ally (see Figure 3).18 In this context, NATO publics increasingly view the United States as the only credible military opposition to potential Russian aggression against the Alliance (see Figure 4).19 The Obama Administration is thus faced with both political and policy imperatives to demonstrate readiness to [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED – Figure 3. Many NATO Countries Reluctant to Use Force to Defend Allies ] [ FIGURE 4 OMITTED – Figure 4. NATO Countries Believe U.S. Will Come to Defense of Allies ] fulfill its Article 5 commitments, creating a situation that is not conducive to promoting a conciliatory tone in relations with Russia. This, in turn, exacerbates the risk of further demonstrations of resolve and increases the chance of miscalculation. 5. Close Military Encounters With increasing frequency and alarming regularity, Russian warplanes and warships are coming dangerously close to Western military and civilian assets, creating heightened risks for accidents that could lead to further escalation. As described in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, these close encounters include two near-collisions between Russian military jets and Swedish commercial airliners, repeated incidents of Russian fighter jets “buzzing” U.S. warships in the Black Sea, and incursions and near-incursions by Russian military aircraft into NATO airspace during the last 18 months.20 Russia has insisted that NATO also has engaged in such behavior, arguing that NATO military exercises close to Russian borders have “destabilizing” effects on the region.21 In the absence of routine military-to-military communications (a factor described in more detail later in this paper), these close encounters and military exercises create conditions under which dangerous misunderstandings and accidents could happen—accidents with the potential to prompt rapid escalation. 6. Broken Channels of Communication During the past 18 months, institutions designed to promote dialogue between Western powers and Russia have been suspended or rendered powerless. In March 2014, Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8) was revoked and its participation in G8-linked processes, such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, suspended.22 In April 2014, Russia’s representation at the NATO-Russia Council—the mechanism designed to foster security-related consultation and consensus building—was limited to the Ambassador-level, practically stripping it of any meaningful working-level interactions.23 Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the Nuclear Security Summit process24 and suspended most of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States.25 Military-to-military engagement on EuroAtlantic issues between NATO and Russia, as well as the United States and Russia, has—for all practical purposes—been terminated. Security confidence-building engagement only continues in the context of arms control verification, an area that has also come under considerable strain as Western powers and Russia accuse each other of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violations.26 Such severe curtailment of communications creates little room for confidence-building and increases the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.